Changing Security Paradigms in Romania and South Africa after the Cold War
CHANGING SECURITY PARADIGMS IN ROMANIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE COLD WAR
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FORWARD

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This Occasional Paper brings together contributions of some of the members of the grant “Society and changing paradigms of national and regional security: Romania and South Africa, a comparative analysis”, a bilateral project between Romania and South Africa. The topics are far from being homogenous, in fact each of the representatives of the two countries selected a subject that he considered as representative for the national security agenda. This is the reason we did not select a title for the book. According to decisions taken at the beginning of the work, within this grant, each of the participating institutions, the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History from Bucharest and the Centre for Military Studies at the Stellenbosch University should publish a monograph and an occasional paper.

The idea of launching this bilateral research project in the field of security and strategic studies, between Romania and South Africa, emerged on the occasion of the International Congress of Military History, taking place in Trieste (Italy), in the summer of 2008. The director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History from Romania (IPSDMH/ISPAIM), major general (r) Mihail E. Ionescu and major general (r) Mollo, president of the South African Commission on Military History, took the decision to propose a com-
mon research project dedicated to the study of national and regional security from the South African and Romanian points of view, with a special emphasis on the post-Cold War era.

The main reason behind this decision was the fact that both countries and societies had entered after the end of the Cold War in a process of societal transition – Romania turned into a democratic regime, leaving behind the totalitarian political and economic system, and South Africa from apartheid regime to a democratic one – and this has entailed also the security field. Or a comparison in this field between the two ways of solving the issues, in spite of the huge distance between the two countries, could draw significant conclusions including „lessons learned” to be used in similar processes.

Following these exploratory debate, there were some rounds of bilateral dialogue and eventually each of the two institutions signed a contract with the Ministry of Education of its country. The IPSDMH and the National Authority for Scientific Research (ANCS) signed a financing contract for executing projects in 2008 and also convened an Action Plan.

The Romanian side has in view to better comprehend the features of the social, political and security environment in South Africa and the neighboring area in the context of rising in economic and political importance of the African continent and how security solutions were combined with different social issues raised by the transition period. Also, it was a necessity for Romania, as an EU member, to take part in the regional policy conceived by EU for Sub-Saharan Africa and to increase the visibility of Romania in this part of the world. The other goal is to explain and disseminate Romania’s Armed Forces’ role in enhancing the foreign policy visibility and credibility of the country. But may be the most important goal is that Romanian researchers from IPSDMH acquire expertise on Africa, a continent which unfor-
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Unfortunately is insufficiently known and studied by the academic and the strategic thinkers from Romania.

The research grant is taking place between 2009-2011 and the outcome will be workshops, conferences and scientifical trips in South Africa, also the publishing of some occasional papers and monographic studies.

The Romanian side is involved with five researchers from the IPS-DMH: major general (r) Mihail E. Ionescu (co-director of the project), colonel Petre Otu, Carmen Râjmoveanu (senior researcher), dl Şerban Cioculescu (senior researcher) and Peter Vlad Szasz (junior researcher).

So, why Romania and South Africa? Firstly, because there is a relation based on friendship and cooperation between the leadership of the Romanian Commission of Military History and the South-African Commission of Military History. And, as we have already mentioned, the experience of the post-communist transition to democracy in our country has some points of similitude with the transition from the Apartheid to pluralistic democracy in the African partner-country.

Thirdly and no less important, the major strategic interest of the South-Africans, especially of the military decision-making structures, goes to the Greater Indian Ocean, which is a huge geopolitical area bordering Eurasia, that is the Greater Middle East and, at a regional level, the Wider Black Sea Area.

According to well-known contemporary strategic thinker Robert Kaplan, the Greater Indian Ocean, which is the “center-stage for the 21st century”, “encompasses the entire arc of Islam, from the Sahara Desert to the Indonesian archipelago”, thus being a quasi-synonym for the already classic Greater Middle East (or more accurately, the maritime room surrounding the Greater Middle East’s terrestrial mass), a geopolitical decoupage invented after the Cold War by American
strategists. In his recent book, *Monsoon*, Kaplan defined the region more precisely - “eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond.”

Of course, South-African military and civilian experts in regional security do not go as far as Kaplan, but it is natural that they give the Indian Ocean the necessary attention, in the context of an increasing competition among the world power poles for security and wealth. Certainly, South Africa has been and still is a regional power, dominating the sub-regional security complex which it’s belonging to. In fact, it is the most developed and rich African country, taking into account the huge natural resources and the human capital. Some specialists already are proposing that South Africa should enter in BRIC, either replacing Russia or extending the acronym. In fact, strategists in Pretoria already speak about BRICS. No country can escape geography, and South Africa is a good example. Situated at the junction of two oceans – the Atlantic and the Indian ones – it is absolutely normal that its decision-makers conceive the long-run security of their country being fulfilled especially by the projection of the maritime power far from the national borders. Even if the future competition for this new centre of gravity will be mainly among US, People’s Republic of China and India ( and EU as a main player too ), it is possible for South Africa to play a significant role there: one of the players of power games, balancer etc. Of course, there is much more than naval security, as Pretoria is actively involved in peace-keeping missions in failed or weak states all around Africa.

On the other hand, Romania, according to its geographic location, territorial and demographic size, is one of the major players in Cent-
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tral-Eastern Europe, a border-state for EU and NATO and a provider of security for the trans-Atlantic world in the Eastern and South-Eastern areas. The Wider Black Sea Area is considered as being vital for Romania’s national security but also for the future of EU and NATO as collective actors representing the West. In order to be able to cope with the new risks and threats arising at the regional and global levels, Romania needs performant and modern armed forces – a process still continuing even after the NATO membership in 2004 -, able to be deployed in all kind of missions: territorial defense, security and stabilization operations, collective security operations under UN, NATO and EU etc. But, also very important, Romania needs a good pool of expertise in security studies and international relations, because having only the material element of the security policy (armed forces, state agencies etc.) is not enough. A good security strategy, a valid defense concept are absolutely compulsory for any modern state willing to survive and to develop in the new century.

And there is also another aspect of the joint work developed under this grant regarding Romania. As a EU medium-size power, Romania is also interested in acquiring expertise about „The Great Indian Ocean”, the new axis of the 21st century of competition within the international system. It is not only about competition, but also about cooperation along this new axis, knowing that a huge part of resources and goods are passing along the routes.

Professor Thean Potgieter, from the Centre for Military Studies at the Stellenbosch University presents an analysis of the maritime security within the wider Indian Ocean, focusing on the role played by the “new byg players” such as India and China, and on the strategic partnerships and alliances which are built in this area. As the author warns us “maritime security is a broad, somewhat amorphous focus area, and the maritime security literature covers everything from physical safety
and security measures to port security, terrorism and much more.” He mentions that the region includes no less than 51 coastal states: “26 Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) states, five Red Sea states, four Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, France, Britain and 13 landlocked states.” The main issues discussed are regional conflicts (“42% of the conflicts in the world can be associated with Indian Ocean countries”) for territories and identity building, competition for energy resources. The risks and threats affecting Indian maritime security: intense arms build up, rise of assertive new powers like India, extra-regional naval presence, the need to protect the energy corridors and sea lanes of communication, to fight piracy, terrorism, organized crime. Environmental security is also an important point of the analysis, as pollution is increasing and “sea temperatures in the Indian Ocean are rising at a faster rate than elsewhere”, the illegal fishing is more and more present. The increasing role of non-state actors is underlined, especially when speaking about piracy, organized crime, smuggling and terrorism. Then, the author lists the main regional, sub-regional and multinational cooperation frameworks in the Indian Ocean area: Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Indian Ocean Commission (COI), The Arab League), The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) etc. The logical conclusion is that “it is important that African states improve their maritime security and participate as equal partners in the Indian Ocean security debate” and the most effective way is through regional and sub-regional cooperation structures.

Another researcher from the Centre for Military Studies at the Stellenbosch University, dr. Ian Liebenberg, delivers a paper named “From racialism to authoritarianism: South Africa, militarized politics and the implosion of state legitimacy under apartheid”. He explains racialism in South Africa as an inheritance of the colonialism and the apartheid regime, and underlines the strategy of the white elite who
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held power for a long time by discriminating the black and colored majority. Because of the “militarization” process, South Africa became a “garrison state, a bunker state or a praetorian state.” The nefarious effect has been the violent behaviour of the state authorities against the black majority and the tendency to interfere in the affairs of some neighbouring states. When the National Party won the elections in 1948, its leaders worked hard to ensure the white supremacy and used the context of Cold War within the bipolar international system to justify their repressive policies and the militaristic adventures in foreign countries. In order to block the black people’s aspiration for freedom, the apartheid regime drafted a “total national strategy”. The white leaders offered a limited suffrage to coloured and Indians, not to the black people. The racial classification of the population and the mapping of the country in areas allowed or not allowed to black people intensified the repression mechanisms of the apartheid regime. The author also describes the military service in South Africa, from an all volunteer force to a more professionalized one. But the compulsory military service became unpopular in the last decade of the apartheid regime. In the end, the popular revolt of black people, the assertiveness of the labour organizations, the erosion of the regime’s cohesion contributed to the decision of the white leadership to allow the black majority to take part in universal and free elections. As a conclusion and lesson for the future, the author thinks that “for a democracy to last, civil society has to ensure that the military remains under civil control and tendencies towards influencing politics are kept in check. Civil society also has to relentlessly check the politicians who develop an obsession with state security rather than development, protection of human rights, public service delivery without corruption and equality of all citizens whatever their religion, race or class. Civil society should be alert to, and remonstrate against military appointments of senior staff simply because of their political linkages with ruling parties.”
Carmen Rînoveanu, senior researcher within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History from Bucharest, examines the “Romanian participation in post conflict/reconstruction missions/operations after the end of the Cold War”. She mentions first that during the communist regime, Romania did not participate in multi-national operations as the national security concept was focused exclusively on defending the national territory against foreign threats. The military doctrine called “the War of the Entire People”, envisaged a defensive war fought on Romanian territory against a more powerful aggressor – be it the Soviet Union (an aggressive and untrustful “brother state”) or the USA/NATO forces. The end of Cold War greatly transformed the world security landscape and made interstate wars less likely while intra-state conflicts (civil wars, identity conflicts) became the dominant pattern. As Romania strived to integrate both NATO and the EU, a shift from territorial defense to projecting security in remote areas occurred. Thus, as part of its new pro-Atlanticist security vision, Romania has assumed an active participation in various international peacekeeping and peace-support operations. From a legal point of view, after the entering into force of the law no. 42/2004 it became clear that the consent of Parliament was no longer necessary for the deployment of troops in international missions as it was agreed that the international treaties to which Romania was a party made provision for troop deployments directly applicable. According to Romania’s National Security Strategy the armed forces should be professional, modern, effective, highly flexible and deployable, able not only to defend the national territory but to fulfill their commitments to collective defence, and to take part in international operations, in keeping with the priorities and requirements of Romania’s foreign policy. After listing and explaining in detail the multi-national peace-support operation in which Romanian Armed Forces were or
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are still involved – under UN, NATO, EU leading or in a coalition of the willing framework – the author concludes that Romania is very active in projecting peace and security in the neighborhood but also in remote theaters like the Middle East and Central/Southern Asia.

Şerban F. Cioculescu, senior researcher within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History from Bucharest, is the author of the study titled “The evolution of civil-military relations in Romania after the Cold War”. First, he passes through the western-centric theory of civil-military relations, investigating the evolving patterns of interaction between the officer corps and the society during modern European history. Then, he goes to post-communist Romania and underlines the fact that the old security concept of tous azimuts defense was abandoned as Romania began its push for NATO and EU integration. The fate of the armed forces was controversial for a time, first because its repressive role in the early stages of the 1989 Revolution, then because reformers and conservatives clashed within the officers corps in the first years of freedom. The collapse of the communist regime has been a crucial event for the historic fate of Romania, because it put an end to the geopolitical dependence on the Soviet sphere of influence and reshaped the general framework of the national security paradigm. The first step in the way of ensuring a full civilian control on the armed forces was made in 1994, when for the first time a civilian was appointed as minister of National Defense. Then, the criteria for NATO membership stipulated by the Membership Action Plan (MAP) since 1999, greatly eased Romania’s strive for ensuring civilian democratic control of the armed forces. The best guarantee of a full and fair civilian control on the armed forces is to have powerful, legitimate and effective civilian political institutions and highly professional military which keep their distance with the political arena but do not lack civic spirit.
While this book draft was ready to be sent to the editor, between 15 and 19 May 2011, a delegation of Romanian researchers from the IPSDMH (major general (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, colonel (r) Petre Otu and senior researcher Serban F. Cioculescu) went in South Africa in a planned trip, in order to discuss the practical steps to move forward the bilateral research program.

Thanks to the good will of our South African partners, we had the great opportunity to visit Denel Aviation corporation, the biggest producer of military planes and equipment in South Africa. We saw the performant Oryx PSS, Rooivalk and Cheetah helicopters, the Hawk, Mirage and Gripen jets and we were briefed about the partnership among Denel and famous French company Mirage and Swedish Gripen. They successfully produce military helicopters and jets for states like Brasil and Ecuador. We also visited the PALAMA (Academy for Management and Public Administration Leadership) in Pretoria, the main state institution preparing public servants for all the ministries and state agencies. General Solly Molo is a very ambitious and gifted leader for PALAMA, and as a former Army general he brought discipline and rigor in this field. Others visit and meetings were with the leading staff of the Faculty of Military Science within Stellenbosch University (but located on the Atlantic Ocean shore at Saldanha) – general L. Yam (commander of the Military Academy) and the vice-dean, mrs. Edna Van Harte, the vice-rector of Stellenbosch, mr. Arnold van Zyl – with which we discussed the need to enhance our bilateral scientific relations, and also we met with the chief of the Department for Military Veterans in Pretoria, mr. Tsepe Motumi. All of them, beginning with the leading academic person of the South African side, professor Thean Potgieter, were very open-minded, friendly and en-
couraged further cooperation and exchange of researchers between Romania and South Africa. Thus, we think that this Occasional Paper should also be read in the context of these meaningful events.
ABSTRACT

Indian Ocean security is no longer only the domain of colonial states or superpowers, but has become multifaceted and dynamic. New role players such as India and China have become major powers, while new alliances are constantly being forged. On the other hand current global realities have introduced greater maritime security problems and have made it possible for non-state actors to influence Indian Ocean security directly and fundamentally. This is especially serious as the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade is crucial to the global economy because it involves the transportation of much of the world’s energy. Now, it seems that many of the lessons of centuries gone by are again being learned – instead of fighting, navies have to adapt, project power, play a diplomatic role and maintain good order at sea.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, security, strategy, great powers, piracy

For millennia those living around the Indian Ocean have benefited from its rich trade, while the interaction maritime communication made possible invariably influenced their lives fundamentally. This interaction included everything from cultural and religious influences to conquest and slavery. The traditional patterns of trade and communication that existed around the Indian Ocean changed drastically after
the Portuguese, followed by other European powers, sailed around the Cape of Good Hope to establish trade links and Eastern empires.

Initially Africa was little affected by this change, as the European focus was on the rich trade with the East. As ships had to sail around the large African continent, its most important value was to provide refuge and provisions along the long and often dangerous route. European naval power made an early entrance into the Indian Ocean as formidable warships eradicated local opposition and projected European maritime power to the furthest corners of the Indian Ocean. European naval forces were crucial for the creation of Eastern empires and the elimination of other European opposition. Through a process that lasted centuries, and because of their effective utilization of sea power, the British created a large Indian Ocean empire. During the course of the nineteenth century European navies also played an important role in maintaining good order at sea, eradicating piracy, and fighting slavery.

The decolonization process after the Second World War ended British hegemony in the Indian Ocean. The Cold War was marked by superpower rivalry in the region, which enhanced its global strategic value. After the end of the Cold War, Indian Ocean countries to a certain extent rediscovered some of the economic, social and cultural facets that made the ocean the bridge between Africa, Asia and Australasia. However, regional interaction and cohesion still leaves much to be desired.

Indian Ocean security is no longer only the domain of colonial states or superpowers, but has become multifaceted and dynamic. New role players such as India and China have become major powers, while new alliances are constantly being forged. On the other hand current
global realities have introduced greater maritime security problems and have made it possible for non-state actors to influence Indian Ocean security directly and fundamentally. This is especially serious as the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade is crucial to the global economy because it involves the transportation of much of the world’s energy. Now, it seems that many of the lessons of centuries gone by are again being learned – instead of fighting, navies have to adapt, project power, play a diplomatic role and maintain good order at sea.

Maritime security is a broad, somewhat amorphous focus area, and the maritime security literature covers everything from physical safety and security measures to port security, terrorism and much more. A coherent definition is therefore difficult to articulate, but for the purpose of this article, maritime security is concerned with preventing illicit activities in the maritime domain. It could be directly linked to a specific country and its national security efforts, or include regional and international efforts to enforce maritime security.

This paper is concerned with maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The discussion will centre on the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the relevant maritime security characteristics and threats. Brief attention will finally fall on possible solutions as well as the importance of international and regional cooperation.

**INDIAN OCEAN: STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND EMINENCE**

The Indian Ocean is vast. Its western border is continental Africa to a longitude of 20° E (stretching south from Cape Agulhas), to the north is continental Asia (from Suez to the Malay Peninsula), to the east are South-East Asia and Australia (Singapore, the Indonesian Archipelago,
Australia and Tasmania) to a longitude of 147° E, while in the south it stretches to a latitude of 60° S (as per the Antarctic Treaty of 1959).

Various criteria could be used in designating states as Indian Ocean region. In this paper the term will apply to 51 coastal and landlocked states: 26 Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) states, five Red Sea states, four Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, France, Britain and 13 landlocked states. Many of these states are former colonies. The landlocked states included are dependent upon the Indian Ocean for trade and communications and with the exception of Afghanistan, the landlocked states exclude the Central Asian states. This delimitation covers an area of 101.6 million sq km (the sea area is 68.56 sq km and the land area is 33.05 sq km). With a total population of 2.6 billion, it represents 39% of the global population, representing a vast and diverse political, cultural and economic kaleidoscope.¹

The Indian Ocean is an area of conflicts. Some conflicts are internal and remain local, but other local and regional conflicts are of global significance and are prone to foreign political and military interference. According to a recent analysis of global conflicts by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, altogether 42% of the conflicts in the world can be associated with Indian Ocean countries.² The list is extensive, but notable conflicts are Israel and Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Though the causes of these conflicts vary, many can be associated with the weakness or failure of states, significant levels of poverty, poor institutions and lack of democracy, corruption, competition for scarce resources, interference by a foreign power, the global war on terror and what can be termed “turbulence” in the Islamic world. The urgent need for sustainable development (both human and economic) and improved security cooperation within Indian Ocean is therefore obvious.
The Indian Ocean is rich in energy resources and minerals (including gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium) and also contains abundant fishing grounds. The oil and gas moving through the Indian Ocean on a daily basis are very important to the global economy. Though figures vary, they could be summarised as follows: roughly 55% of the known oil reserves and 40% of the gas reserves are present in the Indian Ocean. The Gulf and Arab states produce around 21% of the world's oil, with daily crude exports of up to 17.262 million barrels (about 43% of international exports).

From a shipping point of view, Indian Ocean ports handle about 30% of the global trade, while half of the world's container traffic traverses it. However, the Indian Ocean possesses some of the world's most important choke points, notably the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca as well as the Bab el Mandeb. As these choke points are strategically important for global trade and energy flow, a number of extra-regional states maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Besides the vast strategic importance of the oil rich countries to the world, sub-Saharan Africa was strategically not a high international priority. However, as the competition for scarce resources intensifies, with specifically China and India becoming major role players on the African continent, major Western powers are becoming increasingly interested in this region.

In short, international interest in the whole Indian Ocean region is growing. This is due to security concerns about the instability that characterizes and destabilizes the region, the vital role oil production and the movement of energy shipments plays, the vast resources and raw materials Indian Ocean states possess, the involvement of extra-regional powers in a number of conflicts in the region as well as the
Growing interest of major powers in the Indian Ocean region and their ability to project power into the region.

**Indian Ocean Maritime Security: Characteristics and Threats**

During the Cold War the newly independent Indian Ocean states in Asia and Africa became subject to the competition between the superpowers, which guaranteed a specific security balance in the region. This disappeared as the Cold War ended, but the post Cold War era transpired to be less stable with much rivalry, competition, suspicion and turmoil.

Moreover, after the Cold War world order ended the maritime security environment in the Indian Ocean also underwent transformation. As a result of weak government authority and poor maritime domain awareness, all types of illicit activities flourished in many parts of the Indian Ocean. Maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean are vast and are affected by key variables such as the militarization of the region, the interest and involvement of major and extra-regional powers and non-traditional security threats.

**Military Aspects**

As maritime security is concerned with security in the maritime domain, it is understandable that much recent international attention has focussed on the ability of state, regional and multinational role players in Indian Ocean maritime security. In analysing the complex Indian Ocean maritime security system, Don Berlin identified a number of principle trends. First, the efforts by the United States and to some degree its international partners (referred to as India, Australia, Singapore, Japan, France and Canada) to maintain and expand their
authority in the Indian Ocean and achieve key strategic objectives. These include efforts to hinder or limit the power and influence of other continental countries (perhaps states such as China, Iran or Russia), protect their secure access to energy sources and counter terrorism as well as other security threats. Second are the endeavours of countries such as China and perhaps even Iran, Pakistan and to some extent Russia, to strengthen their position in the Indian Ocean and increase their ability to counter potential threats the US-aligned states might pose. Third are the littoral Indian Ocean states that are mainly concerned with their national or regional maritime security in relation to specific rivals within their own sub-regions. The many conflicting maritime boundary disputes and conflicting jurisdictional claims in the Indian Ocean bear testimony to this. Finally are the efforts by IOR states to manage the large variety of transnational and non-traditional threats they face, threats such as environmental challenges, fishing infringements, smuggling and trafficking, piracy as well as the security of offshore installations.4

As the Indian Ocean is an area of much geostrategic rivalry between the big powers, much militarization has taken place and in 2008 two of the top military spenders in the world, Saudi Arabia and India, were IOR countries. The armed forces of five states in the Indian Ocean region number more than 4.000 000 (India (1 200 000), Pakistan (610 000), Iran (440 000), Burma (439 000) and Egypt (423 000)) and the military expenditure of ten states is above 3% of GDP (Oman (10.7%), Saudi Arabia (9.3%), Burundi (4.9%), Sudan (4.4%), Singapore (4.1%), Djibouti (4.1%), Kuwait (3.9%), Brunei (3.6%), Bahrain (3.4%) and Pakistan (3.1%)).5 However, though military observers will be quick to point out that the size of an armed force is not necessarily an indication of an efficient, highly competent and well equipped armed force, many Indian Ocean states are certainly placing much emphasis on their military preparedness.
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After the end of the Cold War, the US strategic umbrella in the Indian Ocean widened and, besides its Indian Ocean island base on Diego Garcia, the US Navy also used bases in littoral states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. As a result of the US anti-terrorism campaign that followed in the wake of 9/11 the whole Indian Ocean region came under US military surveillance, and the US Navy was able to translate its commanding position at sea into military interventions. With the assistance of US coalition powers, both extra-regional as well as Indian Ocean states, it became possible to consolidate a naval grip on the entire region.6 In fact, the employment of highly advanced naval forces such as carrier battle groups with their various surveillance, support and logistical capabilities, made the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan possible. This invasion was essentially a maritime war, as it was dependent on the long maritime reach of the USA.

The Indian Navy is undergoing substantial expansion as it has 40 ships and submarines (including two nuclear submarines and two aircraft carriers) on order. Its target is to have a 165 ship fleet by 2022, consisting of surface combatants, submarines and three aircraft carrier groups with 400 aircraft and helicopters. Certainly, as some Indian observers are keen to point out, by 2012 with two aircraft carriers (equipped with MiG-29Ks) in operation, “the balance of power in the Indian Ocean will tilt decisively in India’s favour”.7 Yet, it is emphasized that India seeks cooperation with Indian Ocean states and will aim at improving stability in the Indian Ocean region.

Maritime security in the Indian Ocean is characterised by considerable extra-regional naval presence. Though the focus of these states is obviously trade and energy security, many countries are providing assistance to the maritime security forces of IOR states. Furthermore,
the scourge of piracy and non-traditional maritime threats has led to multilateral exercises and much maritime security interaction between IOR states and extra-regional powers.

With the possible exception of the states mentioned in Berlin’s first two categories (above), many IOR states, specifically in Africa, lack the resources and budgets necessary to properly enforce their maritime sovereignty. In many cases their navies or coast guards could hardly even be regarded as “token navies”. The dilemma is that sovereignty must be exercised to be recognized, which causes a “double jeopardy” – since it is not possible to effectively police and control the maritime domain and maritime domain awareness is very low, it is possible for illicit activities of all types to flourish. It prevents these countries from properly exploiting their own ocean’s resources and benefit fully from the potential revenue they might bring. Due to the turbulence in much of the Indian Ocean region, ensuring good order at sea poses a daunting challenge to the maritime security forces available. Many coastal navies are therefore focusing more on policing roles and the security of littorals.

According to an Africa Union Protocol signed in 2003, an Africa Standby Force (ASF) consisting of five regional brigades must be created and be operational by the end of 2010. The idea is that the ASF would only be utilized as a last resort if diplomacy has failed. The deployment would then take the form of a peace mission, focusing on military and civil support, post conflict disarmament, demobilization of the combatants and humanitarian assistance.

Due to the militarization that has occurred in and around the Indian Ocean, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increased missile capabilities, rise in non-traditional threats as well as the
fact that the Indian Ocean is used for the power projection of foreign militaries, the area has not become more peaceful. Instead, the Indian Ocean can be regarded as the most troubled region in the world. Considerable scope therefore exists for greater regional security cooperation and efforts to enhance regional peace and stability.

**Strategic importance of sea lanes of communication**

The security of shipping and sea lanes of communication (SLOs) across the Indian Ocean is a major strategic concern. It is firstly important to the national economies of Indian Ocean countries (specifically to industrial and commercial sectors) as imports and exports provide the main link to global markets. The Indian Ocean is furthermore a transit route between the Pacific region and Europe and Africa which implies that vast cargoes pass through it. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean is the world’s most important energy highway as substantial oil and gas shipments traverse it on a daily basis.

Many extra-regional forces operate in the region. This is due the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and the fact that the free flow of traffic can easily be interfered with at the Indian Ocean choke points – keeping its SLOCs open is therefore vital to the global economy. Furthermore, the volatile security situation and the tension in the Gulf region have stimulated foreign military intervention in conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan being recent examples), while piracy, the asymmetrical threat and the flow of vital energy resources have also caused much anxiety and the deployment of many navies.

Oil and gas are central to the growth and development of contemporary civilisation. Since the First World War oil has become the most strategic resource in conducting wars, while after the Second World War, the USA seems to have placed much emphasis on securing, or if
possible controlling, the Persian Gulf oil resources. Access to energy and energy security is increasingly important as there are many energy dependent states in the Indian Ocean, oil is crucial for sustaining industrial and economic progress and the energy demands of India and China are growing.

To India, energy security is at the core of its foreign policy approach and it has apparently adopted a long-term strategy to procure and expand energy resources to support its growing economy. Obtaining energy resources from all over the world is a high priority, while the security of ships carrying oil and gas, as well as offshore platforms, must be ensured. This places quite a demand on the Indian Navy and it is very aware of its peacetime responsibility to safeguard SLOC, coastal zones, installations and shipping. Much emphasis is also placed on the cooperation between the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, maritime police and other agencies. Economically India encourages domestic and international cooperation with foreign energy companies. It accepts that the energy drive and growing maritime threats posed by non-state actors increase the security responsibilities of the Indian Navy.

The evidential growing competition between China and India is also visible in the Indian Ocean, and some IOR countries have expressed concern about the increasing Chinese presence in the region. It seems that the flow of energy and trade is China’s first concern, but increased competition with China would certainly hold implications for Indian Ocean countries like India, and others whose economic strength are on the increase. China is exerting increasingly more political and economic influence over Africa as it invests billions in oil, mining, transport, electricity, telecommunication and infrastructure. In return it is securing access to sources of energy and raw materials crucial to
the development and growth of the Chinese economy. Some consider China’s efforts to secure energy resources and the companies managing them as the beginning of a new era that will focus on the “geopolitics of energy”, which would impact on development, imply competition and involve conflict. In fact, it could be termed as a “power struggle” for energy, which has the potential to become a defining characteristic of this century.11

Indian observers often emphasize China’s efforts to use military assistance, combined with economic and soft power, to gain influence in the region. China is certainly expanding its maritime power and recent naval building projects also include an aircraft carrier. Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean are causing India considerable concern and its military and political relationship with India’s neighbours is even at times referred to as a process of strategic encirclement. By participating in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, China has demonstrated its capability of sustaining out-of-area operations. Naval vessels from Japan and the Republic of Korea were also deployed to the Horn of Africa and it may seem that their presence was both a counter to China as well as an effort to protect their shipping.12 Divergent views certainly exist on the implications of Chinese naval expansion and its impact in the Indian Ocean. The question that must probably be asked is if capabilities denote intent? Not necessarily, but intent can develop quickly.

As so much of the shipped energy supplies of the world navigate the Indian Ocean, it is obvious that the region’s security problems, both ashore and at sea, are often the cause of international concern. As major states are keen to protect their supplies, naval power is increasingly being used for the purposes of energy security and minimizing threats to SLOCs.
**Maritime piracy**

Maritime piracy, which in this discussion includes hijackings for ransom, robbery and criminal violence, is very prevalent in and around the Indian Ocean. Though piracy incidents seem to have decreased in the wider Indian Ocean since 2003, the 2009 statistics of the International Maritime Bureau indicate that of the 406 reported pirate attacks during 2009, 294 were in or adjacent to the Indian Ocean (See table 1). The large number of pirate attacks and hijackings off the Horn of Africa (specifically around Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden) are of much public concern, often make international headlines and have caused considerable international reaction. A notable success in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean has occurred in the Malacca Straits, where attacks have dropped significantly because of aggressive patrols by the littoral states and interstate maritime cooperation.

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## Changing Security Paradigms in Romania and South Africa after the Cold War

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## Rest of the Indian Ocean

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<td>166</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>200</td>
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* The attacks in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and Oman, are all attributed to Somali pirates.
Statistics vary and some statistics indicate that as many as 166 attacks in various geographic locations could be ascribed to Somali pirates.

Attacks in South East Asia and around the Indian subcontinent usually occur at anchorages or in approaches. As these attacks are often conducted by thieves armed with handguns, knives or machetes, many attacks are unreported. Somalia is different – the pirates are well armed and use a variety of weapons (including automatic weapons, handguns and rocket-propelled grenades). Attacks take place while
ships are underway, mostly, but not exclusively, in the Gulf of Aden or off the coast of Somalia. Pirates often use mother ships to enable them to conduct operations far from their bases and attacks have also taken place off the coasts of Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles. Ships will be boarded, or pirates will induce ships to slow down by firing at them. If a vessel is boarded and captured, it will be sailed to the Somali coast and the pirates will then demand a ransom for the ship and crew.\(^{16}\)

Piracy and the lack of maritime security around the Horn of Africa cause a great deal of international concern as they not only threaten finance and commerce, but also peace and regional stability, international trade and international energy flows. The pirates often operate from Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland province and specific parts of southern Somalia as government authority is lacking and laws are not enforced. Hijacking ships for ransom is the most common form of piracy as the pirates usually have an economic motive.

Piracy around the Horn of Africa has increased alarmingly since the late 1990s. By 2005 Somalia was a piracy hotspot with 35 recorded attacks and 15 hijackings, while by April 2006 this had risen to 45 attempted and 19 successful hijackings since the beginning of 2005.\(^{17}\) Piracy was declared a crime after the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) seized Mogadishu in the middle of 2006. In an effort to re-establish regular trade they captured pirate centres and ports which resulted in a dramatic decrease in piracy during the latter half of 2006.\(^{18}\) However, after Ethiopian and Somali troops ousted the UIC at the end of 2006, the situation deteriorated rapidly.

During 2007 pirate attacks off Somalia more than doubled and hijackings rose to a high of 31, while 111 reported attacks and 42 successful hijackings were attributed to Somali pirates in 2008 – nearly
40% of the 293 attacks reported internationally. Discrepancies exist between the various sources reporting piracy statistics and some sources even indicate that Somali pirates were involved in as many as 166 attacks in 2008. However, the reporting of the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (ICC IMB) could be regarded as “reliable.” Notwithstanding the international naval presence around the Horn of Africa during 2009, 217 incidents were attributed to the Somali pirates who managed to hijack 47 vessels and took 867 crew members hostage. Somalia accounts for more than half of the 406 international incidents of piracy and armed robbery that were reported during 2009.

Though the number of incidents reported in 2009 is almost double the 2008 figure, the number of successful hijackings was proportionately less. This could be ascribed to a variety of measures, such as greater vigilance and evasive tactics by ships, the contribution of private security companies, controlled sailings as well as the active anti-piracy patrols by the large contingent of international naval vessels. On the other hand this resulted in the pirates changing their approach: ships were more indiscriminately fired at to force them to stop or reduce speed so that they could be boarded, while the pirates also extended their operations to areas where they would be less prone to the scrutiny of naval vessels and out of the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (a well-policing transit route through the Gulf of Aden). Attacks occurred further out to sea (even off the coasts of Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar and Oman), in the southern Red Sea, Bab El Mandeb, or the Arabian Sea.

During 2010 Somali pirates have intensified attacks away from their coast. As a result of the monsoon season, operations with small skiffs are difficult in open waters during the middle six months of the
year and a full picture of the 2010 incidents will only become available in 2011. By the end of the third quarter of 2010 it was estimated that pirates linked to Somalia were responsible for 44% of the 289 global maritime piracy incidents and that they also carried out 35 of the 39 worldwide ship hijackings in this period. 21

Globally, January to September 2010 saw a decrease in the number of pirate attacks compared to 2009 (down from 306 to 289). This is to a large extent attributed to the international naval presence and the ongoing anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, while, due to anti-piracy measures, 70 attacks were thwarted. Despite the decline in the Gulf of Aden, the indications are that piracy in the South China Sea is growing as well as in other parts of the Indian Ocean such as Chittagong in Bangladesh, where thieves specifically target ships at anchor or approaching the anchorage. 22

As open SLOCs across the Indian Ocean are strategically important for international shipping and the flow or energy shipments, much concern exists because of the large number of attacks on energy vessels. The capture of the MV Sirius Star on 15 November 2008 was significant because of the location (450 nautical miles south-east of Kenya) and the fact that it was carrying two million barrels of oil (a quarter of Saudi Arabia’s daily output) worth US$100 million. It was thought that a captured Nigerian tug acted as the pirate mother ship, and though it was the biggest ship hijacked, the fully-loaded ship was low in the water and probably easy to board. 23

Port security

Despite the immense wealth in resources of the Indian Ocean region, economically the region is noted for its insecurity and some states in the region are “aid dependent”. In 2005 the largest recipients of
official development assistance were Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam, while several African states received official development assistance in excess of 40% of the total value of imports.24

As healthy ship-borne trade in the Indian Ocean can contribute much towards the economic development of the region, harbours are crucial, as a safe and well-functioning port infrastructure will facilitate trade and development. However, security is a problem as ports and shipping are attractive targets because of the value of cargoes, the concentration of so much merchandise in one location and challenges linked to ensuring container security. The geographic and physical layout of ports often inhibits security, while ships alongside or anchored with unarmed crews (in the case of merchantmen) are vulnerable targets, an aspect which organized crime as well as those wishing to conduct terror attacks can exploit. Ships can also be high profile targets with a potentially high political and propaganda value. The attack on the USS Cole in Aden has shown that even highly sophisticated warships are significantly threatened by low-tech attacks.

The IOR is endowed with many good, albeit often neglected, ports. Yet these ports pose massive security problems as they are often prone to a large variety of illicit activities and some IOR countries lack efficient customs and excise controls. African countries suffer substantial losses as a result of these problems, as the potential for security breaches exist in almost all aspects of the shipping industry.

Furthermore, the majority of piracy incidents reported in the Indian Ocean region occurred while ships were in anchorages, roadsteads or alongside. These attacks were opportunistic as ships were boarded for theft. For example in 2009 the four actual attacks and one attempted attack in Tanzania took place on anchored ships, the 12 reported
attacks in India were all on ships alongside or at anchor, while Malaysia had 16 reported attacks, of which two occurred on berthed vessels and six on anchored ships. Worldwide 14 ports reported more than three incidents in 2009. Of these the following ports or anchorages were in the Indian Ocean or adjacent to it: Bangladesh (Chittagong with 17 is the highest in the world), India (three incidents each in Kakinada and Kochin), Indonesia (three incidents each in Balongan and Belawan), Malaysia (four incidents in Sandakan) and Tanzania (with five incidents in Dar es Salaam). It must be noted that many incidents in ports and anchorages go unreported as masters and shipping companies are often reluctant to get involved in potentially lengthy and futile prosecution processes.

Environmental and ocean resource security

Insufficient emphasis is placed on environmental security, specifically as the degradation of the environment, climate change, and the over-exploitation of ocean resources are threatening the interests and future of all the countries and peoples in the Indian Ocean region. Sea temperatures in the Indian Ocean are rising at a faster rate than elsewhere, while changing and more severe weather patterns and rising sea levels will probably have adverse effects on natural systems and societies. They will increase the likelihood of flooding with the resultant loss of life and damage to property as recent tsunamis and cyclones have illustrated. This will severely threaten the existence of communities on low-lying islands such as the Maldives. Africa is also likely to be adversely affected by climate change due to the risks it poses in terms of food production and access to fresh water. As close to 40% of the roughly four billion inhabitants of Asia live within 100km of the coast, climate change is likely to adversely affect their quality of living and human security.
The quality of coastal marine systems and ocean water in the Indian Ocean is deteriorating. Much of this is due to land-based pollution (sewage, drainage and discharge) and marine-based pollution (shipping, spilling, ballast water, drilling and mining). Illegal waste dumping is also a serious concern, specifically as little is known of the extent thereof. The water off Somalia has particularly been targeted as it is easy to reach, public awareness is low and influential locals have allowed toxic waste dumping to occur (usually in exchange for foreign currency). After the Asian tsunami, broken hazardous waste containers washed ashore and according to the UN Environmental Programme, Somalia has been a dumping ground for hazardous waste since the early 1990s. It was much cheaper for European companies to dispose of waste there (as low as $2.50 compared to $250 a ton) and specifically organized crime in Italy was linked to this. It is uncertain if illegal waste dumping continues, but a UN report (dated February 2005) warned that it can have serious health implications as the type of waste might include uranium and radioactive waste, leads, heavy metals like cadmium and mercury as well as industrial, hospital and chemical wastes. Due to the scarcity of available information about the extent of such dumping, the exact impact cannot be calculated.

Due to the growth in global prosperity and technological advances, competition for resources in and under the ocean, specifically sources of energy and protein, is intensifying. World energy consumption is growing significantly, particularly the demand from Asia and the Middle East. The fast-growing Indian and Chinese economies are forecasted to be the key world energy consumers in the future. As national efforts to control energy sources and secure energy shipments are increasing, some observers contend that energy competition could imply conflict, while the opposite is that it is rather in the common interest of the powers concerned to maintain a stable trading environment.
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a major international problem as it is estimated that 75% of global fishing stocks are already fully or over-exploited. The culprits are often “seasoned and sophisticated foreign-flagged operators” that decimate offshore resources and also venture into coastal waters where they compete for depleted resources with local subsistence fishermen.\textsuperscript{31} Foreigners are not the only problem as local fishermen often under- or misreport catches, use illegal fishing gear or employ methods such as dynamite or poison fishing because it is more lucrative than traditional methods. As African countries often lack the ability to maintain good order at sea in their own waters they are the worst affected and it causes serious economic losses as well as protein shortages.

Fishing is important to Africa: annual catches are more than seven million tons, the export value is about $2.7 billion (USD), it provides income to roughly 10 million people and it is an important, often cheap, source of animal protein (22\% on average in Africa and in some cases as high as 70\%).\textsuperscript{32} In the SADC, the income generated by fisheries is the highest in South Africa and Namibia, mostly due to the abundant species to be found in the cold waters of the Benguela current. Also, with a contribution of between 5 and 10\% of GDP, fishing is more important as a source of income to Namibia than to any other SADC country (See Table 2).

Tuna fishing is very important in the Western Indian Ocean and catches are more than three times those of the Eastern Indian Ocean. The processed value of catches in the Western Indian Ocean is estimated at between two and three billion Euros per year. The EEZs of all the SADC countries on the IOR overlap with the tuna fishing area and many French and Spanish vessels fish there under negotiated access rights in accordance with agreements between the EU
Although data is from the most recent FAO Fishery Country Profiles, in some cases it is outdated and the specific states. The scale and impact of illegal fishing differs across the region, but in the Southwest Indian Ocean and Southern Oceans sophisticated operators have decimated Patagonian toothfish stocks for more than a decade. This can largely be ascribed to insufficient patrolling. Although regional and international fisheries governance bodies exist, the need to strengthen the capacity of these bodies, enforce measures and enhance cooperation is internationally recognised.

Maritime security is closely linked to illegal fishing activities, not only as it has a serious impact on environmental security, but illegal fishing vessels are often used for trafficking (humans, arms and drugs) and other illicit activities. As large amounts of money could be involved, these operators are sophisticated in lying about catches, falsifying customs declarations, circumventing port control measures and they can even be well armed.
Smuggling and human trafficking

Organized crime, trafficking and smuggling are increasingly tied to global patterns of violence. Illegal drug and arms smuggling are rife in much of the Indian Ocean region. The sea is used by international crime syndicates and unscrupulous traders and non-state actors for distributing their wares, or providing belligerents with highly sophisticated weapons. Due to the prevalence of conflicts and insurgencies, arms smugglers find a ready market in areas such as the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. It is also estimated that as much as 95% of the “hard” drug production occurs in conflict zones. Afghanistan is the source of much heroin and cannabis production, but sources indicate that this might be dropping. Organized crime is also engaged in much of the counterfeit trade, which includes everything from cigarettes to famous brand name fashions and medicine. It is estimated that as much as 50% of all drugs sold in Africa and Asia might be counterfeit pharmaceuticals.35

International migration is an important issue, and it is stimulated by political instability, poverty and the lack of order in many developing countries. Human cargo constantly moves around as the developed world provides more lucrative options to skilled labour. However, more often than not, human trafficking exploits the vulnerable and desperate. According to UN estimates, there are currently more than 12 million people in forced labour, bondage, forced child labour and sexual servitude. Large international networks operate across the Indian Ocean and, after arms and drugs, trafficking in human beings is the best source of income to organized crime. Shockingly, it appears that people are starting to replace drugs as the second largest source of income, as “bodies can be replaced”.36 No countries are immune to it, as countries could either be source countries, transit countries, desti-
nation countries, or all three. These issues require much more serious international attention than they currently receive.

Smugglers can use everything from pleasure boats to small fishing vessels and containers. A major source of concern is container traffic. As more than seven million large and small containers are moving around the world every day, the ability of port and customs officials to check their content is very limited. Recent experience has indicated that containers can be used to smuggle everything from Al Qaeda operatives and armaments, to illegal waste. This certainly affects maritime security and calls for more effective law enforcement and the maintenance of order in the maritime domain.37

The non-state and asymmetrical threat

Recently the number of non-state actors affecting security has grown substantially. It also appears that greater links are being forged between global crime syndicates, insurgents and terrorist groups. Due to weak governments, poor border control and the lack of maritime domain awareness, such groups can often operate unimpeded. Radical Islamist groups influence security in a large part of the IOR. Analysts, for example, suggest that groups linked to or affiliated with Al Qaeda seem to be at least present in Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.38 Though the activities of these groups have mostly occurred ashore, alarming prospects exist within the maritime domain.

Attacks could be launched from the sea or vessels could be used for the purpose of infiltration or gunrunning. The so-called “26/11” terror attack in Mumbai (November 2008) was a seaborne attack. The attackers came by boat and it is also known that the explosive material used for a terror attack in March 1993 was also landed in Mumbai. To India, this highlighted the vulnerability of their coastal access and the
urgent need to upgrade and coordinate coastal and maritime security. The result is that the Indian Navy received overall responsibility for coastal security in coordination with other agencies.\(^{39}\)

The *Achille Lauro* incident in October 1985 (hijacking of an Italian cruise ship by members of the Palestine Liberation Front and the killing of a hostage) indicated that maritime terrorism is a real threat and states need to consider potential responses. The worst such attack at sea occurred in Manila Bay on 27 February 2004 when a bomb, ostensibly planted by Abu Sayyaf, resulted in the burning and destruction the passenger ferry *SuperFerry 14* and the death of 116 people. This was also the worst terror attack in Philippine history.\(^{40}\)

The Gulf of Aden has been the scene of a number of incidents. An Al Qaeda attempt to ram a boat loaded with explosives into the *USS Sullivan* in Yemen failed in January 2000 as the boat sank under the weight of its lethal payload.\(^{41}\) Their next attempt was successful. On 12 October 2000, the *USS Cole*, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, equipped with the Aegis system, was alongside in Aden during a brief refuelling stop. Two men with a small boat packed with explosives rammed the ship. The explosion left a gaping hole of 40 feet in the ship’s side, caused 17 fatalities and an estimated $100 million (USD) of damage. The attack highlighted the existence of a capacity for meticulous planning as well as a trained capability to handle explosives.\(^{42}\) After the attack on the *USS Cole* port security was emphasized, however, after the 9/11 attacks the focus quickly centred on air transport.

Soon after the *USS Cole* attack, on 6 October 2002, the potential danger an asymmetric attack at sea posed was dramatically illustrated when the French super tanker *Limburg* was rammed amidships by an explosive-laden dinghy in the Gulf of Aden, a few miles off Yemen. The ship burned fiercely and much of her cargo spilled into the sea. The oil
price immediately increased, and Yemen lost millions in port revenues as international shipping decreased.\(^4^3\)

Of significance is the fact that vessels, even merchant vessels, can be used as weapons of war and not even warships are exempt from possible harm. Furthermore, it is obvious that a very effective way of disrupting the global economy is by attacking oil supplies, or supply routes. In this respect, shipping around Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is especially vulnerable.

**Outsourcing security**

Non-state actors, such as security companies, are increasingly being used to enhance security in the Indian Ocean region, both on land and offshore. Concern exists, specifically in Africa, as private security is usually insufficiently regulated and no coherent policy framework regarding the import and export of private security is in place. Many foreign security companies operate in Africa and Africans are often recruited to perform security related duties in volatile situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Security companies also assist with reforms in post-conflict situations.\(^4^4\)

The security industry has the potential to have a major impact on security in Africa, if it is not properly controlled and understood. Private security companies are playing an increasingly central role in security and could impact on a state’s capacity to control instruments of violence. As security companies employ large numbers of former soldiers and policemen they possess high levels of skills and knowledge, which could cause vulnerability in the state sector and they may even become a force unto themselves if not properly controlled and regulated.\(^4^5\) Africa must therefore engage security companies carefully and develop frameworks for proper accountability, as security companies
should make an important contribution to enhancing the security of the peoples of Africa, nothing more.

Many private security companies are involved in combating piracy. Their support to the shipping industry includes a large variety of techniques and services, ranging from the training of bridge officers to evasive manoeuvres, physical security measures and security guards. A large variety of non-lethal anti-piracy measures can be used to deter pirates, such as the use of high-tech sonic cannons, electrified handrails, placing extra crew on watch, drenching approaching boats with foam sprayers or high pressure fire hoses, while decks could be sprayed to make them very slippery. Most shipping companies do not arm their ships and crews as many experts, insurers, the IMB and the IMO do not endorse arming merchant vessels, arguing that this could increase the levels of violence.

How effective is private security? It certainly is a deterrent, but often security guards on ships are not armed. Though an armed deterrent would obviously be better, the argument, as stated, is that it could unnecessarily endanger crews. Blackwater, a private security concern, availed a vessel to escort ships through the Gulf of Aden, but by February 2009 it had not been used and shipping companies have instead appealed for more naval support. Security guards have a mixed record regarding piracy deterrence. When (in the Gulf of Aden, November 2008) five pirates approached the Singaporean chemical tanker Biscaglia in a small open speedboat, they succeeded in boarding and hijacking it despite the presence of three unarmed security guards (ex-Royal Marines) working for a British security firm. The security guards promptly leapt overboard, were rescued by a German naval helicopter and were taken to a French frigate. In another incident in April 2009, when pirates attacked the cruise ship Melody, security guards on board exchanged gunfire with the pirates and used a fire hose
to beat off the pirate attack. In essence though, a variety of private security companies are operating around the Horn of Africa and are providing various services, from armed guards to patrol boats for hire to escort vessels.

Private security companies have also provided a contentious service to shipping companies and pirates. Ship owners would negotiate, sometimes for months, before paying ransom (often amounting to millions of dollars) to the pirates. Ransoms were initially paid through the “hawala”, a system of informal money-transfers that utilized Somalis abroad as contacts. As the amounts grew and ransoms became more regular, ship owners contracted private security companies to deliver the cash by speedboat or drop it from helicopters or aircraft.

Private security companies are not welcome in all cases where countries experience maritime security problems. Coastal states in the IOR with extensive coastlines such as Indonesia and Malaysia are serious about the protection of their declared sovereignty and their control over ocean resources. As a result they have taken full political responsibility for controlling piracy. Indonesia, for example, will not allow other countries or private security companies to guard international shipping passing through its side of the Malacca Strait and have made it clear that they will strongly object to “any security guard escorting ships in its waters.”

SOME POTENTIAL RESPONSES

Though the purpose of this article is not to analyse responses to maritime security problems in the Indian Ocean, a few incomplete remarks will nonetheless be made pertaining to the role of naval forces
and coast guards, the international reaction to piracy and the potential contribution of regional cooperation to enhancing security in the Indian Ocean.

Navies are redefining their roles as the former emphasis on the conventional responsibilities has shifted. The complexity of maritime threats, specifically from non-state actors and the current nature of maritime violence have created a new pattern with regards to naval responses, causing the traditional distinction between the conventional and constabulary roles of navies to wither. Warships of many nations are present in the Indian Ocean and they are being used for a variety of tasks which range from war-fighting to escort duties. Besides naval participation in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, their recent responsibilities have centred on diplomatic roles and maintaining good order at sea. As naval diplomacy includes maritime coercion, alliance building and international maritime assistance such as training and capacity building, navies could contribute much towards international or regional stability. Furthermore, navies are very versatile instruments capable of providing valuable assistance in maintaining good order at sea. This can range from the protection of a nation’s maritime resources to constabulary roles at sea.

A high degree of naval activity in the Indian Ocean is notable as many countries are participating in maritime security operations. Warships deployed in the Indian Ocean have the responsibility to protect the maritime security objectives of their states or groups of states. Though unilateral actions by states are very common, naval cooperation is a feature of the international involvement in the Indian Ocean on a scale never seen before in history. An interesting feature, however, is the fact that naval cooperation is more visible than naval coercion.
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The most obvious international cooperation in the Indian Ocean is in the sphere of counter-piracy, but due to the vast quantity of commercial traffic traversing the Horn of Africa, it is a difficult task. The IMB has commended international navies for the part they play in preventing many attacks off the Horn of Africa. As this is a vast area it is difficult for navies to realistically cover it, however, the naval contribution is specifically valued as “increased intelligence gathering coupled with strategic placement of naval assets has resulted in the targeting of suspected Pirate Action Groups before they became operational”.

In the Gulf of Aden attacks between January and September 2010 were substantially lower than during the corresponding period the previous year with 44 attacks compared to a 100. However, it seems (as was explained above) that due to the large naval presence in this area, pirates have chosen to extend their area of operations and many hijackings have taken place further off the coast of Somalia.

Another feature of the international concern over energy shipments and the deficiencies in the international legal framework is the fact that it resulted in a series of UN Security Council Resolutions against which naval operations are set. Resolution 1814 (15 May 2008) requested states and regional organizations to provide naval protection to vessels of the World Food Programme. Resolution 1816 (2 June 2008), authorized states cooperating with the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use “all necessary means” in anti-piracy operations in a manner “consistent with the relevant provisions of international law”.

This clearly acknowledged the fact that Somalia does not have the maritime security capacity to enforce law and order in its own waters. Security Council Resolution 1838 (7 October 2008) supported the earlier Resolution and urgently requested states to participate actively in the fight against piracy off Somalia “by deploying naval vessels and military
aircraft” 55, to cooperate with the TFG and to continue with the protection of ships of the World Food Programme. With the adoption of Resolution 1846 (2 December 2008), the international community’s mandate was extended for another 12 months. 56 In Resolution 1851 (21 December 2008), the Security Council invited states and regional organizations participating in the anti-piracy operations to conclude so-called “ship rider agreements” with states willing to prosecute pirates and to assist with the process. 57 States were also encouraged to cooperate and establish international cooperative mechanisms regarding the fight against piracy and a Contact Group on Piracy was established as the principle contact point between states and regional organizations.

The international naval and maritime security response comprises two main cooperative groups: the European Union Operation ATALANTA which includes ships from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the US-led CTF 151, with ships representing the US, United Kingdom, Turkey, Denmark, Singapore and South Korea with other states participating at times. In addition, independent naval vessels from China, India, Malaysia, Japan, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to name a few, were also conducting operations in the area. Most of these vessels operated in the Gulf of Aden and much goodwill and a cooperative attitude exists between the various navies. Some navies provide escort vessels or even place special forces on board merchant vessels (usually of their own flag) for shipborne security.

Many observers have called for merchantmen to be armed, as they consider a visual deterrent such as a powerful machine gun as sufficient. However, the IMO and IMB have consistently warned against arming merchantmen, as they fear it would increase the levels of violence. Individual ships have adopted many different onboard deterrents,
ranging from rudimentary measures such as fire hoses and deck patrols to a non-lethal electric screen with loudspeakers emitting a high-pitched noise. In an unconventional approach, Chinese sailors have even used Molotov cocktails to fight off pirates who attacked their vessel. As private security companies also operate in the fight against piracy, shipping companies wishing to spend more on protection can hire private security companies for added protection.

The practical, logistical and financial challenges of fighting piracy remain substantial. It seems that much of the threat has moved from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Somalia or even much further from the coast. As the area is vast, the element of surprise rests with the pirates and as their skiffs are difficult to detect, coordination between the international forces needs to be improved and constant contact with merchantmen is necessary.

The international community’s short-term response to piracy off the Horn of Africa was multinational naval patrols, diplomatic efforts and private security efforts. However, in the long term, piracy can only be addressed by strengthening regional security capabilities, improving intelligence gathering and sharing, effective law enforcement and enhanced multinational cooperation on land and at sea. In essence, though, the problem will remain as long as pirates find sanctuary in Somalia. The solution is therefore to restore government authority and the basic enforcement of law and order at sea and ashore.

Port security can be improved through better situational awareness (gained through sensors, intelligence, patrolling, etc) and the improvement of physical security. It is important that all role players cooperate and that port authorities adhere to the international regulations applicable to port security. Though much must still be done to
improve port security in the IOR, in a number of cases port security has been enhanced with international assistance and the contribution of specialist private security companies. Kenya has, for example, actively enhanced the security of its coastline and harbours. After the port of Mombassa was described as a soft target by American and Kenyan surveys, port security was improved with measures that included the installation of electronic surveillance systems, physical security and a higher police and security presence. The USA donated security equipment and six speedboats to the Kenyan Navy, and also provided training assistance. The speedboats will improve efforts to police Kenya’s territorial waters, and personnel underwent intensive training in Mombassa and coastal patrols were stepped up.

**Regional, sub-regional and multinational cooperation**

Much can be gained from a cooperative regional approach between states that emphasize and promote consultation not confrontation, reassurance not deterrence, transparency not secrecy, prevention not correction, and interdependence not unilateralism. When regional cooperation exists, navies can contribute much towards enhancing maritime security, managing disasters, providing humanitarian assistance and aid in limiting environmental security challenges. Regional cooperation can therefore be a “force multiplier” and is certainly desirable in the vast, relatively unpoliced Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean region is noted for its complex sub-regional geopolitical and geostrategic associations, each with its own vested concerns. Cooperation is mostly in the spheres of economy and trade, rather than in security, and it is to a large extent hampered by distrust and lack of interaction. On sub-regional level cooperation exists in the Persian Gulf, South-Asia, South-East Asia, East Africa, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, South-West Indian Ocean Islands, with overlapping
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regional systems in the Greater Middle East, African and the Asia Pacific. The following are the most pertinent examples of regional and sub-regional cooperation:  

- Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC created in 1981) became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Member countries signed the SADC Treaty on 17 August 1992 (in Windhoek), which was put into force on 30 September 1993. The SADC has 14 member states of which South Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius and Tanzania are also IOR-ARC members. The SADC Standing Maritime Committee aims to promote regional peace and prosperity through maritime military cooperation and has three main objectives: mutual maritime security to ensure the freedom of sea lanes of communication, to develop and maintain maritime capabilities in the region and to develop a quick response maritime capacity.

- East African Community (EAC). The EAC is a regional intergovernmental organization with its headquarters in Arusha Tanzania, with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi as members. It wishes to improve political, economic and social development, with a Political Federation of the East African States as its ultimate aim. In maritime terms the emphasis is on economic and safety issues rather than security.

- Indian Ocean Commission (COI). The COI (the Commission de l’Océan Indien in French) is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1984 with the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, France and the Seychelles as members. Its objectives centre on cooperation and development in diplomatic, economic, commercial, agricultural and aquacultural, cultural, scientific, judicial and educational fields. The COI has funded various projects focussing on conservation and alternative livelihoods projects.
The Arab League or League of Arabian States. The League was formed in Cairo in March 1945 and is the regional organization of Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa. Its current membership is 22 and its main aim is to improve relations and collaboration between members, safeguard independence and sovereignty, and deliberate affairs in the Arab world. It signed an agreement on Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation in April 1950 that committed members to coordinate defence related matters. Maritime cooperation is the responsibility of the subordinate regional economic communities.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC was founded between 1969 and 1972 with 30 member states. Its aims centre on the promotion of Islamic solidarity and cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and scientific fields.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC was established in 1981 in response to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. It aims to strengthen cooperation in agriculture, trade, industry, investment and security among its six member states. Though the GCC supports regional and international counter-terrorism efforts, it places emphasis on the distinction between terrorism and the legitimate right of the people to struggle against occupation. As far as military and maritime cooperation is concerned GCC members aim to create a GCC defence force and they have signed a Joint GCC Defence Pact (ratified on 31 December 2000). The pact was the result of much military cooperation and its objective is to protect the interests of member states and cooperate on land, air and maritime defence. Member states currently cooperate on army, air force, naval and intelligence level and have standardized much doctrine and training.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC was established in December 1985. It is an agreement between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to create an atmosphere of trust and friendship, and
work towards economic and social development. Maritime cooperation is not part of the agreement.

- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was already established in 1967 with a twofold purpose: economic growth and social progress as well as regional peace and stability with an emphasis on rule of law in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. ASEAN leaders resolved in 2003 that community should stand on three pillars, the primary one being an ASEAN Security Community, followed by Economic and Socio-Cultural Communities. Maritime cooperation is not a core function, but has developed as part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (see below).

- The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF comprises 27 countries, including ten ASEAN members, plus a number of “partner states”. The ARF is the principal forum for security discourse between Asian states and provides the opportunity to discuss regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. On a security level the various states appear to have strong, but diverse objectives. However, cooperation with regards to counter-terrorism has improved since September 2001 and the Bali bombings of October 2002. Maritime security cooperation is high on the agenda and an exercise involving 22 Western Pacific navies was held in May 2005. Security cooperation within the ARF has certainly been enhanced and indications are that maritime security issues could be tackled together.

- The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA is a defence relationship based on a series of bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore dating from 1971. The FPDA makes provision for defence cooperation and replaces some of the former defence commitments of the UK. An Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for Malaysia and Singapore is based in Malaysia, at which aircraft and personnel from
all five countries are rotated. The first annual land and naval exercise took place in 1981, and exercises currently focus on air, land and naval cooperation.

- The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC). With the transformation of the global security environment, the opportunity for co-operation and interaction between IOR states has increased. After initial preparatory meetings, IOR-ARC was formed in Mauritius on 6-7 March 1997 and a Charter was adopted. It comprises 18 member states: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The Seychelles announced its withdrawal from the Association in July 2003, while China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners. The idea was to “open” the region and it had four major components: trade liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, economic and technical cooperation, and trade and investment dialogue. It did not address defence and security cooperation directly, as the idea of “open and free trade” implies maritime security. Unfortunately, because of numerous difficulties, the IOR-ARC is not really functioning.

- Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). IONS is a consultative and cooperative effort to find commonality regarding the growing asymmetric threat. The Indian Navy acted as facilitator and invited naval chiefs or the heads of maritime agencies from IOR countries to a symposium. Twenty-seven chiefs (or their representatives) attended the event in February 2008, where the majority endorsed the charter in principle. The objectives of IONS are to expand it to the next level of cooperation, create allied maritime agencies, establish a high degree of interoperability, share information to overcome common transnational maritime threats, natural disasters and maintain good order at sea.
At the sub-regional level, the most effective organizations are probably ASEAN, SAARC, SADC, GCC and COI. As regional systems such as the Africa Union (AU), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ARF partly overlap they are also linked to the Indian Ocean Region. A clear and coherent geopolitical system therefore does not yet exist in the Indian Ocean and the real prospects of developing one are ambivalent, as many of the organizations currently in existence seem to be ineffective in getting real commitment and focusing the actions of member states. Some hope can be placed on the IOR ARC with regards to economic cooperation and the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean on peace and security matters.65

The IONS initiative is currently in its infancy, yet it could develop to the next level of cooperation and expand. A need exists for a parallel group or a working group that can address wider maritime security matters and bring together various countries (regional and extra-regional) to assist with capacity building and develop adequate policy. Though the initial response to IONS was positive with consensus reached at the first meeting, progress since then has been disappointing. Political will is necessary to maintain the process and establish proper structures.66

The efforts of IOR countries to cooperate and achieve lasting maritime security, however, will be hampered by the fact that the countries, navies, coast guards and maritime forces in the region are vastly different. There is much political and cultural diversity in the region as some states are former colonies (linked to the British Commonwealth), others are Islamic Republics or Kingdoms, while some states emphasize the fact that they do not wish to be aligned. In military terms the size and type of platforms used, weapons, doctrine, tactics as well as air assets are divergent.
One of the critical issues to address in the Indian Ocean is maritime domain awareness, which geographically implies an essential awareness of all activities in or adjacent to a country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coast), the contiguous zone or coastal waters (24 nautical miles from the coast) and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ, 200 nautical miles from the coast). Effective control over such a vast domain is certainly a daunting task for most IOR states. Furthermore, the sheer size of the Indian Ocean and the scope of its maritime security problems make it difficult to control, even given an ideal situation where good regional cooperation exists.

**Conclusion**

In maritime security terms nations wish to facilitate vibrant maritime commerce and economic activities at sea as they underpin economic security, while they also endeavour to protect the maritime domain against ocean-related threats such as piracy, criminal activities, terrorism, pollution and the like. This ideal can best be achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities and by an integrated effort to tackle maritime threats, which should take place within a specific legal framework. Cooperation in this sphere between nations is essential, since virtually all nations benefit from maritime activity, while those engaged in illegal activities at sea usually do not care for national or international boundaries.

The Indian Ocean has a long history of trade, culture and military interaction with various parts of the world. Today, its traditional status as an international trade highway is more important than ever before, while the international military presence in the Indian Ocean is at an unprecedented scale. This is due to the vast resources, specifi-
cally energy, it possesses, the strategic importance of the shipping traversing its waterways and the maritime security problems the region experiences.

Although the Indian Ocean is experiencing much development and economic growth, security concerns often dominate the agendas of Indian Ocean countries. Multinational coalitions under the leadership of the USA are engaged in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though it is due to a variety of reasons, it cannot be divorced from the immense strategic value of the energy resources of the Middle East and the rise of radical Islam.

Many of the maritime security problems are linked to failed states or weak states. Specific challenges are piracy, asymmetrical threats, illegal movement of people, smuggling as well as the security of resources and the environment. Because the maritime security problems in the region have the potential to disrupt the global economy, energy security and SLOCs, it has become an important international security issue. Many extra-regional powers have a stake in Indian Ocean maritime security and deploy forces in the region. In an effort to fight piracy, the UN Security Council has passed a series of resolutions calling for international assistance. Various multinational tasks forces and independent naval units therefore operate in the waters off the Horn of Africa.

China is a newcomer to the Indian Ocean and its expanding influence is welcomed by some, but viewed with suspicion by others. Recently China has concluded military agreements with some Indian Ocean countries and deployed ships to participate in anti-piracy operations. This has illustrated her capacity to project power into the region. The Chinese presence should be used as an opportunity to
develop interoperability with China and Indian Ocean states should share security problems with China as they will have to get used to the Chinese presence in the region, whether they like it or not. As India’s maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia is well ahead of China’s, India should take the initiative to establish an environment that is conducive for working with China. Furthermore, it is necessary to separate the military and security dialogue with China from ideological disputes over issues such as Tibet and Taiwan.

It must be emphasized that transoceanic security cooperation is very important in the Indian Ocean region. Regional, sub-regional and international organizations can contribute much to enhance security. India is regarded by many as a leader in the Indian Ocean and the IONS initiative of the Indian Navy is welcomed in many circles as it has the potential to improve maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean. As many extra-regional powers are not part of IONS, there are considerable calls to include such powers in the dialogue and for them to assist with regional maritime security and capacity building. The basic suggestion is that the Indian Ocean states define their security concerns and seek assistance with capacity building from powers with a stake in Indian Ocean security. However, such an expectation might be difficult to implement in practice because of political issues and regional concerns.

African countries have a large stake in the Indian Ocean and many have significant maritime security problems. It is important that African states improve their maritime security and participate as equal partners in the Indian Ocean security debate. Again, this might be an obvious principle, but in practice it is not always easy to have all African partners at the table, especially as landward security concerns are
usually much higher on the African agenda and many African countries are severely lacking in maritime capacity.

One of the objectives of IONS is to encourage capacity building. Though each sub-region has its own unique challenges, the capabilities required to deal with maritime security can be common. The need to have a security structure parallel to IONS that will address maritime security capacity building and involve regional and extra-regional countries is evident. Vast potential also exists for the international community and regional organizations to improve international cooperation, contribute more towards improving security in the region and to create a broad-based Indian Ocean security strategy that will be acceptable to international and regional role players.

This is certainly a difficult undertaking. In the meantime, specifically in maritime security terms, the Indian Ocean has rough seas ahead.

**ENDNOTES**


15 Data collected from the Annual Reports of the ICC IMB on piracy and armed robbery against ships, between 2005 to 2009, ICC IMB, London.


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22 Ibid.


26 Ibid.


33 Ibid., p.114.

34 Ibid., pp.116-118 and 122-127.


37 Allias, ‘Illicit trade, smuggling and human trafficking’, p.70.


52 ICC Commercial Crime Services, ‘Pirates intensify attacks in new areas’.

53 Ibid.

Changing Security Paradigms in Romania and South Africa after the Cold War


FROM RACIALISM TO AUTHORITARIANISM: SOUTH AFRICA, MILITARISED POLITICS AND THE IMPLOSION OF STATE LEGITIMACY UNDER APTHEID

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ABSTRACT

Racialism in South Africa had its origins in colonialism. It progressively turned into paternalistic and authoritarian rule over the black South Africans who had been viewed as subjects since colonial times. This article describes the increasing authoritarian elements in the ruling minority party and the militarisation of white society. It shares with the reader the economic costs of a protracted internal strife and reflects on the outcomes of one-sided dominant party rule which both underestimated civil resistance among South Africans and the nature of a (nationalist) struggle for liberation while the projection of aggressive military power in the southern African region eventually brought about the dissolution of the apartheid regime in 1993.

Keywords: apartheid, militarisation, paternalism, destabilisation (southern Africa), South Africa (democratisation), liberation struggle, economic racism, racial capitalism, Total Onslaught

INTRODUCTION

The word militarisation is used when a country’s leaders make increasing use of the army and security forces rather than find solutions through negotiation or social accommodation or democratic proce-
Militarisation occurs when a country (or a section of the population) starts to feel threatened or is prodded by the political elite to expand national economic interests in the immediate or outlying regions through means other than diplomacy. This often leads to a state that depends on military power and one which emphasises state security rather than development projects, education, human rights, voting rights, negotiation, good service delivery, democratisation or enhancing the equality of citizens. Militarisation as a phenomenon is internally marked by oppression and an obsession with security, while externally the particular state increasingly projects power through military means and aggression. In short, the internal situation is mirrored by the external situation. Aggressive foreign policy and domestic security-obsessed attitudes reinforce each other.

Some refer to such a situation as a garrison state, a bunker state or a praetorian state. Militarisation manifests itself domestically and internationally, usually starting with internal security mindedness. Militarisation almost always leads to interference in the affairs of neighbouring states. Militarisation leads to the suppression of political resistance by citizens of the state and externally to militarist projections. Think, for example, about the rise of Nazi-Germany and Fascist Italy.

The scene for a security state and later militarisation was set by the National Party’s (NP) victory in 1948. The NP aimed to create a “whites-only” Christian-Nationalist state. Strong handed government was to escalate from the late 1960s well into the 1980s. The white minority government was not popular. Its narrow nationalism had to rely on the police to suppress unrest and protest while the majority of South Africans demanded the right to vote, and after years of peaceful resistance embarked on an armed struggle to attain democracy. Following the retirement of President John Vorster, who depended on and made substantial use of the police (including the secret police) and the Bureau of
State Security (BOSS), President PW Botha came to power with loyal followers and advisors like General Magnus Malan and police Minister Louis le Grange behind him. Botha was more militarily minded than Vorster. Botha and his advisors were soon called securocrats; denoting those who favoured hard-handed (military) options and were preoccupied with the security of the state. A host of security legislation had been implemented since the 1960s and this escalated under Botha’s rule.

Since only white people had voting rights in South Africa, agitation for equal rights for all South Africans, including black people, had been ongoing since the late 1800s and resulted in a fear of the “Black Threat” (Swart Gevaar) or the “black problem” by the ruling class. The “Red Threat” or Rooi Gevaar (communism) also featured later on because the government of the day saw socialism and communism as supportive of black liberation. Liberalism, as in other authoritarian societies, was also unpopular with the government and its supporters. Apartheid laws prohibited racial equality, open political discussion and mobilisation while the liberals advocated an open society free of racial discrimination and demanded economic merit and free association over racial barriers. Some liberals within the white parliament also expressed discomfort about the increase in security legislation. After the Soweto uprisings in 1976 and increasing activity on the northern boundary of Namibia (then South West Africa), where the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) fought for their freedom, military and related forces were increasingly called upon to safeguard the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The activities of those who resisted government from outside the country were seen as “the communist threat in the north” and the activities inside the country were seen as subversion.

The apartheid state’s political elite exploited the Cold War syndrome as an excuse for maintaining the status quo in South Africa and So-
uth West Africa (Namibia), a former Class C mandate that had been occupied by Pretoria since the 1970s against the wishes of the United Nations and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). South Africa often worked covertly with the United States of America, while Britain, France, Belgium and Germany at various stages supplied arms to the apartheid government. Britain provided South Africa with Vampire fighter jets, later Canberras (B1, 12 and T-4s) and Buccaneer bombers (S-50s), Shackleton (MR3) long-range maritime patrol aircraft and Wasp helicopters. Ferret reconnaissance cars and Saracen armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were also acquired from Britain. France provided Mirage fighters (Mk IIIs and F1s of various models), Puma, Super Frelon and Alouette helicopters (first Mk IIs followed by the famous Mk III) that would play an important role in the Bush War. South Africa also imported the French patent for the Panhard armoured car that evolved in South Africa through the Armaments Development Corporation (Armscor) into the Eland armoured car armed with either the 60mm mortar or 90mm gun. Harvard aircraft for training trainers and Sabre fighter aircraft at an earlier stage were also imported from Canada. At one stage, Belgium provided FN rifles, later manufactured in South Africa under licence and named the R1. Franco’s Spain exported small arms ammunition to South Africa, while Italy first provided training and close air support aircraft and later licences for the construction of the Impala (Aeromacchi 326 models), produced in South Africa as the Impala Mk I and Impala Mk II. France provided Daphne class submarines, which ensured that South Africa was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that boasted a submarine capability.

South Africa and Israel (and later Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Taiwan) began working closely together on the security level. The Latin American countries mentioned above were ruled by military dictatorships (juntas) or authoritarian leaders guilty of serio-
us human rights abuses. These states also received large-scale military and economic aid from the US, which was involved in an arms race with the Soviet Union. South Africa bought strike craft of the Reshef class from Israel and would later build them locally. These maritime vessels were relatively small, fast, armed with sea-to-sea and anti-aircraft missiles, smaller calibre anti-aircraft guns and a 76mm gun. They were intended for close shore patrolling. Their deep sea operations capacity was limited. It was said that the original design for the Reshef/President class vessels was obtained by Israel from France.

An exchange of knowledge took place that benefited the Israeli and apartheid defence (and air) forces, one example being the development of the Cheetah and the Israeli Kfir fighter aircraft that shared some characteristics, but both countries also included unique features in their own designs. The upgrading of the ageing fleet of Centurion tanks in South Africa also benefited from knowledge exchange with Israeli armour experts. The RSA also worked on developing its nuclear capability with Israel and France (South Africa had earlier engaged in nuclear technology exchanges with the US and West Germany).

The development of the G-5 and G-6 artillery systems and Valkiri 127mm multiple-rocket launchers followed. The Valkiri multiple rocket launcher (MRL) was developed as a counter for the Soviet BM-21 and as a new design was considerably more sophisticated than the Soviet weapon. The infantry assault rifle used by South African troops, the R-4, was a copy of the Israeli Galil. The R4, which replaced the FN and R1, followed the trend of using a smaller calibre namely 5,56 x 39 mm rather than the previous Nato standard of 7,62 mm calibre ammunition.

By 1972, a State Security Council (SSC) had been established in South Africa and the South African military stepped increasingly into the limelight. The state budget for defence increased annually. By the
middle 1970s the RSA was already stronger than the combined power of all the sub-Saharan African states. Due to South Africa’s large-scale weapons procurement programme in the late seventies and early eighties, this gave rise to an arms race. Countries suffering under South Africa’s military threat and cross border aggression, which in the case of Angola was more severe than Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, strengthened their defence systems. In a way South Africa’s armaments programme triggered a small arms race in the region with South Africa retaining the upper hand most of the time. Because of growing South African operations in southern Angola after Operation Savannah (1975/1976), which had a destructive impact on Angolan infrastructure, Angola implemented conscription in 1981 (conscription in South Africa had started years earlier). Soft-skinned and light vehicles were purchased by Angola from various countries such as Japan, Canada, Spain and Portugal, while Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union provided military hardware.

As can be seen from the following tables militarism spread throughout the white South African society from 1961 onwards.

The annual defence budget increased substantially as illustrated hereunder.

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE BY SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1952 AND 1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>Budget voted</th>
<th>% of state expenditure</th>
<th>% of gross national product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>£(UK) 22 218</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>R121 600 000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>R271 506 000</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>R316 500 000</td>
<td>12,2</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For years the state budget favoured military development over large scale investment in education, health and achieving equality for citizens. The acquisition and procurement of military hardware increasingly received priority. The following table illustrates this.

**EXAMPLES OF ARMAMENT AND ESTIMATED NUMBERS***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>A/Cars</th>
<th>AFV</th>
<th>APC</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Unknown (65 -100?)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>80+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1 400</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1 600</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>90(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures for the years 1969 to 1989 above are based on estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. In cases annual differences between numbers relate to the selling off of “moth-balled” equipment, introduction of new products (acquisition and procurement) and operational losses, accidents or wear and tear.

In the 1950s, Chief Albert Luthuli, a prominent black leader who later became a Nobel Peace Prize recipient, wrote a book entitled *Let
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*My People Go.* He appealed to the government and all South Africans to engage in a national convention to write a new constitution that would give equal rights to all citizens of the country. In South Africa, his words were lost. In fact 20 years later they were still lost as prudent members of the white political opposition, such as Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, called for a national convention to write a new constitution for a democratic South Africa. Slabbert eloquently argued with a piercing logic that neither racism, nor minority rule, could last and that attempts to reform apartheid without touching the basic structures of power and discrimination would only amount to “sham-reform”. More so; it was unlikely that one-sided reform would attain popular support among the majority of South Africans. He argued that major role players in South African politics such as the exiled African National Congress (ANC) and the populist United Democratic Front (UDF) and the trade union movement, Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) as well as the smaller Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) should be included in negotiations for a new constitution. A change from militarist and war talk to peace was needed.

For this reason Slabbert and Alex Boraine, opposition leaders in the white parliament, resigned from parliament and created the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) which advocated a negotiated solution, non-racialism (no racial discrimination on social or economic levels) and majority government. Through various external and internal conferences (such as the Dakar meeting between the exiled ANC and an Idasa group in 1987) Idasa popularised these ideas. The Botha government threatened to cut off Idasa’s funding because Idasa in their view was singing in “Moscow’s choir”. Some members associated with Idasa were detained, while others received death threats and in two cases staffers were killed. The institute and its members remained under constant state surveillance while the pro-government
media and their academic cohorts spouted constant criticism and pejorative labelling against them.

To ensure survival of the apartheid regime, a “total national strategy” was formulated as a counter to an alleged “total onslaught” waged against South Africa. Verligte ideologists that supported the National Party regime advocated “power-sharing” under white rule as long as race classification, black homelands masked as “independent states” and the free-market system was accepted as “political realities”. Blacks, coloureds as well as Indians, were invited to participate in the war by the middle of the 1970s. By 1983, coloureds and Indians would be allowed to become part of a tri-cameral parliament where the white chamber and the executive State President PW Botha would have the final say. Defence Force requirements had made it necessary to draft more troops from other ethnic groups. Offering limited suffrage to other South African groups was one way of doing this. Needless to say, black South Africans were kept outside the political system; the argument being that they could pursue their “independence” in the allocated “homelands” or “bantustans”.

International sanctions were increasing during the 1980s despite the US and Chester Crocker’s constructive engagement advocacy. The Reagan government argued that South Africa was a historic ally of the US and that the apartheid government should be considered as a legitimate partner to a regional political solution and the undermining of Soviet/communist influence in Africa. At the same time the US provided military support to South African proxy forces such as the rebel movement Unita in Angola. Constructive engagement allowed the South African government breathing space for its military adventures in Angola and elsewhere. It also ensured that Unita, as a proxy force, continued to receive arms from South Africa and the US. US support
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in the United Nations Security Council ensured that South Africa was not forced to withdraw from Angola, and the country could tentatively escape international accountability despite wide calls from the international community and non-aligned member states of the UN to act more forcefully.

Within South Africa, South Africans of all races opposed apartheid and especially the regime of PW Botha, his generals and academic advisors. Civil society, Christian churches and Muslim groups opposed Botha’s regime due to its unreasonable policies and racialism. Many white military conscripts chose to stay away from call ups by going into exile or underground. Others chose to go to prison. At the same time the South African economy suffered because of inflation, sanctions, militarisation and the cost of the war in Angola. The South African monetary unit (rand) increasingly weakened during the 1980s.

The war in Angola eventually ended in a stalemate. The South African government had to withdraw its forces from Angola and Namibia. The South African forces went home having inflicted, in military terms, far greater losses on their opponents and they had destroyed the infrastructure of the country that they had invaded (though far, far smaller in scale, a historic parallel can be found here with the German invasion into Russia in 1941 that reached a turning point due to resilience of the defenders but at greater human and material losses for the defenders). Pretoria won many battles, but could not overcome the political resistance and the active wish for independence by the people of Angola and Namibia. Politically South Africa operated a short-sighted international policy. In military terms, long logistic lines, stereotyped tactics and the resilience of Swapo and the Angolan forces with Cuban support, enforced a withdrawal on the aggressors. Namibia became independent in 1990 after its first elections in 1989 under
the UN supervision of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Namibians, having started their fight for independence in the 1800s against the German colonisers, had finally won it.

In Angola, the war lasted much longer as the Unita movement headed by Jonas Savimbi refused to accept election results. Only on the death of Savimbi in 2002 did the Angolan conflict subside. Peace in southern Africa came at a high price. The peace was not made by Chester Crocker, the US policy of constructive engagement or Pretoria. It was facilitated by the consistent struggle of Angolans, Namibians and South Africans inside South Africa against a regime that suffered from a day-by-day lack of legitimacy while involved in military adventures in a country twice removed from South Africa. Add to this the cost of destabilising Mozambique and other southern African states and it is possible to understand the decline of both the monetary unit and the legitimacy of Pretoria in the region and inside South Africa.

The Pretoria regime depended on military conscription to continue its aggression inside and outside South Africa. Less conscripts, in fact the minority compared to the number that were trained, saw conflict in Angola and occupied Namibia. But annually large numbers were used to guard key installations, do administrative duties, serve in various arms of service, assist in intelligence work, act as support for police, man medical services, work as military police, signallers and act as motivational staff such as chaplains and teachers (commissars in other words) or assist as legal officers for the apartheid military. Others patrolled the borders of Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Significant numbers of conscripts (and citizen force members through call ups) did however saw combat in northern Namibia and Angola, including large scale cross border operations. They served as artillery men, mechanised infantry (i.e. 61 Mech Battalion), airborne soldiers,
armoured corps staff, infantry, signallers, engineers, medical staff, anti-aircraft gunners and more. One South African General, Jannie Geldenhuys later commented that the Bush war “was not a war of generals but of lieutenants and corporals”. If it was not for the large reservoir of conscripts, the apartheid state’s military would hardly have remained prominent in southern Africa for so long.

**NATIONAL SERVICE**

South Africa participated in the two world wars without the need for conscription or enforced military service. South African soldiers, volunteers as they were, carved out a proud military record during these wars. During the Second World War the Union of South Africa fought together with the Allied forces, including the Soviet Union against Nazism and Fascism.

Non-white South Africans participated in the Second World War, serving as members of the Union Defence Force in their combined struggle with the Allied Forces against fascism. Following the transference of power to the National Party and the defeat of the United Party, the outstanding contribution during the two wars by other than white South Africans was conveniently “forgotten”. Several protests took place when thousands of people who were classified as “coloured” were removed from the general voters’ roll due to the National Party’s discriminatory laws. In this regard, the activities of the Springbok Legion and the Torch Commando can be recalled. White veterans demonstrated their solidarity with the non-white veterans and their families through such actions. Ultimately, as the apartheid government encountered more resistance to its policies from within South Africa, it was conveniently regarded appropriate for the coloureds to come and lend a helping hand again.
After the Second World War, South Africa relied mainly on the Active Citizen Force (ACF) to supplement her increasing manpower needs. The active citizen force at the time functioned on a volunteer basis. After 948 the National Party government propagated racial segregation and they limited voting rights based on racial grounds while the international community started debating the Universal Bill of Rights, when Nazism was defeated in Europe and when the first colonies began receiving their independence. The new government in South Africa was convinced that their new dispensation should remain the status quo through any means necessary. The apartheid vision needless to say, ran contrarily to the international mood of the time. Maintaining Afrikaner-Nationalism required increased manpower.

By 1952 a limited military service system by means of a lottery formula was implemented to comply with the needs of national defence. In 1954, the initial training period for the system was established. It was determined that a period of three months would be sufficient. An amendment to the Defence Act of 1957 – aimed to make service in the SADF mandatory for all white South African men – came into effect in June 1967. Conscription became a reality of social life for white men. This would last for more than twenty years. The Defence Amendment Act was carried in parliament with the support of the white opposition parties.

National service was earmarked to extend over a period of nine months of training for white men between the ages of 17 and 65 years. From January 1968 onwards, there would be two yearly intakes of national servicemen: One in January and then again in June. Some of the recruits from both the intakes would be trained as supplementary instructors to rectify the deficit of manpower in the permanent force.
Initially, approximately 30 000 white men between the ages of 17 and 20 were called up for national service each year. This figure was considerably more than the approximately 10 000 national servicemen who did annual national service before the Defence Act was amended, but the South African Defence Force and politicians always needed more men. In 1972, the period of national service was extended to 12 months per recruit, and citizen force obligations were set at 19 days compulsory service each year for a period of five years (Du Plessis, 2009). By 1974, citizen force obligations to the defence force stretched to three months per year over five years. In 1978, when national service had already been extended to a period of 18 months, it was extended to two years. By 1982, a citizen force member’s duties towards national defence increased to 90 days per year over the same eight-year period.

Female involvement was voluntary. During the year 1972, 265 white women completed their 12-month training cycle at the Army Woman’s College. By 1978, the Army Women’s College facilitated training to over 500 trainees per year who could be inserted in support positions. On completion of their service they were eligible to become part of the active reserve. Within the school cadet system female participation was also voluntary with girls joining “drill platoons” and shooting exercises by choice.

Non-white participation was never made mandatory and was based on a volunteer system. In 1973, the first coloured soldiers started to receive their basic military training at Eerste River, near Cape Town, under the auspices of the South African Cape Corps service battalion. During the initial intake, 400 coloured soldiers were trained. The first black unit, 21 Battalion, was established during 1974. In 1975, the first Indians started their training at Salisbury Island in Durban. Indian trainees were mostly destined for the navy and maritime services.
By 1974, just before South Africa’s invasion of Angola, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that the permanent force was approximately 18 000 men strong, with a further 92 000 in the citizen force, and yearly intakes of volunteers and conscriptees taking place. During the mid-eighties, the numbers had risen. Total reserves accounted for 455 000 men in the active reserve, in other words the citizen force. Another 175 000 men and women (voluntary) in the commandos or territorial defence units were available. Certain observers disagree about the exact numbers. For example, *To the Point*, (1976, Vol. 5(50):9), a magazine with close ties to the South African government, explicitly stated that the Republic of South Africa could at any time mobilise 400 000 soldiers. Official SADF figures show how the national service system had systematically grown over a number of years:

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conscripts</td>
<td>34, 211</td>
<td>38, 642</td>
<td>48, 495</td>
<td>55, 160</td>
<td>43, 835</td>
<td>45, 178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1981 a full deployment of the SADF could muster an estimated 168 000 soldiers. Only 7.5 percent of this figure comprised permanent force members. Citizen force units were regularly deployed in the operational area alongside national servicemen, especially when there were large cross-border operations into Angola. The commandos acted as a citizen militia in towns and rural areas and received regular military training. The school cadet system introduced school children to military drill and practice. Eventually nearly 600 white schools formed part of the cadet system that trained and socialised white children into military life. South Africa, especially the white citizenry, became
a “nation in arms”. “Without their conscript and citizen force reservoir and commandos, the politicians and their generals in Pretoria could hardly have taken their adventures outside Pretoria, let alone South Africa” (Du Plessis, 2009: 3).5

Compulsory military service became unpopular. People who did not wish to answer the call to national service could object to military service as conscientious objectors if – and only if – they could prove that they were universal Christian pacifists. Objection under other conditions would imply a punishable act. In these circumstances, some simply decided not to pitch up for compulsory military camps. This was, however, also a chargeable offence and many of them can testify to this. Only 50 percent of the called-up citizen force members reported for service in 1981. Only 36 percent of commando members responded to their respective call-up instructions. Those who did not arrive at the military camps often deferred the call-up due to some or other reason given. But most simply did not respond to the army’s orders for call up. Trying to find them and prosecute them added another financial burden to the state.

Defence legislation made it compulsory for employers to release their workers for military service. Employers initially accepted the absence of workers due to military service, but the friendly support the SADF once had started wearing thin and many men at that time lost their jobs because of the mandatory military service imposed by the government. The loss of working hours due to people doing military service elsewhere further added to the state’s economic burden.

The issue of refusal or not obeying call-ups became more acute after 1984 when the SADF increasingly deployed domestically. “Township service”, in other words suppressing internal unrest in non-white
communities and urban settlements became a familiar word among national servicemen and citizen force members. “The Border” was no longer just in Angola and northern Namibia, but was now extended to include “home”. A percentage of white national servicemen from poorer families were not afforded the opportunity to further themselves or enter tertiary education due to this system. They had thus been forced into the permanent worker class. Today they contribute to the immense unemployment rate in South Africa and form part of an extensive phenomenon of poverty.

While there were isolated cases of objection to military service in the 1960s and 1970s, more and more (young) white South Africans publicly expressed their unwillingness to do enforced military service. Amongst these were also ex-conscripts/conscript veterans and junior officers. Numbers escalated from an initial number of 11 public objectors to an eventual number of more than 700 by 1988. While the movement against conscription (national service) was never large, it caused enough headaches for a government that wanted to retain the status quo by having access to a reservoir of young lives. Even in small numbers these objections made a public impact that could not be ignored.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AN “IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY”

Dutch born Hendrik French Verwoerd followed in the footsteps of DF Malan and Hans Strijdom as prime minister of South Africa. Many saw Verwoerd as the person who formalised the ideology of apartheid. In 1966 Verwoerd was assassinated in parliament. The new incumbent was B J Vorster, a strong-handed man who made consistent progress
Within the National Party despite his earlier links to an authoritarian movement based on Afrikaner Nationalism that was active during the 1930s and the Second World War. The Ossewa Brandwag to which Vorster belonged was sympathetic to the German war effort during the Second World War. It sought to actively undermine the Union Defence Force of South Africa which was engaged in war against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Vorster oversaw the increasingly security mindedness of the South African state by relying heavily on the police and security police as well as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). In the 1970s Vorster was implicated in Vorstergate, a financial scandal, and was forced to resign as prime minister. However, he was subsequently promoted to State President of the minority state in an interesting quirk of logic. In his wake PW Botha, a relatively uneducated man, was elected as prime minister. Botha rose as a loyal apparatchik through the National Party structures. He was both hard handed and hard headed. He favoured hawkish politics outside the country and had support from military structures and army generals, including Magnus Malan who rose through the military ranks (some say as a political appointee) and later became Minister of Defence.

Under Botha the ideology of apartheid was updated, streamlined and embedded in the para-ideologies of tricameralism/reform and “total onslaught”.

While “reform” was preached, oppression increased. The National Party elite consistently exploited the Cold War frenzy for their own benefit by declaring that there was a total (communist) onslaught against South Africa and all its peoples. Simultaneously, as remarked earlier, they tried to include some representatives of the non-white community in government. This was in fact a divide-and-rule strategy that amounted to “domination through reform”.

Trica-
meralism or a chamber for white people, coloured people and South African Asians did not broaden democracy. It centralised power. The non-white chambers of government had little say as the white chamber of parliament could veto the decisions of the other two chambers. In turn PW Botha, as an executive president, could veto any of the decisions of the three chambers of parliament – and was advised by a State Security Council (SSC) consisting of security minded people, many of them appointed by the president himself. The system was authoritarian per se and further led to the militarisation of South African politics. The opposition parties in the three chambers of parliament had no seats in the SSC and the president and his inner circle controlled decision making. For all practical purposes the already exclusive parliament of a severely restricted democracy was fundamentally marginalized when it came to security issues.

The government of the time and its advisors consciously or not-so-consciously deluded its followers – and perhaps itself – that the political agenda of the time was to deal with a “terrorist onslaught” waged by agitators under Moscow’s control aimed at destroying South Africa and its Christian values. The government and securocrats of the day believed that strong-handed security and military tactics internally and externally (against the Frontline States) would be able to curb, if not overcome, this “onslaught”. Security and military actions increasingly supplanted political solutions, with long-term social and economic consequences.

Ironically, the agenda of other South Africans had focused on attaining universal suffrage, equality and economic justice since the 1880s. In the absence of meaningful political transformation to a democracy, resistance movements such as the South African Native National Congress or SANNC (later ANC), the Communist Party of South Africa
or CPSA (later SACP), the PAC, and Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) became increasingly radical and militant during the latter half of the 1900s. An armed struggle, not aimed at Soviet-inspired rule or the destruction of Christianity, but pursuing the aim of attaining a non-racial one-person-one-vote democracy, ensued.

Before the beginning of the armed struggle, Chief Albert Luthuli argued: “[The African National] Congress has adapted itself to the needs of the situation ... and with each adaptation we have brought ourselves and our country nearer to the vision of a homeland where man may eventually live at peace with neighbours of all races – because they are really neighbours, not white masters and other-race servants”. Things were to take a turn for the worse.

The apartheid government deepened repression and activated the extensive security-management system to defend unpopular and unconstitutional structures against internal opposition. By the 1980s this system supposedly justified the institution of emergency rule to “contain” or “destroy” the ANC, UDF, SACP and PAC. As in all authoritarian societies, security first became a pre-occupation, then an obsession. Not only were militarised political structures created to deal with the “onslaught” but the whole climate that was created favoured unconventional intervention by the ruling elite and their security specialists inside South Africa and the region (Coleman, 1994: 130ff; Grundy, 1988: 34ff, 58ff, 107–109; Du Pisani, 1988; Seegers, 1986, 1996, Selfe, 1994: 103ff; Liebenberg, 1998). Large-scale suppression of revolt and covert operations by security institutions played an integral part in maintaining the non-democratic regime. In this, the extensive National Security Management System (NSMS) with its multi-layered structures played an important role. At the time a change in the locus of state power as a result of the rise of the security establishment
took place. Parliament and the white civilian population – even if they
would have wanted to differ from their elected government – were si-
delined effectively. If there ever was a white democracy in South Afri-
ca, it lost all influence to hawkish politicians and politically minded
generals; people with little vision of, or liking for, democracy and an
equal society.

For the average white South African this changing locus of state
power to the SSC and the NSMS was less obvious. Few, except pru-
dent observers, noticed that the cabinet seemed to be sidelined, the
executive presidency rose in profile and that “reforms” on regional and
local government level fell into the hands of security personnel.

The above organigram reflects the parallel structures created in
South Africa as part of a national/total counter strategy to the suppo-
sed “communist onslaught”. Note the central position of the National
Joint Management System (NJMS) vis-à-vis cabinet committees and
government departments. Note the lesser position of cabinet when
compared with the position of an executive president. The integrated
parallel system on national, regional and local government levels pro-
vided a pervasive security web in which the citizenry had little role.
(Source: Schutte et al, 1998: 140).10

An obsession with a “national co-ordinated strategy” sucked the
military deeply into the upholding of apartheid (Compare Grundy,
1988; Seegers, 1996: 163 ff, 285). Covert operations became part of
the package of “counter-terrorist strategies” (Schutte, Liebenberg &
Minnaar, 1998; Sanders, 2006). A “politics of terror” forming part of
state-security strategies evolved. It reached its zenith in the late 1980s.
The SADF was seen as widely used in internal oppression. During
Operation Palmiet in 1984, 7 000 soldiers sealed off the township of
Sebokeng. A strategic shift away from reliance on the police force to
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Organisational Chart of the NSMS

- National Security Management System
  - Cabinet committee for security matters State Security Council (SSC)
  - Core work committee
  - Work committee
  - Secretariat of the State Security Council (full-time staff)
  - Regional level - 11 joint management centres
  - District level - 60 subjoint management centres
  - Local level - 448 minijoint management centres
  - Local management centres + subcommittees of minijoint management centres

- Government departments
  - State President
  - Cabinet
  - Cabinet committee for constitutional affairs
  - Cabinet committee for economic affairs
  - Cabinet committee for social affairs
  - Committee of departmental heads
  - Management committee
    - National joint management system
    - National joint information committee
      - National security forces committee
      - National political, economic and social committee
      - National strategic communication committee

- Departments
  - Executive committees
  - Regional services councils
  - Local governments
uphold “law and order” took place (Cock, 1990: 87). During 1985, 35 000 troops were deployed in the townships alone. If the numbers of troops deployed in black townships (mostly conscripts or citizen force members) were as high as Cock suggested, it would equal the entire number of a yearly intake of South African white conscripts and coloured/Asian “volunteers”.

These developments were not unexpected. The political socialisation of apartheid leadership – even if paying lip-service to reform – and their followers within the paradigm of a garrison state invited further tension and conflict. Police and military action and increasing covert operations by security agencies had an impact on both internal and foreign policy making and their implementation. Organised violence and repression assumed many faces due to the various structures of oppression. This politics of coercion and co-optation spread throughout South Africa and further. It eventually crossed borders and spread into southern Africa with negative economic effects and resultant human suffering. The use of front organisations and partner organisations to assist in internal oppression and external aggression became one of the sombre characteristics of the time.

Needless to say, the Pretoria regime’s approach bred many variants of local and internal resistance. It also solidified the commitment of neighbouring countries to resist the Pretoria regime.

**Conclusion**

South Africa as a case study was both like and unlike oppressive societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The Pretoria regime embarked on oppression in terms of racial differences like Nazi-Germany,
though genocide was not the intention, nor contemplated by the state. Rather black people was meant to be an obedient labour resource and outside “white South Africa” could attain “independence” in pre-allocated geographical areas if they so wished - but their independence prescribed by and subservient to the racialist economics of a white state. South Africa’s search for power extended to other states in order to maintain racialism and the resistance to equality. The security state moved from police control to military support and a garrison state – praetorianism of a special type, I call it. The military never attempted a *coup*, but was invited into politics by the hard-line politicians, yet participated loyally, sometimes enthusiastically, in the system. Externally the choice for military projection rather than diplomacy led to the destabilisation of the frontline States, specifically Angola and Mozambique.

Like the contemporary state of Israel, South Africa became irksome to those who wanted to see regional peace and eventually lost its international support and the loyalty of its citizenry. These developments all contributed to the eventual regime change. To a large extent the South African security establishment, with the approval of the political elite, embarked on their own dirty war along the lines of military juntas in Latin America. This unconventional war against their own citizens further led to the loss of whatever legitimacy the government had.

South Africans were led to believe that the state was involved in external aggression for the good of all, while oppression was felt by the majority of South Africans. As in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the persistent lie of a government doing everything for a citizenry who had little say, the authoritarian government in South Africa was to lose support and legitimacy leading to a regime change. Growing dis-
satisfaction among the followers of the National Party and segments of the white, coloured and Indian communities led to internal ideological dissonance and played a role together with (black/non-racial) resistance that precipitated internal social dis-consensus that forced the political hawks in parliament and Pretoria to reconsider options. The scene was gradually set for a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy through a drawn out negotiated settlement.

South Africans now have a commonly agreed upon constitution and is a multi-party democracy, albeit ruled by a dominant party. Much suffering and a long struggle for democracy brought this about. As in Poland, labour organisations played an important role in the regime change.

Reflections for the future? Lessons learnt? For a democracy to last, civil society has to ensure that the military remains under civil control and tendencies towards influencing politics are kept in check. Civil society also has to relentlessly reign in politicians who develop an obsession with state security rather than development, protection of human rights, public service delivery without corruption and equality of all citizens whatever their religion, race or class. Civil society should be alert to, and remonstrate against, military appointments of senior staff simply because of their political linkages with ruling parties.

History taught us that if this is not done societies revert to authoritarianism and the negative consequences that go with it. As in any other society these challenges remain in South Africa today. Democracy can only be upheld, nurtured and empowered by a vigilant civil society.
Source consulted and suggested for further reading


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**ENDNOTES**

1 This article greatly benefited from a contribution on national service/conscription in South Africa by Tienie du Plessis, publisher in Pretoria and deployed as a conscript (artillery) in Angola in 1975/1976. Numerous discussions with Tienie and Gert van der Westhuizen, prominent journalist and military historian (also deployed as a conscript to Angola) enriched this article. My thanks to them as well as to Tjaart Barnard and Herman Warden, post graduate students at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University at the Military Academy in Saldanha. The author of the article did not see deployment in Angola but completed three border deployments in
northern Namibia (Sector 10, 20 and 70) serving as a junior commissioned officer. He objected to further military service in 1988.


3 Idem.


5 Ibidem.


8 Seegers convincingly argues that the South African government overestimated the geo-strategic position of South Africa on the globe and Soviet interest in southern Africa. The Pretoria government also misinterpreted the support from Reagan (the Reagan Doctrine announced in 1986) and the notion of constructive engagement. Constructive engagement was advanced by prominent Republicans such as Chester Crocker and Ronald Reagan and not necessarily backed up by pervasive support of Congress and the rank and file of US citizenry. The Clarke Amendment (1985) that repealed the prohibition of covert assistance to organisations such as Unita probably strengthened South African apartheid leaders’ belief that they now had a free hand in the region to undertake military action (see Seegers, 1996: 236). Between 1986 and 1987 approximately $30 million was channelled to Unita covertly (Seegers, 1996: 236). The results were that “When it (the South African Department of Military Intelligence and to an extent the Department of Foreign Affairs) turned its analytical scalpel to larger politics, all blended into a mass of concentrated Communism” (Seegers, 1996: 215). Seegers rightly remarks that, “Once the hawks took charge in Pretoria all levers were pumped …” (Seegers, 1996: 214). The results were what Seegers called “uncivil war” and “executive wars” waged by South Africa in Southern Africa (Seegers, 1996: 232ff, 210ff). Political scientist André du Pisani, then at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and now at the University of Namibia, warned against a South African “Frontier Army” that carries a war into southern Angola by using quasi-surrogates, notably Unita. This happened with negative long term effects for the region.


ABSTRACT

After the end of the Cold War, Romania’s national security was driven by the commitment to join the Euro-Atlantic security structures seen as the main guarantee of assuring its own national security. The shift from the territorial defence specific concepts to collective defence and countering asymmetric risks in the global perspective, required a profound reassessment of the national security approach and, implicitly, of the missions to be performed by the Romanian Armed Forces. As part of the new security vision, Romania has assumed an active participation in various international peacekeeping and peace-support operations as the expression of its determination to contribute to the international efforts to efficiently manage the emerging unstable security environment.

Keywords: Romania, post-Cold war, military, security, risks, geopolitics

The end of the Cold War brought about a dramatcal geopolitical shift that embraced the whole Europe and much of Eurasia leading to a profound rethinking of the traditional security paradigm. In the new strategic context, we have been witnessing growing struggles to build new cooperation mechanisms replacing the bipolar order and the ideological confrontation to meet newly emerging external challenges and threats to international security.
The question of how to reshape the armed forces as to meet the new challenges and consequently, to be able to assume new types of missions required by the changing international situation was the core of the complex process of defense reform started in Romania after 1990.

The missions of the armed forces have been derived from four correlated defense policy objectives: integration into NATO and EU; finalizing the reform process in order to acquire modern, flexible and sustainable defense capabilities; developing the mechanisms for civil and democratic oversight; and improving Romania’s status as a security provider through maintaining and increasing its contribution to regional stability1.

Romania’s participation in peace operations has undergone several evolutions in the last two decades in terms of the type of operations conducted. In the recent years, the demand for peace operations has grown significantly, leading to a steadily rise in number of forces sent to various international missions. The needed assistance came in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing agreements, electoral support, military and law enforcement and economic and social development.

It is worth mentioning that during the Communist regime, the Romanian Armed Forces have not been engaged in multinational operations or other related international missions. The Romanian security concept was focused exclusively on the defending of the national territory. According to the assumptions explicit in its military doctrine, known as “the War of the Entire People”, and the defense law of 1972, Romania’s greatest likelihood of future military conflict was a defensive war fought on its territory against a more powerful aggressor (to be understood the Soviet Union). Thus, Romania’s strategy started from the assumption that the country’s homeland defense would involved a
massive, prolonged resistance that denies an enemy the possibility of a rapid, successful military operation against Romania and a high degree of cooperation among the regular military forces and paramilitary organizations, such as patriotic guards, detachments of the youth, or civil defense groups².

After the end of the Cold War, Romania’s national security was driven by the commitment to join the Euro-Atlantic security structures seen as the main guarantee of assuring its own national security. The shift from the territorial defence specific concepts to collective defence and countering asymmetric risks in the global perspective, required a profound reassessment of the national security approach and, implicitly, of the missions to be performed by the Romanian Armed Forces. As part of the new security vision, Romania has assumed an active participation in various international peacekeeping and peace-support operations as the expression of its determination to contribute to the international efforts to efficiently manage the emerging unstable security environment. The main missions of the military had to answer to a few requirements/features imposed by the new international trends: the potential of conventional wars in Europe highly decreased leading to the revision of defense concepts and missions; growing impact of threats posed by the emergence of failed and failing states (especially in the early ‘90s); globalization of the main security challenges; diversity of non-military and non-conventional risks and threats.

In order to fulfill its new missions required by the changing international security environment, Romania had to reform its military forces to implement NATO’s standards and interoperability objectives. Additionally, Romania participated actively in NATO combined exercises and exploit the training opportunities of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. In the ten years of PfP participation, Romania was engaged in more than 3,300 activities³.
Following the decision taken on November 21-22, 2002, during NATO summit in Prague, on March 29, 2004 Romania became a fully fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) together with other six states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia).

One of the major commitment assumed by Bucharest regarded the active participation in the entire range of allied operations, the enhancement of the Romanian armed forces’ level of interoperability and operational capacity within multinational forces. To this end, a major task was to revise the force structure and build up interoperable, high readiness, deployable and sustainable forces. On January 1, 2007, the Romanian Armed Forces have been completely professionalized. Based on national plans, all NATO-dedicated units are to become operational gradually until 2015, when command positions will represent 4.55% and execution positions will represent 95.45% of the armed forces’ personnel⁴.

The Romanian participation in international missions has been subject of firm internal and legal reglementations required by the need to bring Romania in line with the international procedures in place. Within the Romanian Constitution, the article no. 118 stipulates that: under the law and the international treaties Romania is a party to, the Army shall contribute to the collective defence in military alliance systems, and participate in peace keeping or peace restoring missions⁵. It is also mentioned that: foreign troops can only enter, station, carry out operations, or pass through the Romanian territory under the terms of the law or the international treaties Romania is a party to.

According to the constitutional law, the participation in international security mission, and in collective defence in military alliance systems, as well as in peace keeping or restoring missions, is to be regularized by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT).
The procedures that allow the deployment of Romanian troops abroad are settled though the law no. 42/2004. Following the entry into force of the new law, the consent of Parliament is no longer necessary for the deployment of troops in international missions as it is accepted that the international treaties to which Romania is a party make provision for troop deployments directly applicable. Therefore, the decision to participate in operations which are legitimized by the treaty or membership of an international organization is considered to be an executive responsibility. In the art.7 it is stated the obligation of the Romanian president to inform the Parliament about the decision to send troops abroad.

Nevertheless, the president cannot decide to send troops abroad if this obligation does not result from the international agreements that Romania is part of, acts that are ratified by the Parliament. It is the Parliament responsibility to approve the necessary funds for training and sending military units to international missions out of the national territory.

According to the Law, the main missions in which the Romanian Armed Forces will participate out of the national territory are the followings: collective defense, peace support, humanitarian assistance, coalition-type missions, common exercises, individual and ceremonial missions.

Under the current legislation, only soldiers and volunteer officers are compelled to attend missions outside Romania’s territory.

The main documents in the field of security and defense policy set as one of the top priorities of Romania’s security and foreign policy the active contribution to the regional and international efforts of projecting stability and managing the emerging potential crisis/conflicts.

Romania’s National Security Strategy recognized, as a top objective the building of a modern and professional Army, with mobile and multifunctional expeditionary forces that are swiftly deployable, flexi-
ble and effective, able to provide a reliable defence of the national territory, to fulfill its commitments to collective defence, and to take part in international operations, in keeping with the priorities and requirements of its foreign policy. The document also underlines Romania’s active participation in peacekeeping and security activities regionally and globally, and in effectively countering both traditional and asymmetric security risks and threats.

Moreover, the National Military Strategy states that Romania will be a key provider of regional stability and contributor to peace and security in Europe. In line with the document provisions, the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations will be carried out according to the provisions of the joint military doctrine and strategy, as well as to the provisions of the agreed common operational strategy.

THE BEGINNING OF THE ROMANIAN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

At its initial stage, the Romanian military participation focused mainly on humanitarian missions. Starting by 1996, the focus shifted to missions of military nature, by sending engineering units and consequently, infantry units with operational tasks that allowed even the use of force.

The Romanian Armed Forces have been participating with troops and capabilities in the peacekeeping operations and other-related missions organized by the United Nations, OSCE, EU and NATO. Several times Romania has participated in the missions mandated by UN, organized and conducted by the temporary coalitions of the member states and led by the US (the Desert Storm Operation in Iraq in 1991, Iraqi Freedom Operation: 2003-2009).
On September 24, 1998 Romania signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Concerning Stand-by Forces Arrangements. The purpose of the document is to identify the resources which the Government of Romania has indicated that it will provide to the United Nations for use in peacekeeping operations under the specified conditions.

The first military participation in a mission abroad started in 1991 when Romania brought its contribution and support to allied forces during the military operations launched against Iraq by a US-led international coalition under the auspices of UN - codenamed Desert Storm Operation. Romania contributed with 360 medical personnel and 180 chemical warfare experts after endorsing, as non-permanent member of the Security Council, the UN decision to condemn the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

PARTICIPATION IN UN MISSIONS

In the early 1990s, with the end of Cold War and collapse of the bipolar order, the UN agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded. At the request of the Security Council Summit of January 1992, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali prepared a document that was envisaged to become the conceptual foundation of an ambitious role to be assumed by the UN in peace and security matters. The report called An Agenda for Peace, underscored the four main interconnected roles that were to be assumed by the UN: peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. Romania strongly advocated the central role played by the United Nations in peacekeeping being a constant presence in both UN-mandated and UN-authorized peacekeeping and peace-support operations.
The first participation in UN peacekeeping operations began on April 23, 1991 when Romania deployed 10 Military Observers with the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). The UN mission was settled after the conclusion of the Desert Storm Operation and mandated to monitor the demilitarized zone and the Khawr ‘Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait. On 17 March 2003, in advance of the military campaign against Iraq by a coalition led by the United States, the UN Secretary-General decided to suspend UNIKOM’ operations and withdraw the Mission since, due to the military developments, it could no longer operate in the demilitarized zone.

Since then, over 7,000 Romanian military and police officers, liaison officers, military police, infantry troops have taken part in UN peacekeeping operations bringing their contribution to a variety of missions performed by UN in Africa, Balkans, South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The Romanian peacekeepers undertook a wide range of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

Between 1991-2009, Romania contributed with military observers, medical units and troops in 10 UN Missions developed in Africa, Middle East and Europe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>1991-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR II</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>09.03-1994 15.04.1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>50 Military Campaign Hospital</td>
<td>06.07.1993 26.10.1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2004, the United Nations (the Department of Safety and Security) signed a Memorandum with the Romanian Protection and Guard Service (PGS) for the purpose of providing protection for the UN officials who work in the theatres of operations in Sudan and Afghanistan.

The PGS started its participation in UN missions in 2004 when 11 officers were deployed in Sudan. They were assigned to provide protection for the UN officials who were performing diplomatic missions in Sudan. Afghanistan was the second theater of operation where the PGS’s forces have been involved in support of UN missions.

The missions performed by the PGS officers in partnership with the UN (2004-2007) are the following:

- Sudan: 2004-2006: 11-officer strength;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNAVEM III&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Staff officers</th>
<th>17.05.1995 08.07.1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Mechanized company</td>
<td>30.06.1997 26.02.1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Expert officer</td>
<td>August 2002 15.02.2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>2003-204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Liaison officers</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
<td>01.06.2004 31.12.2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Changing Security Paradigms in Romania and South Africa after the Cold War

2006-2007: 12-officer strength;
2007: mission under way - 12-officer strength (Khartoum);  
2007: mission under way - 12-officer strength (Darfur).

At present, a 12-officer team from the Protection and Guard Service is carrying out protection and guard missions for the UN high officials in the Darfur area of conflict with the UNAMID mission.  

Currently, Romania is engaged in UN missions with 98 military personnel, representing the 64th position of the 117 contributing member states:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Observers &amp; Staff Officers</th>
<th>Police Officers</th>
<th>Established at</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.04.2004</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC/MONUSCO</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30.11.1999</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.03.2002</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.06.1999</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.09.2003</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.01.2007</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.03.2005</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.08.2006</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>04.04.2004</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS: IFOR/SFOR

The Romanian Armed Forces became fully committed and engaged in the international endeavor of bringing peace and stability within the Balkan region deeply affected by the outbreak of the civil war after the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation.

Romania’s participation in the international efforts to ensure stability and security in the region answered to a decisive choice made by Bucharest to act as a credible and trustworthy ally, showing its readiness to broaden its engagement in the Balkan region both politically and militarily. From political point of view, Bucharest leadership constantly supported the aspirations of the countries in the region towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration and advocated the need for strengthening the political dialogue among the countries of the region. From a military perspective, Romania is present with troops in various missions and operations undertaken by UN, NATO, EU in such a way being an active contributor to the internal endeavors aiming at maintaining a safe and secure environment in the Balkans.

Moreover, due to its close proximity, the dynamics of the developments in the Balkan region became a matter of high security concern for Bucharest, given the risks of regional destabilization, and therefore, motivated its decision of bringing its full contribution aiming at restoring peace and stability and projecting security within this neighboring area.

Romania started its military involvement in the Balkans in the mid-‘90s. The war in Bosnia which broke out in 1992 turned to become a dramatic refugee crisis as the Bosnian Serb guerrillas launched deadly campaigns of “ethnic cleansing,” aiming at creating exclusively Serb areas. On December 14, 1995, the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the Dayton peace accords, officially ending the wars
in Bosnia and Croatia. The following day the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1031 authorized the deployment in Bosnia, for one year, of the multilateral NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the U.N. Charter’s Chapter VII, having as the main task to enforce compliance with the provisions of Dayton Agreement. On December 20, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for 18 months.

Given the emerging regional developments, Romania decided to be actively engaged in the international efforts by contributing to the NATO-led operation. Therefore, based on the decisions no. 23 and 45 from 1995 of the Romanian Parliament, on the decision no. 63 from February 7, 1996 of the Romanian Government and on the decision of the Romanian General Staff from December 27, 1995, it was decided the Romanian troops deployment within IFOR NATO-led mission. Romania was engaged with the 96th Battalion of Engineers “Joseph Kruzel” formed of 200 military that was deployed in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the first ever Romanian participation in a NATO-led operation. The Romanian battalion operated within the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and performed a various tasks as mine clearing, building of bridges and roads, being also involved in several humanitarian projects.

In December 1996, the internal developments in Bosnia led NATO to replace IFOR with a Stabilization Force- SFOR mission18- that was a smaller force, initially with about 32,000 troops. NATO extended SFOR a second time in June 2008-called SFOR II mission.

Romania continued its military participation within the new NATO mission. Through the decision no. 25 from 1996, the Romanian Parliament decided Romania’s engagement within SFOR for a period of 18 months (from Jan. 1997 – June 1998)19 with “Joseph Kruzel” 96th Engineering Battalion.

The Romanian participation in SFOR II mission has been approved by the Romanian Parliament through the Decision no. 22 from June 27, 2000. Consequently, on the 1st of July, 2000, the detachment “Bosnia” formed of 68 military started its engagement with the SFOR II mission. The Romanian troops remained involved within SFOR until its conclusion in June 2004 when NATO member states agreed at Istanbul Summit with the EU’s proposal as to replace the existed force with the Althea EU-led Operation.

From the beginning of the Romanian military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 691 military (84 officers, 250 military foremen, and 357 NCOs) participated and more than 200 missions took place.

Romanian Armed Forces’ undertakings were highly appreciated leading to the continuation of its presence in other peacekeeping and stabilization missions in the Balkans.

**KFOR NATO-LED OPERATION**

The breaking out of Kosovo crisis in 1998 and the growing concerns over the possible consequences of speeding out the violence all over the region required a firm answer from the international community. On 23 March 1999, following a deterioration of the situation and a series of failed negotiations with the Serbian leadership, NATO launched a campaign of air strikes, codenamed Operation “Allied Force”, against the military capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that lasted for 75 days. Although, Romania did not partici-
pate directly in the NATO military operations in Kosovo, Bucharest leadership expressed its full support to the international efforts of stabilizing the Balkans. It granted NATO unrestricted access to its airspace, established new communication channels with the Alliance and allowed NATO troops to transit and NATO air space management equipment to be installed on its territory.

Following the air campaign, the Security Council authorized the establishment of an international security implementation force having as the main goal to provide secure environment for the return of refugees and deter any renewed hostility - called NATO KFOR mission that was established in Kosovo by June 20, 1999.

Romania has contributed to the International Peace Force in Kosovo with staff officers in the Force Command structures since 1999. The troop contribution started in 2001 with a traffic control platoon consisting of 25 soldiers – deployed to Djeneral Jancovic region, under Greek contingent command.

In the following years, the Romanian forces have performed a wide range of missions with KFOR mission: the permanent control of their area of responsibility, the enforcement of the Peace Agreement stipulations, rapid reaction squad for intervention, convoy and VIP escorts inside and outside the area of responsibility, contribution to anti-smuggling campaign „BLACK CARGO“, specific missions to prevent the smugglers intrusion in Kosovo by joint air-land operations, with the air helicopter support along the province border. Starting with August 20, 2000, Romanian observers were deployed as part of the “UNMIK Mission” in Kosovo.

Following the declaration of independence of Kosovo, on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo: to
assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as well as the
civilian structure to oversee the KSF\textsuperscript{23}.

Romania continues to support the allied efforts aimed at main-
taining a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in
Kosovo. Given Romania’s position of non-recognition of the indepen-
dence declared by Kosovo, the Romanian forces do not participate
in the execution of the new tasks, but they are involved exclusively in
maintaining security in Kosovo, on the basis of the mandate conferred
by UNSCR 1244.

At present, the Romanian Armed Forces contribute to KFOR
mission with approximately 145 troops consisting of Romanian For-
ce National Detachment (ROFND) of 86 militaries, staff personnel,
intelligence personnel and liaison staff\textsuperscript{24}.

**SUPPORT TO EU-LED PEACE OPERATIONS**

The EU’s raising profile as a significant international actor in the
defence and security field represents a crucial element of the chan-
ging international security system. This dynamic led, after 1999, to the
gradual development of the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) and, consequently, to a more substantial role assumed by the
EU in building security in Europe and other areas.

On November 21, 2000, Romania committed itself, at the EU Ca-
pabilities Commitment Conference, to provide troops for the **Euro-
pean Rapid Reaction Force**. Romania’s offer consisted of a infantry
company, a group of divers, a military police platoon, an engineer bat-
talion, a rescue ship\textsuperscript{25}.

Romania also contributed to the successful completion of the Ci-
vilian Headline Goal 2008 (the main document on civilian capabiliti-
es development for ESDP) and it actively attended the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference (November, 2008)\textsuperscript{26}.

Starting by January 2003, Romania has been engaged in a variety of missions developed by the EU in Europe, Africa, and Middle East: civilian crisis management operations, military operations, police and rule of law missions, monitoring missions.

The Romanian Forces are one of the main contributors to the EU missions in the Balkans being engaged in five EU missions in that area and performing a variety of tasks, from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management.

Since the beginning, Romania participated with the \textbf{European Union Police Mission} (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina which represents the EU’s first-ever civilian crisis management operation under European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Launched on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of January 2003, the EUPM operation sought to establish in Bosnia-Herzegovina, through mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, a sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police service operating in accordance with European and international standards\textsuperscript{27}.

Romania is currently engaged with 9 police officers covering Bosnia-Herzegovina’s whole administrative territory, which represents a percentage of 2.18\% out of the general total\textsuperscript{28}.

At the end of 2004, the leadership of the General Staff of the European Union (EU) conveyed an official request to Romania to consider the offer of participation with forces to \textbf{EUFOR-ALTHEA operation} in Bosnia-Herzegovina\textsuperscript{29}. The juridical base of Romania’s participation at this operation is represented by the Agreement signed with the EU on November 22, 2004.

The Operation EUFOR-Althea is the most important operation developed under the aegis of European Union in the Balkan region. It should be mentioned that the mission has been carried out under the
NATO-EU agreement – called ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. The main mission of the EU’s Operation Althea has been to ensure continued compliance with the 1995 Dayton Agreement and contribute to a secure environment and Bosnia’s efforts towards European integration.

Romanian readiness to contribute came to prove the Romanian Army continuous participation in the security and stability reconstruction in the Balkans and in the support granted to a more important European Union implication in this region.

Romanian involvement in the EU mission ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina is maintained with a military police platoon (22 militaries), HUMINT elements and staff personnel contributing 60 troops.

Romania also participates with troops in the EUFOR Concordia Missions, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was the first EU military operation deployed (31 March 2003-15 December 2003). This multinational monitoring mission had replaced a NATO-led operation - ALLIED HARMONY- with the aim of further contributing to a stable, secure environment in the FYROM and ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the political accord which settled the conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians. The operation was requested by the FYROM and endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371, for a six months period.

The Romanian military participation in the EU Operation-Concordia has been approved by the Parliament on April 17, 2003 and envisaged a force made of three staff officers and a national intelligence cell of 6 military. It was also decided to settle a force reserve of 10 military available for the EU in case of a request for additional forces.

After the conclusion of Concordia Mission, EU continued to provide support to FYROM through the police mission code-named Operation EUPOL PROXIMA. The mission was launched on De-
cember 15, 2003 and lasted until December 14, 2005\textsuperscript{32}. PROXIMA was part of the European Union’s overall commitment in assisting the efforts of the Government of FYROM to move closer towards EU integration. In the period 2003-2005, Romania participated in Proxima EU-led operation with 3 police officers.

Romanian forces are also contributing to the EU’s largest civilian crisis management mission to date- ‘\textit{EULEX Kosovo}’ - the European Union Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo-, which has been launched on February 16, 2008 for a two year period. EULEX is tasked to support, mentor, monitor, and advise the local authorities on all areas related to the establishment of the rule of law. The unilateral declaration of independence of Pristina in February 2008 brought about significant readjustments of the mission’s initial mandate\textsuperscript{33}. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the EU mission should remain officially neutral on the question of Kosovo’s independent status.

Romania is engaged with the International Missions Detachment of the Romanian Gendarmerie. Romania started its participation on December 10, 2008, based on the official request made to Romania by the Council of the European Union and on the resolution no. 172 of 18 December 2007 of the CSAT regarding the approval of Romania’s participation in the mission. Romania is among the largest contributors, along France and Italy, to the EU-led mission in Kosovo, participating with the Gendarmes Detachment of 115 gendarmes (12 officers, 103 warrants and NCOs and specialists which are located in the base from Peja, Kosovo) and 60 policemen. According to the CSAT resolution, Romania will continue its participation until the end of the mission\textsuperscript{34}.

As the EU extended its contribution to other European areas, Romania showed and confirmed its capacity and determination to play a significant role in the wider context of the EU foreign policy.
Following the War in Georgia (August 2008), the EU Council decided, on 15 September 2008, to establish an autonomous civilian monitoring mission in Georgia. The mission was deployed on the 1st of October 2008, in accordance with the arrangements set out in the Agreement of September 8, 2008, signed by the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and the French president Nicholas Sarkozy (France being the holding country of the EU presidency)\textsuperscript{35}. In July 2009, the mandate of the mission was extended for another year until 14 September 2010. Its main tasks include: monitoring and analyzing the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, centred on full compliance of the six-point Agreement; monitoring and analyzing the situation as regards normalization building, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and contributing to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence-building measures.

Romania is a participating country contributing, as of June 15, 2009, a total of 7 monitors to the mission.

Romania is also a member country of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine- EUBAM mission. Launched on 30 November 2005, at the joint request of the Presidents of the Republic Moldova and Ukraine, the EUBM is tasked to contribute to the delivery of good quality border and customs services to the citizens and companies of Moldova and Ukraine to facilitate contacts and trade. According to the latest agreement between the EU and the Governments of Moldova and Ukraine the Mission was prolonged until 30 November 2011\textsuperscript{36}.

Romanian engagement in the EU civilian missions conducted in Africa and Middle East is also significant. Romania sent 120 soldiers to \textbf{EUFOR mission} in Chad/RCA\textsuperscript{37}, developed between 2007-2009. In \textbf{EUPOL Kinshasa}- the EU mission in RD Congo- Romania participates with 1 police officer starting by June 29, 2006. 1 Romanian police officer participates in \textbf{EU BAM Rafah mission} (the EU Missi-
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In the Middle East, Romanian military are contributing to the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) which is the EU’s first integrated rule of law mission, performed in Iraq under the auspices of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU mission started on 1 July 2005 being tasked to provide professional development opportunities to senior Iraqi officials from the criminal justice system. The EU Council adopted, on 14 June 2010, the decision of extending by 24 months the EUJUST LEX in Iraq (EUJUST LEX Iraq), from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2012. During this additional period, EUJUST LEX will progressively shift its activities and relevant structures to Iraq, focusing on specialized training, while maintaining out-of-country activities.

In the framework of its comprehensive approach towards Afghanistan, the EU has launched the EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) in mid-June 2007. On 18 May 2010, the Council has extended the mission for a period of 3 years, until 31 May 2013. The mission has as the main task to establish a sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. More particularly, the mission monitors, mentors, advises and trains at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces.

Romania is participating with 5 policemen. On June 23, 2010, Romanian president approved the deployment of additional 5 police troops in support of EUPOL mission.

**MISSIONS UNDER OSCE MANDATE**

With the end of the Cold War, the OSCE played an important role in expanding the zone of stability in Eastern Europe and launched im-
portant field activities aimed at building up democratic institutions and strengthening civil society in these countries. By 1992, the OSCE run a variety of missions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia, of different nature: unstable peace, crisis and conflict, and post-conflict rehabilitation.

Starting by 1992, Romania actively participated in 4 OSCE missions performed in Eastern Europe and Caucasus, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OSCE Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Observers &amp; Staff Officers</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Infantry tactical detachment</td>
<td>04.05.1997-24.07.1997</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillover Monitor Mission</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>15.10.2001-30.06.2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>25.07.1999-30.06.2009</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, led to a dramatic rethinking process of the international security system. Romania, like most other nations, reacted with strong support for the US and unequivocal condemnation of the terrorists. In the same day, the Romanian President convoked the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) as to assess the emerging evolutions of the crisis generated by the terrorist attacks and possible ways of action to be undertaken in that specific situation. The CSAT pledged Romania's
participation as de facto NATO ally and urged General Staff to immediately respond to concrete requests from US and NATO in case of military deployment requirements. On September 19, 2001, the Parliament approved, with an overwhelming majority, the Resolution no. 21 concerning Romania’s participation, along with the NATO member states, in the war against international terrorism, through all means, including military ones. The Resolution also stated that that in the event of a NATO request to such effect, Romania will grant access to its airspace, airports, land and sea facilities.

On October 30, 2001, Romania signed the military cooperation agreement with the USA called SOFA Agreement (Status of Forces Agreement), concerning the status of the US forces, which participate in military operations, on the Romanian territory. The agreement settles the grounds for the endorsement of the military relations with the USA and allows the American troops to transit or remain limited period of time on the Romanian territory.

Therefore, the tragic event of September 11 allowed Romania to demonstrate its commitment to act as a responsible member of the international community and broadened its activities towards achieving its national interests, meaning the accelerated integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures by joining NATO and the EU.

In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks the United States launched a large-scale military operation against the terrorist facilities from Afghanistan - codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom.

As the US-led war against Al-Qaeda was launched on October 7, 2001, Bucharest leadership expressed its solidarity and commitment to provide its full support. A few days before, on October 1, 2001, the Romanian Ministry of Defense authorized the over flight rights on the national air space and approved the transit of the American troops for support and transport missions.

Starting by October 6, 2001, Romanian forces took part in the Operation “Active Endeavor” conducted by NATO in support of
anti-terrorist operations launched by the US, following the activation of the Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Romania contributed three times to this operation with frigates type 22. Frigate „Regele Ferdinand“ participated in this mission from October 15 to December 15, 2005, October 13 to November 19, 2007, and frigate „Regina Maria“ from September 15 to November 30, 2006, in the Central and Eastern Basin of the Mediterranean Sea. The Romanian frigates carried out maritime patrol missions under the command of the Allied Maritime Component Command Naples – CC-MAR Naples.

The mission of the naval forces engaged in this operation was to monitor and deter all terrorist actions including the escort of the civil ships belonging to NATO in the Mediterranean Sea.

In the new changing international environment, Bucharest clarified the new Romanian international posture, arguing Romania must be prepared to undertake responsibilities outside of Europe.

OUT-OF AREA MISSIONS. ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN AFGHANISTAN ISAF NATO-LED OPERATION

Romanian military participation in Afghanistan included the two large operations conducted: ISAF – International Security Assistance Force and OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom.

In the aftermath of the US-led anti-terrorists operations in Afghanistan, the United Nations Security Council authorized establishment, in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001, of a 5,000-strong “coalition of the willing”, called the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). The main task assumed by ISAF (UN-mandated international force) was to maintain security in Kabul and
its surrounding areas – in particular to enable the Afghan authorities as well as UN personnel to operate in a secure environment. Therefore, ISAF became a key component of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and development.

In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.

On 11 August 2003, upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation. Therefore, the Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of all ISAF force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

From the very beginning, Romania was an important contributor to ISAF Operation. The legal framework for country’s participation to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan is Parliament’s Decision no. 38 from 21 December 2001, regarding Romania’s participation in International Security Assistance Forces within “FINGAL” Operation.

Another important step has been made on January 10, 2002, when Romania signed in London the Memorandum of Understanding for building up the ISAF. On January 29, 2002, the first Romanian troops arrived to Kabul, being deployed within the Kabul Multinational Brigade.

The effective participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in ISAF Operation in Afghanistan began on February 3, 2002. The initial forces consisted of a military police platoon - 25 militaries, a C-130 Hercules
carrier for transportation with two crews and auxiliary personnel- 20 militaries; 3 liaison officers and 9 staff officers detached at ISAF General Headquarters of Kabul. The main tasks of the Romanian militaries included patrol and traffic control missions, protection of officers, civilians and buildings, anti-terrorist investigations and control.

It should be mentioned that the Romanian ISAF military personnel was especially selected from elite military units based on their individual experience and achievement while participating in peace support operations in the Balkans and Africa. Other selection criteria included physical, medical and psychological fitness as well as English language proficiency. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the military personnel are comprised solely of volunteers.

The forces are deployed for six month mandate and they have to perform different kind of activities within ISAF’s area of responsibility (in and around capital city of Kabul).

Romanian participation covers a variety of military branches, such as: medical, information /intelligence, military police, air traffic, and combat forces performing a large range of missions: impose ISAF protection measures in Kabul, ensure security of ISAF objectives, traffic control and traffic incidents investigations, security of the responsibility area, patrol service, escort of refugees, military and civilian convoys, monitor of criminal activities in Kabul and anti-terrorist control, etc. A C-130 Hercules aircraft is used for providing transportation of the military personnel, equipment and humanitarian missions.

An important task assumed by the Romanian troops is carrying out in the field of reconstruction and rebuilding the country by participating in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established starting by December 2002. The overall PRT concept in Afghanistan is to use relatively small joint civil-military units to achieve three objectives: to improve security, to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, and finally to facilitate reconstruction. Currently, Romania
runs a NATO Provincial Reconstruction team with the United States in Qalat, Zabol Province.

In July 2002 the first Romanian Infantry Battalion – the 26-th Infantry Battalion “Red Scorpions” was deployed in the theatre – Kandahar Airfield, (about 400 troops). It was the first Romanian military detachment involved in war operations, after the Second World War.

The Romanian Army rotated in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan two Infantry Battalions per year. In the following period, as the military operations extended, the Romanian military participation increased accordingly. For Romania this was a crucial test before getting the official invitation of joining NATO as a full-fledged member. Romania showed, by actively participating in the war against terrorism, its commitment to contribute to the international security efforts and its capability to perform a large range of military missions and cooperate closely with the other NATO allies in the war against terrorism.

On SACEUR request, between August and November 2005, Romania activated the Strategic Reserve consisting of an infantry battalion in order to support the domestic elections in Afghanistan in 2005. During their three months mandate, the Romanian troops performed over 300 missions in both the area of responsibility (in the northern Afghanistan) and in Kabul region in supporting the electoral process. Between April and August 2006 Romania was the lead nation having the command of Kabul International Airport (KAIA).

Since October 2006, when NATO – ISAF took command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan, close to 2,000 Romanian troops operated within ISAF playing a highly important role, along the other contributing countries, in assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability.

As a response to a NATO request, the Romanian contribution to ANA Training mission (Afghan National Army Training Mission) was
increased in 2008 by deploying the first Garrison level - Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) followed by 2 Battalion level - OMLTs’ in 2009 and 2010.

**COALITION-TYPE MISSION/ ENDURING FREEDOM OPERATION**

The Enduring Freedom Operation has been launched on October 7, 2001 having as the main military objectives the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al-Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.

At the request of Romanian president, the Parliament approved on April 30, 2002, the Romanian participation in the Enduring Freedom Operation with an infantry battalion of 405 military, a NBC company of 70 military and a reserve of 10 military in case of a request of force supplementation.

The military deployment started on June 25, 2002. The Romanian troops were assigned to perform different kind of missions: to guard and secure Kandahar Airport, to patrol and control the main roads and ways of communications, to provide security to various logistic operations, to provide humanitarian support to Afghan population and medical assistance, to perform CIMIC projects, etc.

Currently, Romania’s contribution with the Enduring Freedom Operation consists of 8 troops.

On April 3, 2008, the heads of state and government of the countries participating in ISAF issued a “Strategic Vision” statement explaining their “guiding principles” for Afghanistan. The declaration calls for “a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by
the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. In this context, the supplementation of troop’s deployments became crucial.

In January 2009, president Traian Basescu pointed out that Romania has met its security commitments by doubling troop’s part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Romania will now increase its involvement in civilian operations.

As of 15 June 2009, Romania was contributing a total of 904 troops to ISAF. Romania also pledged an additional 108 troops to be dispatched to Afghanistan as of 2010.

In January 2010, Romania’s Supreme Council for National Defense announced to send 600 more troops to Afghanistan, boosting its military presence there to 1,737 soldiers.

Currently, Romania has 1,663 military in Afghanistan of which 1655 for the ISAF operations of NATO and 8 within the Enduring Freedom operation of the International Coalition.

**ROMANIAN TROOPS IN IRAQ**

The 2003 US-led military intervention in Iraq provoked growing diplomatic and strategic tensions in the transatlantic security alliance leading to one of the most acute crisis between the American and European allies after the end of the Cold War. The differences exacerbated as some Europeans, especially France and Germany, kept a reluctant position over Washington’s decision to launch military operations in Iraq. This was the beginning of critical debates concerning the possible impact that the emerging transatlantic rift might have on the cohesion of the Western alliance.
The position adopted by the Central and Eastern European countries to support the United States with their policy towards Iraq led to additional growing division lines among the European allies. In this regard, of a special relevance is the Vilnius Ten group letter issued in support of the US in which is highlighted the need of the transatlantic community to stay and act together to face the threat posed by “the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction”\textsuperscript{51}. Romania was among the ten Central and Eastern European countries signing the document and, thus, pledging backing for the U.S. stance on Iraq.

The military campaign in Iraq was launched on March 20, 2003, by a US-led Multinational Force. The operation was codenamed Iraqi Freedom Operation. Romania expressed its firm support to the United States and their allies towards the Iraqi crisis.

Since the beginning, Romania provided a significant contribution to the operations in Iraq. The military cooperation with Romania became crucial after Turkey denied permission for U.S. forces to use its territory to operate in Iraq from the north. In that particular situation, Romania allowed the use of Mihail Kogalniceanu airport to launch the military actions and other required facilities.

On June 19, 2003, the Romanian Parliament approved the request of the President concerning Romania’s participation with 678 militaries at Iraqi Stabilization and Reconstruction Force.

The Romanian military participation in the process of stabilizing Iraq started in July 2003 contributing with military units and staff personnel in the operations Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi Sunset, NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) and the UN Mission UNAMI.

The Romanian contribution to bring stabilization in Iraq included engineer detachments, military police, infantry troops, medical units, intelligence personnel.
Romania has originally deployed in Iraq 730 soldiers (400 infantry, 100 military police, 150 de-miners, 50 intelligence officers, and 30 medical personnel). At its peak, the Romanian forces operated in three different zones (South-East, Central, and Baghdad). They performed a wide range of missions: base security, supply-route security and quick-reaction forces in Basrah, training and monitoring of Iraqi Army units, reconnaissance and surveillance missions, training, peacekeeping missions, base protection missions, etc.

Romanian staff officers carried out training missions in Baghdad under NTM-I\textsuperscript{52} and conducted training/course for Iraqi officers at NATO PfP Regional Training Centre in Brasov/Romania.

Following the request made by the United State in 2004, Romania’s CSAT approved in October 2004 country’s participation in the protection force of the UN Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) with an infantry detachment of 100 soldiers.

On December 31, 2008, the Romanian troops started their participation in Operation “Iraqi Sunset” by performing training and humanitarian missions.

Romania reduced its participation in Iraq, first to 501 by November 2008, and by early 2009, Romania reduced its contingent to 350. The Romania forces were stationed in Nasiriyah and Al-Kut. On November 6, 2008, Romania announced the decision to withdraw its troops by the end of the year and leave a small group of advisers to assist the Iraqi authorities. In 2008, the Romanian president announced that the troops would stay until 2011, but under the terms of the SOFA agreement between the United States and Iraq that mentioned that all non-US forces must leave Iraq prior to July 31, 2009, Romania decided to pull out its troops.

On January 20, 2009, the Romania’s Supreme Council for National Defense approved the Memorandum of Understanding containing also regulations concerning the status of Romanian forces deployed in
Iraq. On this occasion, Romania’s CSAT agreed on the withdrawal of the Romanian forces from the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG).

Romania formally ended its mission in Iraq on June 4, 2009. On July 23, 2009 the last Romanian soldiers left Iraq. Romania continues to participate in NATO Training Mission in Iraq with 3 militaries. Since August 2003, Romania has deployed more than 5,200 troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Conclusions

In the recent years, Romania was a constant presence in international peace keeping and peace-support operations. Romania’s participation in the international efforts to ensure stability and security in various parts of the world answered to a decisive choice made by Bucharest to act as a credible and trustworthy ally on the international arena.

There are over 2,000 Romanian peacekeepers on duty around the world, which makes the country a major contributor in a wide range of international operations performed under NATO, UN, and EU mandate in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

Since 1990, the international contribution of the Romanian forces covered the whole spectrum missions: collective defense within NATO under article 5 of the Washington Treaty; defense against terrorism; non-article 5 missions, regarding crisis response operations, crisis and conflict management and the whole spectrum of peace support operations; coalition-type missions; post-conflict military actions, in order to rebuild some structures and infrastructures, to stabilize some areas and reconstruct some governmental, central and regional capabilities.
In terms of police missions, Romania has been an active provider and has made significant contributions to the police missions conducted under the aegis of the European Union. A total of 48 police officers are deployed in peacekeeping missions in: Haiti (23), RD Congo (14); Timor-Leste (10); Kosovo (1). Close Protection Teams under the lead of Department of Safety and Security are also participating in peacekeeping missions in: Sudan/Khartoum, UNMIS (12), Sudan/ Darfur, UNAMID (12) and Afghanistan, UNAMA (12).

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the USA, Romania contributing sizable forces to the war against Al-Qaeda and to the peacekeeping and reconstruction missions in Afghanistan. Romania is one of the biggest military contributors among the new NATO members able to participate on allied ground, in air and naval operations. Romania participated with forces and capabilities to all NATO-led operations: ISAF in Afghanistan, SFOR/IFOR missions, Kosovo Force (KFOR), NATO Training Mission in Iraq and the only Art.5 Allied Operation taking place in the Mediterranean Sea (Operation Active Endeavour).

A careful consideration of the experience gained through the participation of the Romanian forces in these peacekeeping operations made possible the achievement of operational compatibility/interoperability/ with the NATO’ principles of command, standards and normative regulations.

Romania will continue its presence in the international missions from Africa, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Afghanistan and Balkans under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. In late August 2009, however, the Supreme Council for National Defense decided Romania should not join the international peace for in Lebanon for the time being as Romania was already involved in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
For the future, Romania committed itself to further contribute to the international efforts of stabilization and reconstruction. During the CSAT reunion of January 2010, it was settled a limit of 3,753 for the overall number of Romanian troops that can participate in missions outside its territory in 2010.

Romania, as both an EU and NATO member, sees an evolving role for its military and police forces in international peacekeeping and conflict-preventing initiatives, with a special focus on the Balkans and the Middle East regions.

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ACRONYMS

CSAT - Supreme Council of National Defense
EUPM - European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL Proxima - EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EULEX Kosovo - European Union Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo
EUBAM - European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUBAM Rafah - European Union Mission Support and Monitoring Rafah
EUJUST Lex - European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
IFOR - Implementation Force/ NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
IPTF/UNMIBH- United Nations International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
KFOR - Kosovo Force
KPC - Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF - Kosovo Security Force
MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MINUCI - United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire
MONUA - The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC - United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ONUB - The United Nations Operation in Burundi
PGS - Protection and Guard Service
SFOR - Stabilization Force/ NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAVEM - The United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNMA - United Nations Mission in Angola
UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNAMIR - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN - United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS - UN Mission in Sudan
UNMIT - UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNMEE - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOMIG - United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNIKOM - United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission
ENDNOTES


3 Romania was the first nation to sign the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace, on January 26, 1994


6 The Law no. 42 of 15th of December 2004 concerning the participation of the Romanian Forces in international missions abroad. The Law is published in the Official Monitor no. 242 of 18th of March 2004


10 At that time, Romania became the 18th member state that joined U.N. Stand-by Arrangements System.


12 The mandate of the Mission was completed on October 6, 2003.

13 In February 1995, Romania was invited by the UN Secretary General to contribute with 36 Staff Officers & Military Police, an Infantry Battalion (751 military personnel) and a Military Field Hospital (110 military medical personnel) at the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). As a result, on May 1995, the first 143 Romanian peacekeepers for UNAVEM III started their military participation in Luanda (Angola). During the months of August and September, 1995 their number increased to a total of 887 military personnel.

Between May 1995 and June 1997, when Security Council decided to transform the UNAVEM Mission in an Observer Mission (MONUA), more than 3600 Romanian military personnel served in Angola for the implementation of peace process.
14 External missions carried out by the Protection and Guard Service under the aegis of the United Nations, http://www.spp.ro/English/SPP_in_misiuni_ONU.htm


17 In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1925 of 28th of May 2010, MONUC was renamed as of 1 July 2010 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the new phase reached in the country.

18 SFOR’s mission, as defined by NATO HQ, is “to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for civil implementation plans.”

19 Calin Hentea, Laurentiu Sfintes, Armata Romana in Misiuni de Pace (The Romanian Armed Forces in Peace Missions), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998

20 NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm

21 In October 1998, the Romanian Parliament approved a government decision to allow NATO forces limited access “for emergency and unforeseen situations” to the country’s air space in the case of NATO military intervention in FR Yugoslavia.


23 NATO’s Role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm#tasks


25 See the statement of Ioan M. Plangu, State Secretary and chief of the Department for Defense Policy, in Monitor Strategic, no.2/2000


29 Following the decision taken by NATO at its June summit on June 28-29, 2004 to conclude the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on December 2, 2004, the
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peace stabilization duties were taken over by the EU force called Operation Althea. On 19 November 2007, the EU agreed to retain a military presence in the country for as long as necessary as part of its overall engagement in Bosnia.

30 The *Berlin Plus Agreement* was adopted at the 1999 Washington NATO Summit and allows the EU to make use of NATO’s military assets in its own operations.

31 The Agreement between the European Union and Romania on the participation of Romania in the European Union-led forces (EUF) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been concluded on November 07, 2003.

32 Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov


35 The September Agreement states that: “It is necessary to accelerate preparations for the deployment of additional monitors in the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to a level high enough to replace Russian peacekeeping forces before October 1, 2008; in effect, at least 200 monitors from the European Union.”

“The European Union, as a guarantor of the principle of the non-use of force, is actively working on the deployment of an observation mission in addition to the already existing observation mechanisms.”, http://moscowcorrespondent.wordpress.com/2008/09/08/russia-steps-back-medvedev-sarkozy-agreement/


40 Starting with the 25th of July 1992, the group of Romanian military observers has been downsized from 25 to 6 military


46 During NATO summit held in Prague (21-22 November 2002), it was underlined the need to be prepared to support or lead operations and deploy forces, wherever the Alliance decides.

47 The Parliament’s decision concerning the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in “Enduring Freedom” Operation in Afghanistan, The Official Monitor/Monitorul Oficial 295 from 30 April 2002


50 Under a Government Resolution published on May 3, 2010 in the Official Monitor of Romania, the Ministry of National Defence receives 61.521 million lei (about 14.475 million euros) to cover the costs of the supplementation of Romanian troops in Afghanistan in the second quarter of 2010. The money will be used for the training and equipping of the extra troops as well as for the reconfiguration of the Romanian contingent deployed to the Afghanistan theater of operations in 2010. According to the same Resolution, the budget required for the entire reconfiguration of the Romanian forces is in excess of 210 million lei, and the rest of the amount will be made available in Q3 and Q4 either from the Reserve Fund, or by a budget amendment operated by the Government.

51 Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries in Response to the presentation by the US Secretary of State to UNSC Concerning Iraq, February 11, 2003. The letter
was signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was set up based on UN Security Council Resolution 1546 and the decision agreed by all NATO member countries at Istanbul NATO summit held on June 28, 2004, following the official letter sent by the interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi asking for NATO support. The NTM-I is not a combat mission. Its operational emphasis is on training and mentoring, and equipment donation and coordination through the NATO Training and Equipment Co-ordination Group. The aim of NTM-I is to help Iraq develop a democratically-led and enduring security sector and help the Iraqi government build the capability to ensure, by its own means, the security needs of the Iraqi people.

ABSTRACT

Since 1989, Romanian armed forces were the subject of a long and gradual process, with the purpose to transform them from a “total defense” operational concept (all azimuths) to a “power projection” pattern. Projecting power abroad is not necessarily a risky behavior but a guarantee for preserving our national interests. Beyond the defense of national territory and population, the Romanian Army became a valuable tool for fulfilling external multi-national missions – peace-support operations, nation building, thus helping the international community to rebuild failing states. Understanding the patterns of civil-military relations allows the assessment of the new democratically controlled armed forces and the influence of the political factor on the military issues.

Keywords: Social sciences, sociology, military, reform, control, democratic

SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY

Social sciences are absolutely necessary to explain the details of the civil-military relations, and military sociology is the best suited for understanding the relations between the society and the military body
within a country. The Romanian case of the civil-military evolutions after 1990 is part of the general transformations of civilian control on armed forces in the post-communist Eastern Europe.

The “democratic control” regards the control by elected civilian authorities on the military. Because politicians (civilians) are elected by people, not the military, they should apply the political will of the whole electoral body on behalf of the entire nation. The military should play the role of servants who implement the will of the civilians in the realm of applying armed force. The nation is the holder of sovereignty, the politicians are delegated by people to make the policies and the military are a technical staff which oversight the security of the state and population. Almost all the states have armies, which are institutional tools for the management of collective (national) violence with the aim of ensuring the defense of the territory, population, sovereignty. The social order of states is defended against external but also against internal enemies, depending on the historic circumstances, identity, socio-economic issues.

One should refer to the major theories of this sub-branch of the military sociology. M. Janowitz and S. Huntington offered the most well-known explaining patterns. With the famous book *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington could be seen as the modern founding father of this subfield of the military sociology. The “societal” and the “functional” factors are shaping the relations between military and civilians and, generally speaking, the tension between the “soldier” and statesman is generated by military professionalism. The “subjective control” implies minimizing the military’s power and the use of their power/prestige to increase civilian groups’ power. The Army is tempted to support certain civilian groups in their political competition with the others, so the
officers are in fact sympathetic to political groups and thus the Army is eventually politicized. The opposite category, the “objective civilian control” means a greater professionalization of all the armed forces and a real distance between civilians (politicians) and the military which assume a pure technical role. The military keep a neutral stance towards politics, refusing to be absorbed into the political arena.

He thought that only by an “objective civilian control” by the society on the officer corps there will be an optimum form of civil-military relations. The “functional” imperative regards the threats and risks perceived by the society, while the “societal” one is based on the social forces, ideologies and dominant social institutions. The officer corps must be assigned a neutral and technical set of tasks, its neutrality meaning a non-implication in the politics game. The military should not try to interfere in politics because they lack the democratic legitimacy, they should keep themselves into the realm of the technical use of the armed force. Thus, maximizing the level of the officer corps’ professionalism means to recognize their autonomy within a clearly defined military sphere. Huntington defined the officers body through the professionalism feature – “Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of the previous ages”².

As any other profession, the main elements of distinction are: the expertise, the responsibility and the corporate pattern. The officers’ body should master the appropriate knowledge on “organizing and applying violence”. The “management of the violence” is the essence of the military profession. The officer must have “deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior which a liberal education stimulates”³, thus multidisciplinary is required for a good scientific analysis of the civil-military relations.

But in order to have a satisfactory level of harmony between the military and the society there should be a certain level of compatibility
between the military’s professional ethics and the political ideologies embraced by the elites and the society as a whole. From Huntington’s five ideal-types of military power – ideology and military professionalism, certain are more connected with the western liberal models, the other with the Prussian-like authoritarian ones or even the totalitarian pattern. As an example, the USA before World War II was characterized by anti-military ideology, low military political power and high level of military professionalism. During the WWII, the configuration changed: anti-military ideology, great level of military political power and low level of military professionalism. Bismarck’s Prussia seems to offer a much better situation: pro-military ideology, huge military political power and high military professionalism, while the totalitarian regimes had anti-military ideology, low military political power and low military professionalism.

On the other side, Morris Janowitz, one of the main founders of the American military sociology, does not agree with this thesis, by arguing that the officers body has passed through a fundamental transition to the “constabulary” model, resembling to the police forces, which organize and apply violence in strictly controlled and limited circumstances and retain close links with the society they are called to protect. The army should be analyzed, in his view, in a dynamic pattern which is able to describe the transformation of the whole society and its effects on the armed forces which are part of this one. The professional military, members of the constabulatory force, thus ready to be deployed in remote operations theaters, are bound to be more and more politicized, as a consequence of the huge transformations with the social structures and technology. The military will follow the transformations of the whole society but without a neutral, apolitical and technical status. In Janowitz’s opinion, the member of the constabulary force he depicted “is subject to civilian control, not only because
the rule of law and tradition but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration within civilian values.”

The relations between the society and the army were analyzed later by the American sociologist Charles Moskos Jr., which envisaged the dual aspect of these relations: divergence but also convergence. The Army is seen as a pluralist entity and there are, on one side, the “institutional” pattern versus the “occupational” one. Some of the contractual military staff chose the military profession as a vocation and life aspiration, this is the institutional model, other did it in order to earn their daily bread and to have a remunerated job. The Institutional/Occupational (I/O) hypothesis has been developed mainly as a tool to promote comparative historical studies of military organization and military transformation. If the 19th century era saw the flourishing of the modern nation-state and the military serviceman integrated into the national mass armies, benefiting from the industrial power of the developed countries, the end of the 20th century saw the post-modern globalization era and a new “soldier”, which is a professional, more connected to the civil society and less organically linked with the state apparatus.

According to Dragoslav Popa, a Romanian analyst of the military issues, there are two main models of the civil-military relations: the “communist” or “authoritarian” pattern and the “western” (liberal) one. Marian Zulean identified three basic models: the liberal pattern, the communist and the interventionist ones. We will use Zulean’s model as we consider it more comprehensive.

The Communist/authoritarian model is basically characterized by such features as the “confusing legal framework, meant to consolidate not only the formal, but also the informal power of the Com-

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munist Party’s leadership”, a “focus on coercion rather than consent in implementing and legitimizing policies, ensuring the Communist Party’s control over the armed forces”, “a (mostly conscription-based) military establishment whose leaders held significant political influence”, “an authoritarian political system, concentrating the power in the publicly unaccountable leadership of the Communist Party”, “a virtually non-existent civil society.”

The political elites in a single-party state control the armed forces and use the state ideology and apparatus to transform the army into a simple instrument of the political power. The officers are poorly prepared and professionalized, mainly extracted from the lower levels of the society; they have a reduced prestige and power within the society.

The communist regime was brought by the Soviet Red Army in Romania, as the local Communist party has only some thousands members in 1944. Thus, there was a Sovietization of the Romanian armed forces since 1945, at the same time a de-professionalization of the old interwar army, because of the numerous purges which eliminated the high and medium officer ranks, accused of belonging to the bourgeoisie and to have supported the anti-USSR war effort between 1941 and 1944, when Romania had been an ally of Nazi Germany. After 1945, as an example, more than 100 generals were arrested and some of them killed on orders of the communist regime.

It is interesting to investigate also the academic research. During the years 70’ of the previous century, a first generation of Romanian military sociologists emerged, working especially within the Center for Studies and Research on History and Military Theory. Unfortunately a sad event put an end to this generation of sociologists – the Faculty of Sociology of the University of Bucharest was suppressed in 1977 and reopened only after the 1989 Revolution.
Western (or liberal) models of civilian control over the military are based on the view that “the armed forces are by nature hierarchi-
cal structures and thus inherently undemocratic and, for that reason, have to be brought under democratic control.” These models are also characterized by several key features like “a relatively clear legal and/or institutional framework regulating the relationship between civilian authorities and the military”, “a democratic political system, providing the mechanisms to ensure the free expression of people’s will in a majority of situations and to facilitate public scrutiny of military actions”, “a (mostly professional) military recognizing the legitimacy of the political system and the rule of law, and acknowledging the need for its own political neutrality as an institution (i.e., politically non-partisan)”, “the subordination of the armed forces (i.e., the General/Defence Staff) to the Government, through a civilian-led Ministry/Department of (National) Defence, and to the civilian Head of State (i.e., a clear chain of command, with civilian leaders at its top), and a significant role for the Parliament in making decisions on military (especially budgetary) issues; the existence of a civil society, involved in a public debate on military issues.”

But, as Dragoslav Popa and Marian Zulean clearly state, the western models are very heterogenous, so the NATO and EU states are not all alike, each retaining specific features.

The interventionist model is typical for Latin America, South Europe, Central Asia and Africa – the military intervene in the political life using coups d’Etat, instauring military dictatorship: Brazil, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Pakistan etc. The military replace corrupted and unpopular civilian regimes and are seen as “rescuers” of the nations. The military pretend and also believe that their corporate interest is the same as the national interest, thus being extremely repressive with the
interests of the independent civil society. Socio-economic cleavages but also ethnic ones could favor a military intervention against civilian leadership and regime change.

Of course, there are segments with the society which are supportive of the military taking power, but other ones fear that military could “swallow” the civil society and annihilate the democratic mechanism forever.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{Post-Communist Romania}

During the communist regime, as Marian Zulean observed, there were three main periods of the national armed forces: the sovietization era (1945-1965), the professionalization period (1965-1979) and the deprofessionalization one (1979-1989).\textsuperscript{15} As Nicolae Ceauşescu had opposed in 1969 the Warsaw Pact invasion in Czechoslovakia, he needed more professional soldiers, with a national patriotic ethos, to deal with the threat of a Soviet invasion (or a Western less likely aggression). The Army was a specialized body which was theoretically able to resist a foreign attack, being supported by the “whole people” (the “fight of the entire people” doctrine – \textit{levéé en masse}). But because of the heavy political interference in the military doctrine and organization, one cannot say that the Army was fully professional. The Romanian defense industry began to produce almost all the necessary range of conventional weapons, with the aim of autarchy which reflected Romania’s isolation within the Warsaw Pact. Romania did not leave the Pact but reduced at a minimum level its military participation and planning within this structure led by USSR. Territorial defense and the general mobilization of the nation were the main pillars of the defense doctrine. The real enemy was more likely to be USSR
or the Warsaw Pact than USA and the “alliance of capitalists”, as NATO was labeled.

After 1980, Ceaușescu turned the armed forces into a production force within the national economy by forcing soldiers to work in agriculture and house building, while diminishing their level of military preparedness, their level of life and the professionalism. Against the possible revolt of its own people, the regime used the special secret police forces, the infamous Securitate, a fact which indicated the rapid delegitimization of the communist doctrine and the need to resort to coercive force more and more frequently.

The Romanian Army passed through the 1989 revolution in a controversial way, as it has been accused by a part of media and political class for doing the “dirty job” of Ceaușescu’s regime in the first days of the popular revolt (17-21 December). Later, the Army changed the sides and colluded with the population, in the streets, against the national-communist dictator and the decrepit communist regime. But the armed forces in 1989 were oversized (more than 300,000 military on duty), prepared for a conventional total war of territorial defense, and unable to deploy forces for the new kinds of war (guerilla, ethnic-religious war, separatist conflicts, anti-terrorist operations, peace-support operations, “failed states”, uncontrolled migration, organized crime and various “other than war operations” etc.) which became quite frequent after the Cold War.

When Romania left behind the communist era and embraced the first democratic institutions, emphasis was put on transforming the Romanian armed forces structures and standards to correspond to the western-style of society, to the democratic-liberal values.
The Constitution of 1991, later revisited in 2003, foresaw the separation of powers within the state, the president being the chief commander of the armed forces. The text clearly stipulated that the Army is subordinated only to the people’s will, with the aim of warranting the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy.

In Romania, the Parliament elaborates the laws on national security and defense, it also approves the participation of the military forces in missions abroad. The commissions on defense, public order and national security of the two chambers debate the laws and approve the military budget. The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces and the leader of the Supreme Council for Defense of the Country, as warrant of the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

The Supreme Council for Defense of the Country (SCDC-CSAT) has been set up in 1924 (when the King was the supreme ruler) and recreated in 1991, led by the President and comprising the minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, heads of the intelligence services etc. Later, in 1994, the Law of National Defense no. 45/1994 widely defined the principles of national defense and named the responsible institutions. The Law no. 415/27 June 2002 concerning the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council for Defense of the Country allowed more guarantees for the civilian control on the armed forces. It replaced the old law no. 39/1990, one of the first laws which allowed the unitary coordination of the defense policies in Romania. Marian Zulean observed that in 1991 five of the ten members of the SCDC-CSAT were civilians, while in 2008 only one is a military.

The vice-president of the SCDC-CSAT is the prime minister, who is also the main responsible for the civilian protection. The Constitu-
tional Court and the Court of Accounts are also tasked with verifying the legality of the national security documents and policies.

The much needed expertise on national security, civilian and military, academic and practical, was provided by the National Defense College, a structure set up in 1992 to prepare civilian experts in security studies to be appointed as decision-makers within the state institutions but also mass media, private corporations etc. The NDC was put under the authority of the MoD, but also the President of Romania, and became a very prestigious institution.

The collapse of the communist regime has been a crucial event for the historic fate of Romania, because it put an end to the geopolitical dependence on the Soviet sphere of influence and reshaped the general framework of the national security paradigm. After the Warsaw Pact dissolution, Romanian political decision-makers tried to avoid the security vacuum situation, because the Russian withdrawal was not followed by an immediate Western (EU and NATO) expansion to the West. Several scenarios had been taken into account: permanent neutrality, membership in a Russian-led security block, alliance with other Balkan/Central-European states and NATO integration.

The pre-1990 defense doctrine was a “touts azimuths” concept, based on mass-army and heavy capabilities with a view to deter or resist a foreign aggression. After the end of Cold War, the new security environment and the prospect for integrating the Trans-Atlantic space suggested Romania needs a new kind of forces structures and a different defense doctrine. This changes within the world strategic environment, coupled with the main national goals of NATO and EU membership and the role of “security producer/anchor” Romania assumed in regional stabilization through preventive diplomacy/crises-
management and peace-support operations, favored the so-called “de-mythization”\textsuperscript{19} of the classical image on the armed forces’ role in assuring a strictly autarchic national defense, in favor of multinational military co-operation and international peace missions under UN, NATO, EU leading or in a “coalition of willing” format.

The first step in the way of ensuring a full civilian control on the armed forces was made in 1994, when for the first time a civilian was appointed as minister of National Defense (mister Gheorghe Tinca). After this moment, all the ministers and state secretaries within the MoD were civilians. Civilians personnel was appointed to leading positions within the MoD, which were by tradition reserved to top-rank military staff. In 1990-1991 Romania signed the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE) as part of the Warsaw Pact, but after the Pact disappeared this treaty allowed spectacular weapons reductions and the enhancement of mutual trust between East and West. There were tendencies of reform within the Army itself, a good example being the controversial Committee of Action for the Democratization of the Army (CADA) made up by young reformist officers who rejected the old practices inherited from communism and militated for the elimination of the high-rank officers who had supported the communist repressive regime during the revolution, for a transparent and fair promotion system for the military personnel. The fact that the first democratic regime in 1990-1992 reacted with such vehemence against CADA suggests that the political leaders were not prepared for a radical reform on a western style since the beginning.\textsuperscript{20} But the gradual orientation towards NATO and EU favored the reformist mind stream in the long term.

In January 1994, Romania was the first former-communist state to sign the PfP agreement, therefore a great emphasis was put on achiev-
ing the full compatibility with the NATO states armies (standards, procedures, doctrine). In order to achieve the national interests, it was absolutely necessary to start the process of transforming and modernizing the national armed forces, a fact which was necessary for reaching interoperability with NATO members states and with the partners countries. Transforming a state’s armed forces like post-communist Romania meant down-sizing the them, improving the recruitment and the qualification processes and prepare the military and civilian personnel for fulfilling the new missions required by the international/regional security environment and the partnership with NATO. Professionalization of the national armed forces within a democratic state refers to the substitution of the conscripts by hired (enlisted) personnel, and the specialization of the military and civil personnel on specific activities, thus increasing the global performance within the army, but also setting up a military organization respectful towards the political leadership and the rule of law. The professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces “will assure a modern and effective defense system for Romania, which embodies(...) the mutation from an autarchic defense concept, strictly territorial, to a concept for collective defense and forces projection in remote theaters and operations”\textsuperscript{21}. Romania should be prepared to participate in all NATO missions, including high-intensity combat actions, and, in this context, the current system for generating the force which is not adapted any more to the national political and military goals has to be replaced.

Romania assumed also the Conduct Code of the CSCE/OSCE in 1994, which had a special chapter on the civilian control of the armed forces.

The main reasons for adopting the professionalization process could be listed as follows: the relative obsolescence of major total war
in current world affairs, the confidence building measures, the NATO membership requiring niche specialization, economic factors, adjustments to deal with the Revolution in Military Affairs, the new globalized security environment with its focus on non-military risks and asymmetric conflicts, peace-keeping and nation-building missions and strategies led by NATO and EU. NATO states offered the best example for Romania, as almost all of them had professional downsized armies, with a high level of training and preparedness and sophisticated military equipment. In the 90’s it became clear that Romania did not have potential powerful enemies in the neighborhood, thus the risk of a classical inter-state war diminished on the short and medium term.

The doctrine was gradually changed to allow the evolution from an autarchic and strictly territorial defense concept to collective defense and projecting security in remote theaters, in the benefit of the whole Euro-Atlantic space.

Therefore, the Romanian Army gradually adapted its structure, composition and doctrine for these missions, understanding that world peace and national security are inter-connected and security has become, in the words of former national defense minister, Ioan Mircea Pașcu, an “indivisible public good of all (countries –m.e.) to be defended where it is threatened”(…)“We don’t wait until the threat come to us and then to take appropriate measures. This is the contemporary thinking and it is one of the most representative features of the new security environment”22. Therefore, involving the Romanian Army in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq or Africa means enhancing Romanian national security at the global level of security. As Romania belongs to the peace and stability area of the world, guaranteed by NATO article S, its endeavor towards the defense of national
security interests will further pass through projecting peace and security in the remote troubled areas, thus avoiding destabilizing spill-over effects.

A NATO member state’s professional army must be able to perform specific missions (credible deterrence or defense of the national territory, collective defense, peace-support operations etc.), to maintain an effective combat expertise capacity, to respect the democratic legal framework which determines the relations between the military and the political class within the state and to have a transparent guidance for the promotion in ranks in accordance with the merit criteria.

In 1989, Romanian Army had more than 223.000 active personnel (about 190.000 privates, 38.045 officers, 36.747 NCOs, 115.837 conscripts - plus 31.879 civilians) and 800.000 (more than 500.000 reservists) in case of mobilization. The beginning of the reform of the armed forces process was difficult, as it was launched at the beginning of the years 90s. But in 1999, there were 207,000 and in 2003 about 140,000.  

The first steps of the professionalization process consisted in depoliticizing the military organism and ensuring the democratic control, keeping in mind the key-idea of a visible separation between military and political competences, correcting the lack of a coherent personnel management concept, setting up criteria for transparent and efficient recruitment and promotion of the personnel. A “pyramid” model was adopted as standard, stipulating fewer figures for the highest ranks than for the lower ranks. At the end of the last century, before the enhancement of the military reform process, there were supplemental ratios of personnel, especially in the area of ranks like majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels. The redundant personnel were to
be pensioned, or to be reconverted or transferred. In 2001, the phenomenon of “exceptional promotion” was finally eliminated as a mean to depoliticize the armed forces and foresee transparent criteria and procedures for promotion. The political and military decision-makers allowed the starting of the process of attracting civilian experts into the army, understanding the need to bring civilian expertise capacity in key-areas like economy, defense planning, security analyze and scientific research within the social sciences. Therefore, highly-educated civilians belonging to the academic community and diplomacy began to receive leadership functions related to socio-politic expertise which was not strictly military. Civilian politically-designated leaders commanding military chiefs is the logical reflect of the democratic structure of the Romanian state, mainly of the core-concept of civilian control over the military.

Romania made substantial efforts to adopt, until becoming a NATO member, of an unitary military education and training system which would correspond to the NATO strategy, doctrine, procedures and standards, so that in 2007 all forces would be trained and educated within this system. In 1995, the Concept for reforming the military education was adopted, with the aim of improving the professionalization level of the personnel, through intra-system education and recruitment of civilian personnel. In 1990-1991, Romanian armed forces participated in their first multinational peace-support operations, in Kuwait and Somalia.

The recent experiences of the participation in multinational missions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that the available technique used by our forces needs a period of 2-3 years of training for a good knowledge; therefore the conscripts are not well-adapted for such missions, only the professional soldiers. Anyway, in the long run
the costs for a professional army are lower than for a conscript’s one because the training and education of troops is not repeated each year for each generation of conscripts and the technique (capabilities) is used more carefully, for a longer period. The money will be better used for endowment than for training. The reserve forces should be fewer than the active forces and they could be put into the fighting theater in case of war, at the third rotation (therefore it will be a 6 months cycle for training)24.

A strong emphasis is put on the knowledge of foreign languages (especially English and French), in order to ensure complete interoperability between national forces and allied forces. Near 1,500 Romanian militaries (officers and warrants) have benefited training courses in Western states till 2000 and the figure expanded the last years. The learning of foreign languages by the personnel who will occupy core-functions within NATO structures is a top-priority and one of the Partnership Goals assumed by Romanian Army25. We should mention the Order of the Minister of National Defence no.M61/5 June 1999 for the approval of the ‘Concept for learning foreign languages, for organizing and carrying on programmes for learning foreign languages within the Ministry of National Defence’26 associated with the ‘Plan for implementing the interoperability goal PGG 0355 I, but also the document named “The catalogue of functions requiring English knowledge”, in accordance with the PGG 0355 I (‘Linguistic Requirements’)27. Within the National Defence University of Bucharest, there is a British-Romanian Preparation Centre where our personnel learn English and the United Kingdom of Great Britain also co-operate with Romania within the PfP Regional Centre for Preparation. The Regional Centre for the Defence Resources Management in Brasov benefits from the constant support of US Army and the courses there are taught in English.
Romania already adapted the system of military education and training system in order to fulfill NATO requirements and set up a Preparation and Simulation Center. All the joint combined forces preparedness documents will be revisited between 2003-2005. They must be compatible with NATO standards, procedures and doctrine.

Another preoccupation is the computer learning process, absolutely indispensable for the C4I system. The Romanian Army works for preparing a core of highly-educated specialists in informatics that are educated within the military system or taken from the civil life.

The main directions to be followed in order to accomplish the military affairs reform, aiming at NATO membership, are: the improvement of the leadership, the down-sizing and restructuring of the armed forces in accordance with the Western model, the human resources management in accordance with allied standards and criteria, a good management of the defence resources, the modernization of the military equipment through accurate procurement policies and the improvement of the C4I (communications, control, command, computers and information) etc.

On the other side, Romania’s national security cannot be isolated from that of the rest of Europe, our country continuing to be a provider of regional stability in a security environment characterized by uncertainties and challenges, as well as by predictable risks. The Armed Forces “will undergo a process of modernization aimed at manpower restructuring and providing it with modern combat equipment.

The core-document of Romania’s security, the National Security Strategy, in its 2001 version, stipulated that, in the realm of national defense, one of the main policies is “the efficient management of hu-
man resources and the restructuring of forces, concomitantly with the enhancement of the professionalism of armed forces personnel and the modernization of military education.”

The structure of the Romanian Armed Forces depends, of course, on the main characteristics of the international and regional security environment and the corresponding risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

The National Security Strategy 2006, which is still valid, stipulated that “during the last decade, the military body passed through a huge process of reform, modernization and reshaping with the aim of creating credible and effective defence capabilities” and our country wants to have “a modern, professional army, well sized and equipped, with mobile and multifunctional expeditionary forces, easily deployable, flexible and effective ones.”

The revisited Romanian Constitution officially endorsed through referendum in September 2003 maintained the stipulation that “citizens has the right and duty to defend Romania” (chapter III, art.52, paragraph 1) but eliminated the stipulation that “military service is compulsory for men, Romanian citizens who are twenty years old, excepting those cases mentioned by the law”, replaced by “conditions for fulfilling the military service are settled through organic law” (paragraph 2). The Ministry of National Defence eventually abolished the compulsory military service in 2007, while another ministries and agencies within the national security system (Ministry of Interior, Romanian Intelligence Service) wanted to keep some conscripts for specific tasks. Since January 1st 2007, the Romanian Armed Forces therefore replaced the old conscription system with the voluntary pattern, in which professional military are joining the armed forces after a rigorous selection. In this respect, the Law no. 395/2005 on the suspension of the compulsory military service and the transition
to the voluntary military service during peace time was completed by the Law no. 384/2006 regarding the status of the soldiers and enlisted ranks.

Anyway, the revisited Constitution offered the necessary framework for the professionalization of Romanian Armed Forces until 2007.

The Directorate of Human Resources Management is that structure of the MoD which ensures the leading of the military promotion, candidates selection and recruitment system, the improvement of the normative framework in the aim of integrating the Euro-Atlantic structures, the co-ordination of the military education system and of the foreign languages teaching system, international co-operation for preparing the human resources\(^{33}\). The policy for restructuring the personnel (military and civilian) has some key-goals, such as: the drastic downsizing of the high-ranks officers, the increasing of number of the NCOs and contractually hired military and the gradual diminishing of the number of conscripts\(^{34}\).

According to the Military Career Guide which was adopted in 2001 the military personnel was organized on a pyramid-pattern, with a weight of ranks as follow: 0,8% generals, 4,2% colonels, 12% lt. colonels, 15% majors, 27% captains, 41% 1\(^{st}\) lieutenant, 2\(^{nd}\) lieutenants. The ideal ratio between officers and NCOs is 1/3 and till 2007 the ratio will be like this within the Romanian Army. The weight of officers between under-lieutenant and captains should be about 68%, whereas the weight of NCOs between sergeant and warrant officers must be situated over 50%\(^{35}\). Currently, an Individual Military Career Guide and a Civilian Career Guide are under way. Romania has made significant progress in introducing a better Military Career Manage-
ment System. Therefore, the Military Career Guide essentially presented new opportunities for an open and transparent career management system, as a consequence of the change of the Law concerning the military personnel status.

Another core-document is the “The Concept on human resources management in the Romanian Armed Forces”, endorsed by military decision-makers at the end of 1997. This document focused on very important features of the ROAF professionalization. First, it stipulates the rehabilitation of the military career, in accordance to evolutions in the human resources management of the modern states, then it is about more transparency and equal chances in the selection and promotion of military cadres, the access to posts according to military ranks, the rehabilitation of the NCO corps, a recruitment and selection system that favors those candidates with clear potential for developing a career a.s.o. The result of implementing the appropriate measures was that, since 2001, the number of NCOs exceeded that of the officers but there are still much work to do, in order to reach the 3/1 ideal ratio. By example, in 2002 there were within the ROAF 19,374 officers, 28,257 NCOs, 20,500 contractually hired military, 32,700 conscripts and 28,000 civilians. The main goals of the modernization of the human resources management system are: rehabilitating the military career, defining the functions in connection with military ranks, following the pyramid pattern, enhancing the professionalization process to reach full interoperability with NATO armies, revalorizing the NCOs status and transforming them into the army’s “back-bone”, setting up a recruitment and selection system which would bring in the most capable candidates etc.

For the period 2004-2006, the Human Resources Management Policy was to increase the number of NCOs in order to achieve a 3 to 1
ratio between NCOs and officers\textsuperscript{38}. The Training of NCOs will continue to be a top priority. In order to build a professional NCO corps, focus has been placed on their training and the involvement of personnel trained in collaboration with US Marine Corps. The American training pattern, in accordance with the NATO standards and training methods, has been generalized in all the NCOs military training institutions.

In 1999 started the implementation “process of the military profession promotion, recruitment and selection system”, a process aimed at sustaining the selection of candidates for the military education institutions. The planners which proposed this system had in their mind the idea of increasing the number and quality of military career aspirants, the improved selection and the better contact between the Army and the public opinion. The Membership Action Plan of NATO played an important role.

A new concept of planning was introduced which deserves to be mentioned as it allowed for an enlargement of the civil expertise in realms that were previously and traditionally the exclusive field of the military, even if they have clear political implications\textsuperscript{39}. The highly educated civilians (graduated, postgraduate etc.) should benefit of a career route comparable with that of the officers.

New education institutions were created by the Romanian MoD, in cooperation with foreign partners, to enhance the interoperability with NATO. The Regional Department for Studies on the Defense Resources Management (DRESMARA) was set up in Brasov, adding to the already existent NATO-PfP Regional Centre for Preparation from Bucharest. The Human Resources Department (DMRU) launched the concept regarding the preparation of civilian and military staff for filling the positions with NATO structures.
One of the most important and sensitive issues was to motivate and attract civilian security experts to work within the MoD by means of giving attractive career opportunities and payments. The civilians were given equal opportunities of professional improvement. The civilians (graduates of higher education) have to be employed as an effective and less expensive alternative to military specialization, for jobs that do not require expressly military experts.

A more sensitive issue was represented by the starting of cuts in personnel. The down-sizing process was accompanied by professional re-conversion and social assistance programmes. Following the stipulations of the concept regarding the human resources management, in 1998 over 11,000 officers and warrants left the Army from which about 75% were over 40 years old. In June 2003, more than 60% of the Romanian armed forces were already professional, a clear sign that the professionalization process had begun. As Worth to mention that the reductions were accompanied by programmes for professional re-conversion and social protection. Since 2002, the MOD, in co-operation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity, the National Agency for Full Employment and the US Labor Department, set up some “business incubators” in order to help the personnel who left the Army to begin earning their lives.

The first revision of forces structure took place in 1997, after the NATO Summit in Madrid, when a document known as the Concept on restructuring and modernizing Romania’s Armed Forces (FARO 2005/2010) was drafted and approved. FARO is a program for restructuring and modernizing Romanian armed forces and it was first finalized on June 30, 1999 together with the framework-plane of action from 2000, given the fact that the planning methodology at that time was based on the planning processes, programmes and goals in-
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tegration, adaptability, dynamism, credibility and transparency. This core-document foresees 2 phases during this long process. The first one took place between 2000-2003 and it consisted mainly in restructuring and operationalizing the forces at a minimum level needed for ensuring a credible defense capacity, in accordance with the interoperability standards which Romania committed to fulfill through its PARP (Planifying and Analysis Process of the Partnership for Peace).

The second phase, scheduled to take place between 2004-2007, consisted in modernizing the armed forces through endowment and in the continuing the setting up the structure operational capacity, following the planning and the finalization of some major endowment programmes.

It was foreseen the necessity of reducing the national armed forces to less than 112000 militaries, while operating an increase of combat capabilities, of education and instruction, as well as reaching, in perspective, the interoperability with NATO forces, concerning the standards and procedures. Before 1998, the key-aspects of the military reform focused on some areas like: upgrading the national systems of command, control, communication and information (C4I), acquiring the STAR communications system, improving the air defense capabilities through the installing of the FPS 117 radars and the opening of the ASOC Center (Air Sovereignty Operations Center, 1999) etc. The General Staff in co-operation with British and American experts fixed in 1998 the project of a structure composed of 112,000 military and 28,000 civilians to be set up in 2003.

Therefore, in 2001 the Supreme Council of National Defense approved the armed forces restructuring according to the scheme: Active Forces, Territorial Forces and reserve Forces or, simply put, Op-
erational Forces and Territorial Forces. The operational one consist in an Early Warning Force (about 5000 military), a Rapid Reaction Force (5000 military) and a Supplement Force (40,000 personnel) which are adapted for national defense and collective security operations (under NATO, ONU, EU or OSCE co-ordination). Territorial forces are made of low preparation forces and reserve forces and their size amounts to 45,000 whereas the preparedness at the personnel level will be about 50-70% and at the equipment level 70-100% and ready for fighting in 90-360 days. In 2003-2004, the decision was taken to renounce to reserve forces and 161 structures were disbanded, from which 25 commandement, 12 big units and 52 military units.

The aim of Romanian military and political decision-makers is to set up an army which is not only suited for defense but for both security and defense because the security missions to be carried out in an international format need adequate capabilities and planning system, a good management of available resources. The “Programme Force 2003” concept was adopted in 1998 and it foresaw a structure of ROAF composed by 112,000 military (18,000 officers, 40,200 NCOs and warrant officers, 22,300 professional grades, plus 31,500 conscripts) and 28,000 civilians.

The “Goal Force 2007” project, launched in 2001, is the force-level mix of service capabilities that meets Romania’s security requirements and international obligations at an optimum level, within the resources that are expected to be available. The framework for developing this new force structure was approved by Romania’s National Supreme Council for Defense in April 2002.

At the same time, by the end of the year 2002, the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff developed a more detailed
force structure and implementation plan to be executed over the period 2003-2007. Therefore, in 2010, the Romanian Army has a size of 90000 militaries and civilians, of which 75000 military personnel and 15000 civilian personnel (representing 60% of the previous structure). Until 2003, Romania planned a force strength of 112,000 military personnel and 28,000 civilians and this goal has already been reached.

Nowadays, this process is a very dynamic one. The „Goal-Force 2007” was professionalized in a ratio of 90% in the realm of the personnel and 100% in the field of the endowment. It must be ready for fighting in 7-30 days, rapidly deployable and flexible. Worth to remember that in 2003, already 47% of the military were volunteers. These structural changes were made within the PfP’s PARP (Process for Analyse and Planning), aiming at the increase of interoperability with NATO forces.

It is widely admitted that the Goal-Force 2007 managed to create a reduced, flexible and more capable one, having the potential for satisfying the national security requirements, for contributing to international peace operations, for contributing as a producer of regional security. Thanks to the correlation between the fighting capacity and the resources, the Force will be able for deploying itself and sustain in the theatre and for developing an enhanced operations capacity.

A new NATO compatible and integrated Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluating System (PPBES) was in force since 2002, in accordance with the Law on the National Defence Planning no.63/2000, and has been fully implemented in 2003-2004 within the Romanian Defense Ministry. Its main instrument, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), is now periodically reviewed with every new budget projection for the coming years, following an integrated con-
cept for planning and administrating the financial resources, in order to ensure that the Romanian Armed Forces will continue to reassess objectives and priorities for optimal effectiveness. The reviewed DGP covered the 2002-2008 timeframe. In order to ensure that the defense budget can properly support these objectives, a budget profile representing 2.38% of the Gross Domestic Product was established for 2002 (or more than $1 Billion) and remained at this level during the period 2003 - 2005. Unfortunately, the economic world crisis beginning in 2008 led to the defense budget falling under 1.5% of the GDP, Romania being seriously affected by the characteristics of this crisis.

Generally speaking, the transformation and modernization of Romanian Armed Forces were enhanced especially after the Washington NATO Summit (1999) when the allied states decided to launch the Membership Action Plan to be implemented by each candidate states through its national yearly programme of preparing for membership. After Romania had been invited to become a NATO member at the Prague Summit in 2002, the 4th and 5th MAP cycles continued to devote resources to the priority areas already identified in previous cycles, assuming new objectives which focused on ensuring that Romanian military forces were fully able and ready to assume the responsibilities and accomplish the tasks associated with Alliance membership. In October 2003 was launched the national plan for implementing the 5th MAP cycle, the last before Romania become a full NATO member, in April 2004.

In 2004, over 60% of the armed forces were already professional, while 161 structures had been abolished, from which 25 command headquarters, 12 big units and 52 military units.

The Law on the national defense planning (the Law no. 473 from 4 November 2004, which abrogated the Decision of the Government
no. 52/1998, stipulated that the defense planning is based on the political decisions adopted by the president of Romania, the Parliament, the Government and the other national institutions with prerogatives in the realm of defense.

Speaking at the end of the year 2010, one can say that civil-military relations in Romania are evolving through a western way, a NATO-inspired one, even if Romania does not have its own model. The military tend to accept the political rule of civilians and some of them even the economic sacrifices asked by the Romanian government to cope with the dangerous economic crisis. On the contrary, they are not very happy with the lost of almost all of the economic privileges which was part of the Romanian government fight against the effects of the crisis. The military generally speaking feel like a social body, there is a certain amount of common identity and solidarity and they seem to have “absorbed the principle of the supremacy of civilian power.” Military neutrality vis a vis political life may be seen as a long term success in Romania, together with the strict subordination to the state political authorities.

**Conclusion**

Civil-military relations within the Romanian Armed Forces re-emerged after the end of Communism, in 1989, using the NATO-inspired models and the general tendency of westernization of the whole society and economy.

Since 1989, Romanian armed forces were the subject of a long and gradual process, with the purpose to transform them from a “total defense” operational concept (all azimuths) to a “power projection”
Projecting power abroad is not at all a risky behavior but a guarantee for preserving our national interests. Beyond the defense of national territory and population, the Romanian Army became a valuable tool for fulfilling external multi-national missions – peace-support operations, nation building, thus helping the international community to rebuild failing states.

As a NATO and EU member, Romania should be prepared to fulfill any kind of mission that the allies could decide, depending on the international and regional security environment. Only in this way Romania will be ready to face the 21st century with all its problems and transformations.

Finally, the best guarantee of a full and fair civilian control on the armed forces is to have powerful, legitimate and effective civilian political institutions and highly professional military which keep their distance with the political arena but do not lack civic spirit. The opinion pools in Romania show that between 1991 and 2009, the Army and the Church were the most trusted institutions. This could be a positive point for the future of the Romanian Army and the civil-military relations.

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7 Janowitz, op. cit, p. 420.


12 Dragoslav Popa, “Civilian control over the military in Romania and Bulgaria 1989-2004”, in *Transforming National Armed Forces in South East Europe – From So-
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cial to the Military Challenge, 9th Workshop of the Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe, Vienna and Sofia, April 2005, pp. 82-83.

Idem, p. 83.


15 Zulean, Armata si societatea in tranzitie, p. 43.


17 M. Zulean, Militarul si societatea, p. 38.

18 Dragoslav Popa remarked that the lack of enough civilian experts on military security “has been one of the greatest problems faced in setting up a system of democratic civilian control over the armed forces.” – D. Popa, “Civilian control over the military in Romania and Bulgaria 1989-2004”, in Transforming National Armed Forces in South East Europe – From Social to the Military Challenge, 9th Workshop of the Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe, Vienna and Sofia, April 2005, p. 110.

19 George C. Maior, Mihaela Matei, “Armonizarea relatiilor civili-militari in Sud-Estul Europei: Analiza asupra planificarii apararii in Romania”, Mediterranean Quarterly, 2003. Fragments of this study were reproduced under the title “Romania si noile concepte de securitate si aparare” (Romania and the New Security and Defense Concepts), in Ziua, 17 June 2003, p.4


25 The PGG 0355 aims at ensuring a level of linguistic knowledge at the level no.3333, in accordance with STANAG 6001, for all the units commanders and General Staff personnel within the operationalized structures and PfP personnel, the crews of navy and airships, the staffs of the various forces categories a.s.o., till the end

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of 2002. STANAG 6001 is an unique evaluation system for listening, speaking, reading and writing.

26 This Concept has 2 parts: the ‘non-intensive programme’, carried on in military schools, colleges and defence academies where English is compulsory and the ‘intensive programme’ carried on within the foreign languages learning centres of the armed forces categories and within the Foreign Languages Centre of the National Defence University.

27 An evaluation made in 2002 indicated that 4,208 (15%) officers and 1,064 NGOs were English users, from which 2354 fulfilled the requirements of the Level 1111 and +1, 1914 corresponded to the Level 2222+2, and 952 to the Level 3333 +3

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30 The National Security Strategy of Romania, The President of Romania, Bucharest, 2001, p.28. The aim of this process is to establish Project Force 2005, which is to be more compact, efficient, effective, flexible and compatible with NATO standards. Such a force, when completely operational, will be capable of defending the interests of the Romanian state in the best possible way”


32 Constitution of Romania, revisited by the revising law from September 18,2003, All Beck Publishing House, p.15.

33 http://dmru.mapn.ro/activitate.html

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35 Idem.
37 Idem, p.86.
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40 *** Rebuilding the Armed Forces for the 21st Century, IPSDMH, INSS, EADIF, Bucharest, 1999, p.84.
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50 George Cristian Maior, Mihaela Matei, Defense Policy Developments: Old and New Missions for the Armed Forces, in Occasional Papers, No. 1(1)/2002, Institute for

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