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**WHOSE PROFESSIONALISM?:  
SEPARATING THE INSTITUTIONAL  
ROLES OF THE MILITARY & POLICE**

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With the end of the Cold War, Western reform assistance to Central and East European militaries reflected US and NATO concerns regarding potential challenges to still unconsolidated “democratic” authorities and new dangers arising from non-traditional and non-military transnational threats. In order to guard against the first danger Central and East European authorities were encouraged to introduce, as quickly as possible, the Western liberal model of democratic civilian control. To address the second concern, regional authorities were encouraged to better integrate military functions with those of law enforcement.

In encouraging better military-police integration, US assistance was relying significantly on habits learned in interaction with Latin American transition states and militaries. Although differing greatly from each other, the threat in both cases was non-traditional for the military. In Latin America, the threat was internal leftist insurgencies rather than a foreign military threat. In Central and East Europe, it was organized crime, terrorism, weapons trafficking and drug smuggling. The US approach to the training of Latin American militaries was, in fact, to have them

perform police functions. Encouraging better military-police integration has the same practical effect.

Herein lies the central codependency issue for transition military and police institutions. Central and East European transition elites must contend, on the one hand, with the still predominant institutional confusion resulting from the previously authoritarian government's intentional convergence of military and police roles undertaken in order to ensure the internal defence of their regimes. On the other hand, they must also contend with the almost diametrically opposite pull of Western advice to better integrate their military and police in order to combat the new transnational threats that have arisen with the collapse of communism and the opening of their borders. Unless preventive measure are taken, the practical consequence of this is also likely to reflect earlier experience in Latin America where military institutions assigned policing and internal security functions did not retain their political neutrality and became more directly involved in domestic politics.

Approaching the problem from the perspectives of history and theory, this study disaggregates the institutional roles of the military and the police and examines the different nature of their professionalism in terms of their respective tasks, expertise and social responsibility. It then analyzes the practical consequences of institutional convergence on professionalization and institutional behaviors. It concludes with some observations and recommendations regarding current civil-military relations theory and practical advising.

## The Nature of the Problem

What was the military designed to do? In primitive societies the 'military' function was originally defence of the community against external foes<sup>1</sup>. The body which fulfilled that mission retained this defensive aspect even as it added conquest, plunder, revenge, etc to its functions<sup>2</sup>. It did these other things in addition to community defence, not in place of it. With the creation of the nation-state in the 18th century, the military was essentially re-assigned the defence of the broader all-inclusive community as its primary *raison d'être*.

Along with this outwardly-oriented role, however, instances of the military's use in a myriad of domestic roles remained commonplace. Examples of the military behaving as traditional national defender, supplementary force to the police, independent internal security force, partisan political actor, government usurper, and vigilante terror organization coexist in the contemporary world. Given the broad range of observable military behaviour, social scientists were faced with the problem of what to include in a definition of "normal" military functions. Whereas the external-defensive function was deemed too narrow a descriptor, casting the net too broadly risked the inclusion of both "normal" and "pathological" behaviour in the definition.

The dilemma of reconciling the wide variety of military behaviour led social scientists to reject an ends-based or norm-derivative definition based on a consensus that the military could not be usefully defined by either its function

or jurisdiction. The military, it was thought, could be better defined by the means it employed. As first formulated by Harold Lasswell, the “unique specialty” of the military was the “management of violence”<sup>3</sup>.

Lasswell’s definition greatly influenced the way we think about civil-military relations and subsequent theorists have modified that definition only at its margins. For Samuel Huntington, the military’s special skill was “the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions”<sup>4</sup>. According to Morris Janowitz, military uniqueness consisted of its expertise “in war-making and in the organized use of violence”<sup>5</sup>. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande asserted that the military’s “designated functions” are “maintaining internal order and waging war”<sup>6</sup>. It became common practice for civil-military relations theorists to define the military as the unique manager of violence whose primary functions included those tasks that required the concentration of coercive force, both external defence *and* the maintenance of internal order.

The problem arises because, contrary to this closely held precept of civil-military relations literature, the military is neither the only institution specialized in the management of coercive force nor the only custodian of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. Ever since the institutional differentiation of the civilian police from the military in the 19th century there have been at least two “specialists in the management of violence” at the command of the state/polity<sup>7</sup>.

Comparing our current definition of the military with the standard means-based definitions of the police institution

highlights the problem. According to Carl Klockars, the police institution is distinguished by its “general right to use coercive force by the state within the state’s domestic territory”<sup>8</sup>. David Bayley describes the police as that institution “authorized by a collectivity to regulate social relations within itself by utilizing, if need be, physical force”<sup>9</sup>.

Police specialists universally differentiate the police from the military primarily by its jurisdiction - the legitimate target of its activity. In doing so, they delimit a specific jurisdiction for the military as well. As Bayley notes: An army is publicly constituted to use force, just as police are, but its jurisdiction is external to the collectivity. An army uses force to defend a community from threats outside itself; a police force protects against threats from within<sup>10</sup>.

The adoption of Lasswell’s means-based definition effectively subsumed the police within the military, rendering it definitionally impossible for civil-military theory to distinguish between the two institutions. The theoretical ramifications of this over-inclusiveness have, in turn, hobbled conceptual development and generated further confusion as unresolvable debates were sparked over such central questions as whether increasing professionalism encouraged or discouraged the intervention of the military in domestic politics. Conceptually blinded to one of the central phenomena under observation, social scientists were led into theoretical *cul-de-sacs*, such as the search for a new paradigm to explain “Communist” civil-military relations.

More significantly, this theoretical shortcoming continues to be reflected in Western practice in the form of mili-

tary advice and assistance to transition states in the realm of civil-military reform with frequently counterproductive results. The failure to disaggregate military and police functions at the theoretical level has encouraged the tendency of political elites in transition states to assign internal security tasks to their military institutions.

The problem, already debilitating during the Cold War, has been further exacerbated in the post-Cold War period as the need for better integrating military functions with those of law enforcement to manage non-traditional and non-military transnational threats has become a central concern in the US and Western Europe and in the advice they purvey to Central and Eastern European authorities<sup>11</sup>. This flawed theoretical usage has directly influenced US (and NATO) military advice and assistance to transition states for almost half a century. Its imprint is clear not only on the US military assistance programmes (MAP) to Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, but also on military reform advice and assistance extended to the post-Communist states during the 1990s as well<sup>12</sup>.

It is therefore not surprising that the tendency to consider the military and police functions as loosely interchangeable remains a hallmark of the new Western-trained defence experts and officials in Central and Eastern Europe. According to one of the first civilian defence officials in Poland, the military is the “organization designed to bring sheer force to bear in the most efficient way possible, whenever the state requires it”<sup>13</sup>. Likewise, a leading Czech defence expert affirms that the military is the

“instrument used to ensure state sovereignty and security, as well as a means of intervening in politics and sustaining or changing the domestic situation”<sup>14</sup>.

The continued failure to more clearly delineate military and police functions in theory and practice places transition state elites in a double-bind, reinforcing a relationship of codependency. On the one hand, transition elites must contend with the still predominant institutional confusion resulting from the previously authoritarian government’s intentional convergence of military and police roles undertaken in order to ensure the internal defence of their regimes. Unfortunately, what was deemed unacceptable for a non-elected government is often readily embraced by weak elected governments as legitimate. Unless and until a clearer delineation is established, which excludes the military from internal security tasks and demilitarizes the military, this confusion will continue to generate problems. At the same time, transition authorities must also contend with the almost diametrically opposite pull of Western advice to better integrate their military and police in order to combat the new transnational threats that have arisen with the collapse of communism and the opening of their borders<sup>15</sup>.

The failure to recognize that two institutions with different roles and different types of professionalization are engaged in the management of violence partially reflects lags in the development of theory in the two fields. The theoretical study of the military began in earnest in the 1930s and the now classic reference works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer appeared at the end of the 1950s and

beginning of the 1960s<sup>16</sup>. In contrast, literature on the police only began appearing in the mid 1960s, partly due to concerns of police abuse during the civil rights movement in the United States<sup>17</sup>. By the time theoretical works on the police made their debut in force, civil-military theory was already set upon a track with a research agenda conditioned by the broad, inclusive definition of the military institution<sup>18</sup>. One artifact of this developmental pattern is the consistent reference and explicit comparison to the military found in police literature and the contrasting absence of any references to the police as an institution in civil-military relations literature<sup>19</sup>.

Although police tasks were subsumed within standard definitions of the military's role, specialists have long recognized that assigning police functions to the military is problematic for civil-military relations and particularly for civilian control of the military. Without identifying it as institutional convergence, Alfred Stepan noted in 1971 that the expansion of the military's role to include internal security corresponded to an increased military role in domestic politics as well<sup>20</sup>. More recently, Michael Desch notes that militaries with internal security missions tend to produce "the worst pattern of civil-military relations"<sup>21</sup>. Likewise, Juan Rial asserts that since the tasks of maintaining "internal order and the defence against external threats" are so "entirely different," their combination "runs the risk of eroding the military's professional ethos and of reducing its accountability and subordination to elected civilian authorities"<sup>22</sup>.

### Differentiating the Military & the Police

In spite of an increasingly generalized recognition that the assignment of police tasks to the military complicates civil-military relations, specialists do not ordinarily investigate the reason why they do so. Having subsumed police functions within the military, civil-military relations theory simply does not focus on the difference between the military and police institutions or the different types of professionalization necessary to each. This shortcoming is accompanied by corresponding inability to recognize when those institutions are undergoing convergence or understand what the likely consequences of convergence are for military professionalization and for the civil-military relationship generally.

The first step in understanding why police functions are problematic for the military is to consider why the police function differentiated from that of the military in the first place. The standing European army, the innovation which serves as the model for contemporary military establishments throughout the world, made its appearance in the 15th century and became the prevalent form of military organization during the 17th century<sup>23</sup>. Separate police bodies appeared only at the end of this period and another 200 years were required before the police was institutionally differentiated from the military as a general practice in the 19th century<sup>24</sup>. Significantly, the police institution appeared during the same period that the military began its own process of professionalization. The professionalization of

the military thus occurred as a process separate from the institutionalization and professionalization of the police.

Prior to the 19th century it was common practice to employ the military as a police force. Policing in its earliest form lacked any specialization, training or recruitment and was “scarcely more than the not always successful use of military force to quell particularly troublesome instances of collective resistance to impositions such as enslavement, conscription, and taxation”<sup>25</sup>. Loyalty was often problematic as locally-recruited military personnel were found in many instances to sympathize with ‘rebels’ protesting new taxes, for example. Especially problematic were the typically bloody and disproportionate consequences of employing the military for crowd dispersal and internal security, which tended to foster bitterness, hostility, and distrust towards political authority<sup>26</sup>.

Separate civilian police organizations came into being largely in response to the self-defeating effects of using the military for law enforcement and internal security tasks<sup>27</sup>. On the one hand, recruitment policies and training proved inadequate to ensure the loyalty necessary for internal missions. On the other hand, the military’s primary expertise – the management of deadly violence – ill-served the goal of transforming the polity’s power into authority. According to Austin Turk:

As military dominance and jurisdiction are achieved authorities consolidate their position by instituting a system in which internal control is accomplished by the process of policing instead of the more costly and less effi-

cient one of military occupation... Occupation confirms power; policing transforms power into authority<sup>28</sup>.

Contemporary military participation in peacekeeping and peace-support missions represents only an apparent anomaly, although such missions also reflect dual role tensions. During their first decades of existence United Nations peacekeeping forces were plagued by officers’ resistance and general complaint that: “We are soldiers, not policemen”<sup>29</sup>. Only with the creation of specialized training centres and programmes since the late 1970s did professional soldiers generally accept service in peace-keeping forces as not undermining their military status, although problems still remain<sup>30</sup>.

In many respects peacekeeping missions resemble astute postwar occupations, such as that practised by US forces in Italy and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, which sought to create an acceptable civil authority along with the restoration of civil order<sup>31</sup>. In other respects they are closely akin to the imperial policing of colonies where long-term political considerations influence military operations, where use of minimum force doctrines are in effect, and where civilian power continues to exercise control but “finds the forces on which it normally relies insufficient.”<sup>32</sup> For the purposes of this argument, the most important common feature of military occupations, imperial policing operations, and peacekeeping and peace-support missions is that participating military units are operating beyond their own borders and amongst a population with which they do not identify closely.

Throughout the historical development of the military the management of deadly violence remained its defining expertise. However, the creation of the nation-state and the introduction of mass armies based on conscription also introduced a more attractive ideology of the military as national defender. The new ideology fundamentally modified what has been variously termed the “motivational orientation” or “social responsibility” of the professional military. Providing defence against external threats was perceived both by members of the institution and by society at large as a noble and necessary task<sup>33</sup>. The near universal appeal and legitimacy of this task enabled the military to rely on general conscription, rather than on a more narrow recruitment geared towards ensuring a more specific political reliability, for its manpower.

This shift in recruitment base added yet another impediment to the already existing danger that domestic engagement of the military’s deadly force could lead to massive fatalities. Simply put, with the consecration of external foes as the legitimate target of its activity, the military became less available for use internally. Involvement in police actions was now even more likely to set military personnel against social groups with which they identified, thus increasing the risk of disobedience, defection and institutional disintegration. A distinguishable line dividing “us” from “them” had been drawn at the border of the nation-state.

The more limited jurisdiction of its fully-legitimate activities allowed the military, at least hypothetically, to remain neutral and ‘above’ partisan domestic politics. In defending

the community against threats it was also defending the polity which commanded it. Where the military is not already heavily politicized, its natural tendency is to protect this non-partisan status and resist attempts by the polity to place it in opposition to society or any of its component parts. Where this resistance proves insufficient, the military tends to split into various groups as its personnel are forced to contend with issues ordinarily considered resolved within the institution, such as the necessity of obedience to orders and the legitimacy of political authorities<sup>34</sup>.

In contrast, the police were institutionally disaggregated from the military at least in part to ensure a more specific responsibility to a sub-sector of society. From its initial differentiation the police institution was designed for the defence and reproduction of the domestic *status quo* in terms of the established public order, commerce and routine patterns of social interaction<sup>35</sup>. Having been “designed for use on behalf of the politics of social order and continuity,” the police were never a politically ‘neutral’ institution<sup>36</sup>. While policing came to be more narrowly circumscribed during the course of its institutionalization, the police remained an integral “part of the political economy of ruling”<sup>37</sup>.

The evolutionary differentiation of the police was encouraged by the technical requirements of the new specialization. Primary among these were the employment of gradations of coercive force and greater reliance on non-violent persuasion in order to reproduce social order on a daily basis in the least disruptive manner. As Richard

Ericson notes, contemporary police commonly “negotiate order, variously employing strategies of coercion, manipulation and negotiation”<sup>38</sup>. The use of deadly violence, the main expertise of the military, is strongly discouraged by internal regulations, administrative practice, and broader legislation, and many police officers complete their careers without ever firing a shot while on the job.

Police are typically granted broad discretion over when, where and against whom to enforce the law and they exercise their responsibilities as individuals. The development of investigation/intelligence techniques to allow more effective monitoring of society for the prevention of crime/threats to the social order has considerably increased the potential of the police as an independent political actor. As one authority notes, since “effective countermeasures presuppose adequate knowledge, and because it is impossible to know in advance just what information is useful, the scope of intelligence gathering is inherently limitless”<sup>39</sup>. The central coordination of this intelligence capability in national police forces lend them a much greater political weight and generally a more expanded political role than that of decentralized police forces.

Regular military personnel are not trained to use anything less than deadly force and there are no negative repercussions for its legitimate employment. Military personnel commonly enjoy far less discretion regarding when, where and against whom to employ this force, and they exercise their responsibilities as part of larger military units rather than as individuals. Military intelligence bod-

ies in democratic states are typically prohibited from or greatly circumscribed in the collection of information pertaining to civilian targets within their nation-state.

The military and police also differ in the accountability of their personnel before the law. In the fulfilment of their primary responsibilities military personnel operate according to a separate set of laws pertaining to war and its prosecution. Transgression of these laws, of military regulations, or of ordinary laws are typically judged in special military courts. The reason for this exceptionalism is that military personnel have a special status arising from their voluntary renunciation of certain civil rights in exchange for special protections. The command hierarchy of the military, and to some extent the trust necessary for effective *esprit de corps*, requires soldiers to accept their orders unconditionally. For this reason, in cases where criminal orders have been issued and carried out, legal responsibility decreases as rank decreases.

In contrast, police are generally subject to the same legislation and juridical procedures as any other citizen of the state. A key factor in the development of policing into a profession was its redefinition from a military force employed for internal security purposes to an organization tied to the legal system. Instead of being “an extension of the violence potential of the state,” the police now became “an appendage of the law”<sup>40</sup>.

Given that the legitimate target of police activity is within the society or community itself, the social responsibility/motivational orientation of the police profession dif-

fers significantly from that of the military profession. Whereas the principal target of military activity is an external foe, police activity is directed primarily against an internal foe. The police not only have the expertise appropriate to their task, they are also granted the legitimate mandate for using their expertise against a portion of the domestic population. Instead of forming a more definite barrier between society and an adversary lying outside the frontiers of the state as in the case of the military, the line between “us” and “them” shifts within society itself (and between society and the polity.)

From the civil-military relations perspective the political nature of policing is the most interesting for its impact on professionalization. The protection and reproduction of a given political, legal and social order necessarily ties the police closer and more uniquely to the polity that endorses it. Since the social status quo is always unequal, inequitable and/or unjust for at least some portions of society the police are inherently partisan and politicized<sup>41</sup>. In spite of the mostly public service role they play in contemporary democratic societies, the inherently partisan nature of the police often limits their general status among society and limits their potential for playing the role of ‘neutral’ arbiter between competing political forces<sup>42</sup>. State authorities tend to create layers of police with at least one (usually the best funded) devoted explicitly to combating threats to the state<sup>43</sup>. Such state security agencies are tied even more directly to the polity and are thus referred to as political police, even though they may principally police

offences that are not political in and of themselves. The line between “us” and “them” is drawn more clearly and closely to the boundary around the polity itself.

It follows that the use of the military as an internal security force will necessarily politicize it. Institutionalizing such roles for the military will lead to the professionalization of a ‘military-police’ institution. Military-police institutions are generally not employed as surrogates for regular police in order to fulfil the function of reproducing social order on a daily basis. Rather, such hybrid institutions are typically assigned the role of a political police defending the regime against internal threats.

Authoritarian governments uniformly conflated their police and military institutions so that the primary function of the military was expanded to the defence of the status quo. Under the Soviet-imposed Communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe the military and the police were joined together as the “Armed Forces”<sup>44</sup>. The convergence of internal and external defensive tasks was fostered by the militarization of the police and the regular transfer and cross-assignment of military and police officers. Combining the inherently partisan and politicized police role with the more neutral military function was consciously pursued as a manner of politicizing the military, with the aim of tying it closer to the polity and making it a more reliable defender of the regime against both external and especially internal threats.

Current civil-military theory permits and provides justification for the convergence of these institutions. Alfred

Stepan’s conceptualization of the military’s “old” and “new” professionalism illustrates the problem. If Stepan’s “old professionalism” is taken to be military professionalism, with very little adaptation, his “new professionalism” conforms to police professionalism.

|                                      | <b>Military Professionalism</b>                                       | <b>Police Professionalism</b>                     |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Institutional function               | External security   | Internal security                                 |
| Skills required                      | Highly specialized military skills incompatible with political skills | Highly interrelated political and military skills |
| Impact of professional socialization | Renders the institution politically neutral                           | Politicizes the institution                       |

Adapted from Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion”, in Alfred Stepan, editor, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, p.52.

The problem is therefore not a “new” professionalism so much as a “dual” professionalism or even “retro” professionalism, harking back to the time before the military and the police were differentiated. The potential impact of such convergence on democratic transition and consolidation is enormous. Rather than playing their role as mutual checks and balances in democratic systems, institutional convergence leads to the creation of a centralized power base that can easily challenge the elected political authority<sup>45</sup>.

A military which accepts internal security functions

cannot preserve their political neutrality over time<sup>46</sup>. As a police role is institutionalized ‘military’ professionalism is transformed into some hybrid of ‘police’ and ‘military’ professionalism that encourages the new institution to intervene in domestic political struggles. Military professionalism converges with police professionalism as institutional roles and tasks converge.

Herein may lie a central motivation for *praetorianism*. Under the contradictory pull of dual professionalism where internal security roles are assigned to the military, it may be unavoidable for the military to adopt an independently interventionist role in domestic politics. In an effort to reconcile their professional social responsibility, which directs them to remain ‘above’ politics, with police tasks that require them to undertake repressive actions against a portion of society, the only means of guaranteeing that the military is not serving partisan political purposes is if the military itself determines when, where, and against whom to direct the repressive force of their institution. In this sense, *praetorianism* may be a common reaction of ‘military-police’ institutions seeking to reconcile their dual institutional roles<sup>47</sup>.

This is a possible interpretation of the pattern evident in Peru (1964-1974), in Brazil (1964-198), in Chile (1973-1989), and in Argentina (1976-1983), where the enhanced internal security roles of the military contributed to their seizure of power. *Nolens volens*, the regular assignment of internal security functions to the military may be preparation for military government as the institution seeks to rec-

oncile its politically neutral orientation with the partisan task of defending the status quo.

Transition states are particularly vulnerable to problems arising from the failure to recognize the different types of professionalization that institutions fulfilling military and police functions undergo. As noted above, transition state elites commonly inherit military and police institutions that have been intentionally combined to some degree. Of equal importance, however, is the often exclusionary nature of politics in transition states, where political institutions are unable to produce compromise between conflicting political interests and governments uninterested in establishing dialogue or pursuing consensus with their oppositions.

Exclusionary politics are commonly accompanied by the politicization of state institutions. Indeed, there is an observable tendency among transition state authorities to seek the politicization of the military for their own ends. In Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, civilian politicians have often employed the military as an instrument against domestic political opponents in one way or another<sup>48</sup>. Since the nature of transition politics frequently results in the underdevelopment of mechanisms for dialogue and compromise as a means of avoiding and managing conflict, demonstrations and mass protests are easily perceived as threats to the political system. The convergence of three factors: exclusionary politics, politicization tendencies regarding the military, and the appearance of perceived internal threats to the sitting

administration/government, may set the stage for the use of the military as an internal security force<sup>49</sup>.

Western military advice based upon muddled theory has proven itself counterproductive in circumstances ranging from assistance aimed at countering armed insurgency to advice on establishing civilian control of the military where governments have felt threatened by unarmed demonstrations and trade union protests. In the 1960s and early 1970s, internal security was the “dominant rationale and objective” of US military assistance programmes (MAP) to Latin America<sup>50</sup>. While the long term effects of that aid did indeed assist in defeating insurgency and promoting rural development, it also directly contributed to the creation of military-police institutions and may have contributed indirectly to the installation of military regimes in the area<sup>51</sup>.

This dilemma lies in the fact that military counterinsurgency specialists in the West are trained specifically to deal with, or train others to deal with, insurgencies in other states<sup>52</sup>. Counterinsurgency for them is fundamentally a task of external security. There is no convergence effect for the Western military specialist operating against adversaries beyond the borders of his state<sup>53</sup>. The situation is very different, however, for the militaries in those states where counterinsurgency operations are required since they are the most suitable institutions to carry them out. These counterinsurgency/internal security tasks inexorably lead to the convergence of military and police institutional roles.

There are no easy solutions to this dilemma. Effective

counterinsurgency often requires the structure and coordination of a fully military organization. However, explicit understanding and recognition of the convergence problem beforehand may lead to the development of more effective mechanisms for monitoring and counter-balancing the increased powers of the resulting military-police institutions. Beyond that, the caution of Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner is worthy of mention: As soon as possible, the military must also be removed from surveillance, policing, mediation, and intimidation of domestic political life. This may well require a far-reaching reorganization of the intelligence apparatus, with institutional separation between foreign intelligence and domestic criminal and antiterrorist intelligence. It also often requires substantial professional enhancement and training of the civilian police (and possibly the creation of an intermediate riot-control and antiterrorist force)<sup>54</sup>.

Insurgency/counterinsurgency is the “hard case” of the Western assistance – institutional convergence – dysfunctional civil-military relations codependency. In cases where armed insurgency is not an issue as, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe, civil-military relations theory as it currently stands also produces ambiguous and contradictory advice on the domestic use of the military. It is not uncommon for theorists/advisors to clearly state the need for the military to be protected from “politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance partisan interests and their own power,” and then insist that the military has “an obvious duty to protect governments from illegal

interventions by any party, including those residing within the state”<sup>55</sup>. Even where it is explicitly noted that political neutrality and non-partisanship require the military to forgo the temptation to consider itself “the ultimate guardian of the state’s social/political order,” it is also recommended that the military understand its legitimate role as servant “of the government in power” rather than “as servant of the state”<sup>56</sup>.

There have been at least four incidents in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of Communism where sitting governments used or attempted to use the military as an internal security force against what they deemed to be threats to the political system. In all four incidents the respective governments justified their actions as a legal response to illegal challenges to the existing political order and legitimate government. Of these, perhaps the most notorious was Ceausescu’s mobilization of the army under the false justification of foreign invasion in December 1989 in order to defend his regime against widespread popular demonstrations. After initial confusion fed by security police provocations, the military sided with the Romanian population against Ceausescu determining the outcome of the revolution and preserving the military institution at the cost of some 1,000 lives, over 20% of which were military casualties<sup>57</sup>.

In Hungary, in October 1990, the Democratic Forum government of Jozsef Antall attempted to call in the military against striking transport workers. The move was blocked at the last moment, and a civil-military crisis narrowly averted,

by the veto of President Arpad Goncz, an opposition party member, with strong backing from the military.

In March 1997, the administration of Sali Berisha called in the Albanian Army against protesting victims of government-tolerated pyramid schemes. Berisha justified his move on the basis of the illegal nature of the demonstrations and labeled the demonstrators “‘red communist units’ directed by foreign intelligence agents.”<sup>58</sup> The military disintegrated, splitting into three factions with the bulk of the soldiers siding with the protesters<sup>59</sup>. This disintegration was accompanied by the opening of the military’s weapons stores to the public, and the subsequent proliferation of arms among the population contributed to the general breakdown of law enforcement capabilities and social order, necessitating the intervention of a number of NATO and non-NATO militaries in the UN sanctioned *Operation Alba* in April 1997.

In January 1999, the administration of President Emil Constantinescu and his Democratic Convention government in Romania ordered the army to deploy against miners protesting their exclusion from decisions on the timing and geographic distribution of mine closures<sup>60</sup>. After declaring the protest illegal the presidency and the government alleged that the miners’ demonstration constituted a “threat to national security” mounted by the “neo-communist” opposition and “foreign forces”<sup>61</sup>. A last minute decision of the Prime Minister to accept discussion with the miners avoided a direct confrontation between the military and the miners but did not avoid resentment of senior offi-

cers towards the government and administration for what they deemed illegal and inappropriate orders to deploy against a socio-economic protest<sup>62</sup>.

In all of these cases, political elites believed that since they possessed the authority to command the military their intention to employ it as an internal security force was fully justified. Truly, from a constitutional and legal perspective the government/administration possessed the right to call on the military in support of the civil administration. The issue, however, is not who can command the military to do what, nor is it to whom the military owes service, but rather for what purposes it can be legitimately used without dysfunctional repercussions. If the military is to be kept out of domestic politics then, as Diamond and Plattner conclude: “Combating crime and controlling violent or illegal domestic protests should not be the business of the military”<sup>63</sup>.

The problem of practical advising derived from faulted theory is further complicated when advisers “overlook” the fact that their recommendations are based on equivocal results, both for the goal intended and for civil-military relations<sup>64</sup>. A case in point is advocacy of an increased role for the military in drug interdiction. There is an identifiable body of opinion emerging in the US, for example, that is seriously critical of the utility of such missions and of their impact on the health of the military and the civil-military relationship<sup>65</sup>.

The dilemma of Western advice is most difficult regarding problems that require greater military-police cooperation because most Western advisers are apparently obli-

ous to the fact that these transition states have not yet fully re-differentiated their police and military institutions. The predictable result of their advice in such cases, when it is taken to heart, is to renounce reforms aimed at re-establishing this clear differentiation. The attitude of Romania's Democratic Convention government towards the two institutions during 1999-2000 illustrates the problem.

When the miners' marched toward Bucharest, neither the defence minister (who, as former interior minister, had previously commanded the police and gendarmes) nor the deputy defence minister were hesitant in proclaiming their willingness to order the military to use "all of the means at its disposal" to compel the miners to stand down<sup>66</sup>. At the height of the crisis, the deputy defence minister was transferred to the post of interior minister, transferring with him three army generals. In the public discussion after the events both the interior minister and the justice minister advocated a blanket amnesty for the military regarding the 1989 revolution in order to facilitate its use by the current government for internal security tasks<sup>67</sup>.

Subsequently, long-discussed plans for the demilitarization of the police were shelved during the rest of 1999-2000 since it was considered that such a move would diminish both police effectiveness and military-police cooperation during a period of increasing crime and multiplying non-military threats to the national security. Fortunately, within the first six months of their mandate following the November 2000 elections, the new administration of Ion Iliescu and his Social Democratic government adopted an

unambiguous stance against the internal employment of the military (aside from natural disaster relief) and introduced legislation de-militarizing the police, while the new defence minister instituted measures to depoliticize the military<sup>68</sup>. However, there is nothing immutable about these policies. Unless Western advice is unambiguous in this regard, the potential return of the Democratic Convention or any of its constituent parties currently in opposition to government in 2004 could roll-back this progress and recreate the same dysfunctional policies.

Means-based definitions of the institutions of state coercion, initially conceived as a way of more accurately defining the military, have actually complicated our understanding of both that institution and of the police, particularly where their roles and professionalization converge. It may be more useful to theory development to reconsider the adoption of a norm-derivative definition. The military, although it is often called upon to perform other tasks, is that institution of state coercion designed for use against external foes and it accomplishes this task primarily through the management of lethal violence. It is only in concentrating on this restricted role and jurisdiction that the military can remain politically neutral over the long term. Peacekeeping and peace support missions, the modern variant of imperial policing albeit for nobler ends, do not adversely impact that neutrality when they are confined to operations beyond the borders of the participating military institution.

The police, on the other hand, is the institution of state

coercion designed for use within the domestic community to defend and reproduce order on a daily basis. In order to accomplish their task the police employ gradations of force, relying primarily on negotiation and persuasive coercion but extending *in extremis* also to the use of lethal force. Because of the nature of the task, policing is an inherently partisan and political act. Therefore, the engagement of the military in policing/internal security functions necessarily politicizes it. Such politicization is counterproductive to democratic consolidation.

On the practical level, if codependency is to be avoided it is crucial that assistance and advising to transition states explicitly recognize and understand the central problem: military institutions assigned policing and internal security functions will not retain their political neutrality and will become more directly involved in domestic politics. It has been widely noted that civilian politicians in transition states, including new democracies, often seek to politicize their militaries in order to gain or retain the advantage in partisan political competitions. Calling upon the military to defend the political status quo during internal crises is the most concrete example of this phenomenon.

There are a number of concrete measures which can be taken to prevent such convergence. First, the police and its functions need to be fully separated from the military. Their tasks are essentially incompatible and combining them encourages inappropriate political intervention by the military. Second, and closely related, the police must be 'demilitarized' as soon as possible. Personnel cross-assignment must

end. The two tasks require two different sorts of expertise and result in two different sorts of professionalization.

Until separation and demilitarization are successfully carried out, the two institutions will not comprise part of the system of mutual checks and balances characteristic of democracies. Instead, they will represent a tempting institutional power base for challengers to the legitimate government. Until this separation is accomplished, advising that encourages closer or better integrated military-police cooperation in order to enhance the capability to deal with non-traditional, non-military transnational threats is also likely to undermine the process of institutional re-differentiation and compromise democratic civilian control of the military. Modes of police-military cooperation and coordination that have proven themselves effective for combating these threats in consolidated democracies cannot be simply transferred without unintended consequences. This is not to deny the utility or even the need for such cooperation and coordination. Rather, it is only to signal the need for careful consideration of its likely impact on professional identities and democratic consolidation in transition states.

Wherever possible, the military in transition states should be strongly discouraged from assuming any internal security functions and the civilian political leadership should be strongly discouraged from assigning it such roles. Given the tendency of civilian authorities in new democracies to enlist the military in the domestic political competition, it is advisable that the domestic use of the military is as strictly controlled as possible, for instance, by subjecting such use to the prior democratic approval of

elected legislatures, where both government and opposition have a voice, rather than arrogating such decisions to the executive branch (government or presidency).

### NOTES

- 1 See, eg, Maurice Davie, *The Evolution of War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929, pp.3 and 229. See also, Elman R. Service, *Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective*, New York, Random, 1962; and Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society*, New York, Random, 1968.
- 2 Kenneth Otterbein noted in his study of 46 primitive societies that the military fought for economic reasons in 37 cases, for social/prestige reasons in 15 cases, and for reasons of political control in 9 cases, whereas all 46 fought for defence of the community. Kenneth B. Otterbein, *The Evolution of War*, New York, HRAF Press, 1970, pp.66-67.
- 3 Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol XLVI, (January 1941), pp.455-468.
- 4 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, pp.11-12.
- 5 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1971, p.15.
- 6 Amos Perlmutter & William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.76, No.4 (December 1982), pp.782.
- 7 Lasswell implicitly noted the military-police duality in the titles of his subsequent work: "The Threat Inherent in the Garrison-Police State", in *National Security and Individual Freedom*, New York, 1950, p.23-49, and "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State," in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R.M. MacIver, editors, *Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science,*

*Philosophy, and Religion, 1939-1949*, New York, 1950, pp.323-328.

- 8 Carl B. Klockars, *The Idea of Police*, Beverley Hills, Russell Sage, 1985, pp.9 and 12. See also, Carl B. Klockars, editor, *Thinking About Police*, New York, 1983.
- 9 David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe", in Charles Tilly, editor, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, p.328.
- 10 Bayley in Tilly (1975), pp.328-329.
- 11 For example, both the US Army War College and the US National War College dedicated their annual strategy conferences in 2000 to the problem of homeland defence against these threats.
- 12 The rationale that drove US military assistance programmes is outlined in Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power, Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America*, Ohio State University Press, 1966. See also, Department of Defence, Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a US Policy Instrument in the Third World*, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1988.
- 13 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control", in Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.99.
- 14 Stefan Sarvas, "Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.26, No.1 (Fall 1999), p.103.
- 15 There is considerable trepidation over the empowerment of the military as law enforcers given the possibility for abuse and related threat to freedom even in the US. The first recommendation of the US Army War College conference was, in fact, to avoid granting the US military a greater law enforcement/internal security mandate "as a quick and easy solution to the complex issues surrounding homeland defence." Strategic Studies Institute, *Conference Brief: US Army War College 11th Annual Strategy Conference*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 11-13, 2000, pp.3-4. Similar concern is expressed in J.G. Diehl, *The Cop and the Soldier: An Entangling Alliance?*,

- Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 1997, Vol.1. See also, Geoffrey B. Demarest, *The Overlap of Military and Police in Latin America*, Fort Leavenworth, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1996.
- 16 Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession*, New York, Norton, 1937, is generally cited as the beginning of modern civil-military relations theory. The first editions of Huntington & Janowitz appeared in 1957 and 1960, respectively, closely followed by Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London, Pall Mall, 1962.
- 17 The evolution of police literature is discussed in David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Change in Contemporary Perspective", *Law and Society Review*, Vol.6, No.1 (August 1971), pp.19-112. Early landmark works include Michael Banton, *The Policeman in the Community*, New York, Basic Books, 1964; David H. Bayley, *The Police and Political Development in India*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969; Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; Bayley in Tilly (1975), pp.328-379; Peter K. Manning, *Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1977; and Herman Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society*, Cambridge, Ballinger, 1977.
- 18 It deserves note that political science neglected police theory more generally. One authority notes that: "One can find discussions of the structure of governments, the state, the meaning of stability and change, legitimation processes, control and coercion, yet the police, the agency which is central to how such policies are effected and what impact they have are notable mainly by their absence." Otwin Marenin, "Police Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.16, No.1 (October 1985), p.119.
- 19 See, eg, Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner, editor, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; John P. Lovell & David E. Albright, editors, *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy*, Westport, CT, Greenwood, 1997; David R. Mares, *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*, Boulder, Westview, 1998; and Constantine P. Danopoulos & Daniel Zirker, editors, *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc*, Boulder, Westview, 1999.
- 20 The "new look" professionalism was first noted in Luigi R. Einaudi & Alfred C. Stepan III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, #R-586-DOS, Santa Monica, RAND, April 1971, pp.6-7. It was refined in Stepan's, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion", in Alfred Stepan, editor, *Authoritarian Brazil*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, and his *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.
- 21 Michael C. Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions", in Diamond & Plattner (1996), pp.1.3-14. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol.1 (Autumn 1993), pp.38-43.
- 22 Juan Rial, "Armies and Civil Society in Latin America", in Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.56.
- 23 The standing army appeared in France with the establishment of the *Compagnies d'Ordonnance* in 1445, and in England with the "New Model Army" in 1645. Permanent "skeleton" regiments appeared in Italy and Spain in the early 1600s whereas a standing force was not created in Prussia until 1655-1660. Samuel E. Finer, "State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Army", in Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, p.99.
- 24 Again, France led the pack with a separate police in the 17th century while Great Britain, Italy and Germany did so in the mid and late 19th

- century. Bayley in Tilly (1975), pp.342-347. As Egon Bittner notes: "The timing of the foundation of the modern police is sequentially the last of the basic building blocks in the structure of modern executive government." Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models*, New York, Jason Aronson, 1980, p.102.
- 25 Austin T. Turk, *Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defence of Authority*, Beverley Hills, Sage, 1982, p.22. The specialized training and recruitment of the police continued to lag into the 20th century. British constables were first given training differentiated from military instruction only in 1907. Bayley in Tilly (1975), p.333.
- 26 For example, such literal overkill occurred in the Gordon Riots and the Peterloo Massacre in Great Britain at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century. Bayley in Tilly (1975), p.357. See also Thomas A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, London, Constable, 1978.
- 27 First in France, then in Italy and Germany, a separate military force possessing heavier arms and greater mobility - the *Gendarmerie* (*Carabinieri* in Italy) - was initially set up for policing purposes. This body was recruited, paid and trained by the various War Ministries but commanded by the Interior Ministries. In Italy, the *Guardia de Publica Sicurezza* was later created to replace the *Carabinieri* in large cities since the latter were "considered too rigid to handle the manifold duties of city policing." Bayley in Tilly (1975), p.348.
- 28 Turk (1982), pp.21-22.
- 29 Charles Moskos Jr. in Morris Janowitz & Jaques Van Doorn, *On Military Ideology*, Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1971, p.22. See also David N. Soloman, "The Soldierly Self and the Peace-Keeping Role: Canadian Officers in Peace-Keeping Forces", in Jaques Van Doorn, editor, *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, The Hague, Mouton, 1969, p.65.
- 30 See, eg, L.L. Miller, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia", *Armed Forces & Society*, No.23 (1997), pp.415-450.
- 31 See, eg, Harry L. Coles & Albert K. Weinberg, *US Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Washington, DC, Center of Military History, US Army, 1986.
- 32 See, eg, Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, London, Macmillan and Co, 1936, especially pp.1-33.
- 33 See, eg, M.R. van Gils, editor, *The Perceived Role of the Military*, Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1971, and van Doorn (1969).
- 34 Every military is characterized by a dual loyalty tension owing to its twin roles of defender of the nation-state (society) and servant of the central political authority. Finer (1962), pp.25-26.
- 35 As Philip John Stead notes, "until the nineteenth century, the word 'police' signified the internal governance of the community". Philip John Stead, *The Police of France*, New York, MacMillan, 1983, p.3.
- 36 Turk (1982), p.115. Likewise, David H. Bayley states that "police forces are the creatures of politics" in Bayley (1971), pp.91-112.
- 37 Marenin (1985), p.102. See also the "Introduction" in John D. Brewer, Adrian Guelke, Ian Hume, Edward Moxon-Browne & Rick Wilford, *The Police, Public Order and the State: Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, the USA, Israel, South Africa, and China*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1996, pp.xiii-xxxi.
- 38 Richard V. Ericson, *Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982, p.9.
- 39 Turk (1982), p.164.
- 40 Manning (1977), p.40. However, variations in the organization of police institutions are far more extreme than the almost universal structure of military forces. For example, the police in France and Italy are still considerably more tied to the state and subject to administrative control than those of Great Britain or the US, corresponding to the greater role of national police in politics generally.
- 41 Since their task is managing order, "policing is always politicized as order is always seen, by some, as unequal and inequitable." Marenin (1985), p.112. See also, Ericson (1982), p.7. The politicization is at times much more direct. For example: "For most of modern American police history, promotion as well as hiring and

- firing was almost exclusively a matter of one's relationship to the local political party in power." Klockars (1985), pp.58-60.
- 42 Marenin, for instance, describes the police function as "indefensible and necessary... indefensible because, so far, it has always been unjust; it is necessary because even injustice needs order". Marenin (1985), p.119. As Bittner point out, policing by necessity has "divisive effects in society" and the police must also contend with the stigma of constant dealing with "evil, crime, perversity, and disorder. Though it may not be reasonable, it is common that those who fight the dreadful end up being dreaded themselves." Egon Bittner, "The Police Charge", in Richard J. Lundman, editor, *Police Behaviour: A Sociological Perspective*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, p.39.
- 43 See, eg, Tom Bowden, "Guarding the State: The Police Response to Crisis Politics in Europe", *British Journal of Law and Society*, No.5 (Summer 1978), pp.69-88. While this phenomenon is universal, it is particularly evident among authoritarian states. See, eg, E.K. Bramstedt, *Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945.
- 44 As of 2001, the constitutions of a number of these countries still retained this overarching definition.
- 45 The danger is particularly great when the military is assigned tasks of domestic intelligence gathering. See eg, Christopher Clapham & George Philip, editors, *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, pp.142-144; and Stepan (1988), pp.14-44 especially.
- 46 As Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner note, the more the military is assigned "internal security functions, the greater the risks of its becoming embroiled in domestic political conflicts, and of its wielding democratically unaccountable power in civic life". Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.xxxi.
- 47 Classic works on praetorianism may err in considering the Roman Praetorian Guard to be military. Their role was confined to the protection of the polity – the Emperor – against primarily domestic threats, a role commonly performed today by state security police. See eg, Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1977, especially pp.2-29.
- 48 Michael C. Desch makes this point in Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.14. See also, Mares (1996), p.18; Anton Bebler, ed, *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1997; Elizabeth P. Coughlan, "Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.24, No.4 (Summer 1998), pp.519-533; and Sarvas (1999), p.114.
- 49 Mares (1996), p.18.
- 50 See, eg, David F. Ronfeldt & Luigi R. Einaudi, *Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement*, Report #R-924-ISA, Santa Monica, RAND, 1971, p.1.
- 51 The politicizing effects of such assistance were noted early on. See, eg, United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *United States Military Policies and Programmes in Latin America*, Hearings, June-July 1969, 91st Congress, 1st session, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1969.
- 52 See, eg, the programmes of the British Special Air Services' (SAS) Counter/Revolutionary Warfare Staff College at Camberley, England.
- 53 This also characterizes marginal cases such as that of Ireland, Corsica and Sardinia.
- 54 Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.xxx.
- 55 See, eg, the otherwise provocative and insightful argument in Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.26, No.1 (Fall 1999), pp.7-26, especially pp.13-14.
- 56 Frank E. Fields & Jack J. Jensen, "Military Professionalism in Post-Communist Hungary and Poland: An Analysis and Assessment", *European Security*, Vol.7, No.1 (Spring 1988), pp.119 and 139.

- 57 Larry L. Watts, "The Romanian Army in the December Revolution and Beyond", in Daniel N. Nelson, editor, *Romania After Tyranny*, Boulder, Westview, 1992, pp.95-126. See also, Romanian Military Archives, *Armata Romana in Revolutia din Decembrie 1989: Studiu documentar*, Bucharest, Editura Militara, 1998.
- 58 Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska and Carolina Fernandez, "The Army in Albania", in Danopoulos & Zirker (1999), p.210.
- 59 Denny Lane, "The Disintegration of the Albanian Army", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.9, No.2 (Spring 1998), p.19.
- 60 The mobilization required a parliamentary-approved government ordinance in the absence of an external threat. The "ordinance regarding states of siege and states of emergency", No.1/1999, was forwarded to Parliament on January 21, 1999, but was then withdrawn unapproved.
- 61 For administration charges see *Romania Libera* and *National*, January 27 1999, and *Adevarul*, February 6 1999.
- 62 Author's interviews. This resentment was widely discussed in the press and the government and administration made a series of public declarations to allay the tension. See, eg, *Cronica Romana*, February 26, 1999.
- 63 Diamond & Plattner (1996), p.xxx. See also Desch *in ibid*, p.26 and Rial *in ibid*, p.62.
- 64 This applies to insurgency and counterinsurgency as well. See, eg, Richard L. Rutledge, *United States Future Involvement in Insurgency: No Simple Model*, Carlisle Barracks PA, US Army War College, March 20, 1993.
- 65 See, eg, Carl H. Builder, *Measuring the Leverage: Assessing Military Contributions to Drug Interdiction*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1993; Gary C. Carlson, *Lost in the Drug Wars: Time for a New Paradigm*, Carlisle Barracks PA, US Army War College, February 9 1993; Michael F. DeMayo III, *Counternarcotics Campaign Planning: A Basis for Success or a Malaise for the Military?*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992.

- 66 *Cronica Romana* and *Curierul National*, January 20-21, 1999. The Romanian General Staff was not consulted beforehand.
- 67 See, eg, *Cronica Romana*, February 26, 1999.
- 68 Larry L. Watts, "The Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations", *Problems of Post-Communism*, forthcoming.

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